An intervention program for development of empathy in student teachers

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AN INTERVENTION PROGRAM FOR

DEVELOPMENT OF EMPATHY IN STUDENT TEACHERS

by

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the requirements for the degree of Doctor

of Philosophy in the School of Education.

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CERTIFICATE

I certify that the work presented in this thesis has not been submitted for a higher degree at any other university or institution.

Hedda Black.

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ABSTRACT

The primary concern of this study is to promote the development of student teachers' motivation, abilities and skills involved in empathic interpersonal relationships. The aims of the study are:

1. to refine the definition of the empathic interpersonal process

2. to identify the experiences that research has shown promote the development of this process

3. to develop and evaluate an intervention program that utilizes the experiences identified

4. to select appropriate evaluation measures.

A model of empathy, developed from Barrett-Lennard's conceptualization of empathy-in-action, or relational empathy, involving three phases and a number of processes, structures and skills is presented. The three phases identified are: 1) The attentional phase, which is concerned with establishing an empathic set. Maturity of moral judgment has been found to be related to this phase. 2) The experiential phase, which is related to the cognitive capacity to take the role of the other. 3) The communication phase, which is associated with the empathiser's communication of empathic understanding to the empathee.

The empirical study was concerned with the development and evaluation of an intervention program based on the above phases. One hundred and five students in a Sydney

teachers' college participated. The experimental group
(n = 54) and control group (n = 51) were tested at the
beginning and end of a 12 weeks semester. The program's
duration was 22 hours over 11 weeks. The three dependent
variables were maturity of moral judgment as measured by the
Defining Issues Test, empathy as measured by the Hogan Scale
for Empathy and communication of empathic understanding as
measured by the Index of Responding. The relationship
between two independent variables, sex of subject and authori-
tarianism and the dependent variables was investigated.

Results of the intervention program showed a
significant improvement in the students teachers' skills of
empathic communication and a small though significant
increase of their level of moral judgment. However, Hogan's
Scale for Empathy showed no significant change. There was
evidence that males and females responded differently to
the program. Authoritarianism was negatively related to
empathy.

The study shows that, within one semester, as a
result of this intervention program student teachers (both
male and female) improved their skill of empathic communication,
without significant personal structural change.

I reach out to you

across the void,

my fellow human being.

I rejoice with you.

I sorrow with you.

I am with you!

INTRODUCTION

The objectives of this report are two-fold. The first is to discuss, evaluate and refine the definition of the empathic interpersonal process. The need for such a discussion became apparent in the early phase of the litera- ture survey, which showed that meanings and specific operational definitions of empathy varied substantially from study to study. The second objective is to design and evaluate a teacher-training program for the development of empathic interpersonal relations or relational empathy in the teacher-pupil interaction process. It is intended that the design of the program be closely tied to relevant theory and research on the processes, structures and skills involved in relational empathy.

Purpose of the Study

There are a number of reasons why this report has focussed on the empathic interactive process in the class- room context. One is the increasing need expressed by pupils for more satisfying interpersonal relations with their teachers. The Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty and Education in Australia (June, 1976) high- lights the way in which school processes and structures often act against the needs and well-being of poor children. The result is that many are excluded from commitment to and extended participation in schooling. One third of the sample

of adolescents who had left school early, (before the
statutory age of 16) stated that they had done so with
"strong negative emotions about schooling sometimes reaching
"the point of explosion in frustration" (Fitzgerald, 1976,
p. 71). Most of the young people in the study of Melbourne
adolescents stated that schooling had failed to cater for
their real needs. Fifty-six per cent of them believed that
the prime goal of school should be personal growth and
understanding as a preparation for life and social develop-
ment. Their sense of frustration and alienation is expressed
in some of the following quotes (Fitzgerald, 1976, p. 71):

> "We were treated like a herd of cattle"
>
> "I was just another in 500. You don't
> get a chance to grow up, they make you
> feel like a kid. The teachers don't
> know your name or nothing."

Children spend a few days a week, for at least ten
years of their lives in close contact with teachers, whose
attitudes (toward them), values and interpersonal skills
often determine pupils' self-image, their sense of competence,
both academically and socially and ultimately their success
and failure in school. The Australian Study of Poverty,
Education and Adolescents showed the considerable value that
young people place on satisfactory interpersonal relation-
ships with their teachers. It seems imperative for teachers
to acquire some of the skills and attitudes which are relevant
to interpersonal relationships.

Another reason for emphasis on the empathic interpersonal process comes from the positive relationship that has been shown to exist between the conditions of empathy and warmth offered by teachers and a number of educationally important variables. Most of the research in the area has come from investigators Rogers, Truax and Carkhuff (discussed fully in Chapter 4). They postulated empathy as a core condition of effective interpersonal relationships between people signified in our society as helpers (teachers, parents, counsellors) and those designated as helpees (students, children, clients). Research investigations indicate that teachers who offer their pupils high levels of empathy facilitate their emotional and cognitive growth. High levels of empathy (as measured by the scales developed by Truax and Carkhuff) exhibited by teachers in the teacher-pupil relationship have been shown to be positively related to their pupils' academic achievement (Aspy, 1969, 1972; Kratochvil et al. 1969), children's adjustment to school (Truax and Tatum, 1966), children's open expression in the classroom and classroom behaviour (Carkhuff, 1971).

The development of empathic interpersonal relationship skills in student teachers is also important because of the modeling effect they have upon the development of empathy in their pupils. Research by Kohlberg (1963, 64, 66) and Turiel (1966, 69) has shown that maturity of moral judgment, an important aspect of relational empathy is promoted when children are exposed to models who exhibit mature levels of

moral judgment by focussing on motives for people's actions
as well as on reasoning used in moral judgment. Hogan (1973)
has pointed out that willingness to act on one's empathic
set depends on a person having received empathic treatment
at some time in his or her life. It is assumed that children,
who are exposed to models who take multiple perspectives,
who show an affective response to another's affect, are
likely to imitate these behaviours.

In a comprehensive review of research related to
the effectiveness of reflective parent counseling, Tavormina
(cited in Letourneau, 1978) reported a number of studies which suggested
that empathy is learned from parents who possess greater role-taking skills.
Greenspan (cited in Letourneau, 1978) found that parents who
were lower in role-taking abilities had children who had
relationship problems in school as measured by a social
competence scale.

Hoffman (1976) in discussing how one can promote
the development in children of the empathic response to
another's distress and awareness of the other's perspective,
stressed the importance of modeling. Empathic responding
is modeled by parents who communicate theirown thoughts and
feelings as well as the presumed inner states of persons to
whom they are responding empathically.

Deutsch and Susman (1974) also support the impor-
tance of modeling in the acquisition of prosocial behaviours.
It seems that, in spite of methodological inadequacies and
lack of firm evidence regarding the generalisability and

duration of modeling effects, families in which members model
and communicate expressions of affect and actually practise
helping others, have children who develop prosocially
(Aronfreed, 1968; Hoffman, 1976). The assumption is made
that the findings regarding the modeling effect on children
of empathic behaviours by their parents may be extended to
that by teachers.

Letourneau Gray's (1978) study of child abuse
provides strong support for the hypothesis that empathy is
an important mediating variable in the physical abuse of
children. She found that Hogan's empathy scale differentiated
between abusive and non-abusive mothers, when both groups
were exposed to a high stress situation. In view of the
high stress aspect of the teaching profession this study
seems to provide more support for designing programs for the
promotion of empathy in teachers.

Importance of the Development of Empathy
in Children

Interest in the development of empathy in children
has arisen from research indicating that empathy may be an
important mediating variable in various prosocial behaviours.
By its very definition "it is an interpersonal phenomenon
denoting a model of social interaction and social relation-
ship" (Feshbach, 1978, p. 3). Coke et al. (1977) concluded
that the cognitive and affective processes of empathy motivate
helping behaviours. Cognitive perspective-taking affects

helping because it increases one's empathic emotional response.
Hoffman (1978) in his work on altruism pointed to evidence
that empathy actually precedes and contributes to helping.
This is so because a person whose empathic response to
another's distress is aroused terminates the associated feel-
ing of discomfort and pain in himself by alleviating the
distress of the person with whom he is empathising.

Feshbach (1978) has reported that in a number of
separate investigations carried out within and outside of
the laboratory of the Empathy and Fantasy Project at the
University of California with children and adults, a con-
sistent inverse relationship between empathy and aggression
has been obtained (Feshbach and Feshbach, 1969;   Huckaby,
1972;   Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972, cited in Feshbach, 1978).

Support for the development in children of the
structure of reciprocity, characteristic of maturity of moral
judgment, and involved in the development of an empathic
set, comes from de Vries (1966). He suggested that oppor-
tunities for and training in reciprocal relations may widen
significantly the area of healthy relationships. "Reciprocity
is not a given, is not a fact, but is a task, a value to be
realised" (de Vries, 1966, p. 11). Some of the important
aspects of relational empathy have been included in a state-
ment of the educational objectives for primary schools, New
South Wales, Australia. The Aims of Primary Education in
N.S.W. include among the priority skills to be developed
in pupils, the expression of feelings and seeing other

points of view. Development of moral autonomy is also a
prime goal.

It is argued that if teachers are to develop
empathic structures and skills in their pupils they them-
selves should experience the same process as that of the
children. Teachers need specific training to acquire some
of the attitudes, structures and skills involved. The
design and evaluation of such a program is the aim of this
report.

CHAPTER 1

<u>THEORY AND RESEARCH RELATING TO THE</u>

<u>STRUCTURES AND SKILLS INVOLVED IN THE</u>

<u>EMPATHIC PROCESS</u>

The word empathy is derived from the Greek word empatheia (em-in-pathos) meaning "an active appreciation of another's feelings". The modern use of the term empathy dates from the year 1897 when the German psychologist, Lipps, published a description of the proces of aesthetic apprecia-tion. He used the term "Einfuhlung" to designate using self-awareness on the part of an observer as he confronts a painting or piece of sculpture, and the tendency of the subject to fuse with the object that absorbs his attention. Titchner (1910) introduced <u>empathy</u> as an English equivalent of the original German. Although it is not entirely clear when and where the concept of empathy first entered the literature in a significant way, it is sure that in the field of counselling the person responsible for the broad dissemina-tion of the concept was Carl Rogers (1951). Interest in the concept has also come from psychologists who have been concerned with the process by which one person comes to "understand" another. They see it as a mediating variable in prosocial behaviours such as altruism and moral behaviour. Social psychologists concerned with problems of socialization and personality development consider that it plays a signi-ficant part in the emergence of the "self concept" and social

control. In spite of this interest, there is much conceptual

and operational ambiguity regarding its meaning. Some

researchers have focussed on empathic ability as a personality-

like attribute, while others are more concerned with empathy-

in-action, that is, empathy as an interpersonal process or

relational empathy. The definition of the concept has

depended upon the individual's general psychological stand-

point. Gribble and Oliver (1973) analysed empathy in its

ordinary usage. They argued that when a person A empathises

with person B in regard to X, there is asserted firstly a

knowledge condition, that is, person A knows how person B

feels, and secondly that A sees or understands the reason

for B's feeling as he does. The second condition is the

affective condition: person A feels in the same manner as B

over the situation, B responding to X. The different

conceptions and operational definitions of empathy will now

be discussed.

The Symbolic Interactionist View of Empathy

The role theorist's interactionist view as presented

by Cooley (1902), who defined empathy as a cognitive ability

to put oneself in the other's place, to identify or predict

accurately responses, thoughts, feelings without actually

experiencing that person's feeling or state of mind, has been

accepted by Mead (1934), Dymond (1949), Cottrell (1950),

Hogan (1976), and Wispe (1968). Cooley's

definition focusses on Gribble and Oliver's first condition

which is the knowledge condition of empathy.

Mead (1934) did not use the term empathy. In his
view the development of self-consciousness depends upon the
ability to regard oneself from the perspective of others
with whom one is involved in social interaction. Mead held
that our action and thought are structured by social per-
spective taking, by the tendency to react to the other like
the self, and by the tendency to react to the self's behaviour
in the role of the other, i.e. to put oneself in the other's
place. This view is thus closely related to the role
theoretical concept of empathic processes. Mead stressed
the importance of imitation in the development of the social
self. Imitation of gestures depends upon the individual's
influencing himself as others influence him, so that he is
under the influence not only of the other but also of himself.
We are more or less unconsciously seeing ourselves as others
see us. Gestures become significant symbols when they
implicitly arouse in the individual making them the same
responses which they explicitly arouse in other individuals
to whom they are addressed. When one calls out in oneself
the attitude that one calls out in others, the response is
strengthened. As Mead said, the bully is always the coward.
The action of a bully hitting another arouses in him the
same responses as in the person he is hitting, that is,
he may mentally cower and recoil in response to his own
actions. This is because the act of hitting has through
social experience acquired the same meaning for the bully as

for the coward. Similarly, when we make a vocal gesture
such as saying 'you look lovely' to another, we are inwardly
responding with a feeling of pleasure so that we are
incorporating the attitudes of the other person into our
own conduct. The attitudes of the other persons which the
participant assumes, organise into a sort of unit and it is
that organisation which controls the response of the indivi-
dual. The individual's concept of the organised community
or social group which gives the individual his unity of self
Mead called the "generalised other" (Mead, 1934, p. 152-64).
The individual carries out a conversation of gestures
between one aspect of himself, the 'me', and the internalised
'generalised other'. That the person should be responding
to himself is necessary to the self. The individual is not
a self in the reflexive sense unless he is an object to
himself. The self-concept is what he sees when he views
himself from the perspective of the generalised other. Until
that happens, a child cannot be said to have a self-concept.

Cottrell (1950) in elaborating Mead's theory, set
out a number of propositions concerning interpersonal
behaviour. The impact upon one individual, A, of the activi-
ties of another, B, not only stimulates and conditions a
response pattern of A-B, but also conditions in A the response
pattern of B to A (how other responds to him) as A has
perceived that action, so that the next response of A to B
incorporates some part of B's reaction to A. A series of
conditioned acts, comprising the reciprocal responses of all

members of the social situation, is referred to by Cottrell as an interact pattern: "This process of responding by reproducing the act of the other(s) has been referred to by various writers as taking the role of the other, identification, introjection, sympathy, empathy, imitation." (Cottrell, 1942, p. 374). It follows, according to Cottrell, that each member of an interpersonal relationship is not only conditioned to respond to the acts of the other(s) with his own act series, but is conditioned to respond to his own response series as a stimulus series with actions he incorporates from the other or others. So, after the interactive experience has been repeated sufficiently, it is possible for each member to carry out the entire interact alone, at least in incipient form.

Figure 1: Cottrell's Diagrammatic Presentation of an
Interact Pattern (1942, 375)

A   R (A-B) --------- r (B-A)$_1$ ---------- R (A-B)$_2$

B   R (B-A) ---------- r (A-B)$_2$

R (A—B) and R (B—A) are the responses of A to B and B to A respectively. r represents the incorporated response of the other.

The theories of Mead are not easily translated into
testable hypotheses. Miyamoto and Dornbush (1956) were
concerned with finding empirical support for three problems
suggested by the interactionist view of the self: first,
Mead's emphasis upon the influence of the response of others
in shaping the self-concept; second, that it is the percep-
tion of the other's responses which is critical; third,
what kind of conception of self and others may be employed
in cases where the individual enters into social relationships
wherein the organisation of roles is obscure, preventing the
individual from taking the role of the generalised other.
Miyamoto and Dornbush used the Dymond-Cottrell (1949)
predictive measure of empathic ability to test these basic
assumptions of Mead's theory. Dymond's predictive empathy
measure involves the following index of self-conception:

(1) Self-conception. A rates himself on a number
    of characteristics.

(2) Actual response of others. A rates B as he
    (A) sees him.

(3) Perceived response. A rates B as he thinks
    B would rate himself.

(4) Perceived response of other. A rates himself
    (A) as he thinks B would rate him. The same
    is done for B.

A measure of A's or B's empathic ability can be
derived from calculating how closely his predictions of B's
ratings [A(3) and A(4)] correspond with B's actual ratings.

Miyamoto and Dornbush obtained a measure of self-conception by asking each subject to rate himself on a 5-point scale for four characteristics. Subjects were told that the middle of the scale represented an "average for this group". Apart from the measure used in Dymond's test, each subject also indicated the perceived response of the generalised other by answering how he perceived most persons would view him. Their findings indicated that the response, or at least the attitude, of others is related to self-conception, that is, a subject who rated himself highly on intelligence was likely to be rated highly on this dimension by others in the group. Self-conception was even more closely related to the mean perceived responses of others to the subject than to the mean actual response of others. They also found that an individual's self-conception is more closely related to his estimate of the generalised attitudes towards him than the perceived attitude or response of members of a particular group. Miyamoto and Dornbush's empirical support for the symbolic interactionist view of the self-concept needs, however to be viewed cautiously due to the methodological problems related to Dymond's measure of empathic ability. These will be reviewed in Chapter 7.

Social Interaction and Empathic Ability

It follows from Mead's theory that the more the social process of community enters as a determinative factor in an individual's thinking, the more the individual has the

opportunity to interact with many others, and to take their role, the stronger, will be his self-concept and his ability to understand another's affective behaviour in certain situations. In other words, social interaction is a facilitator in the development of reciprocal relationships.

Support for the relationship of social interaction and empathic ability comes from a study by Hawkes and Egbert (1954). Dymond's measure of empathic ability and Egbert's Study of Choices, which investigates a personal value pattern, were given to 80 college students in Educational Psychology. Egbert's device is based on the ranking method. Subjects were presented with 30 groups of five statesments of values. The problem is to rank the statements in each group accord-ing to their importance for the happiness of the respondent. After deriving a value-pattern for each subject, they were chosen in groups of four for the administration of the empathy test. Subjects were selected to be in the same group if their degree of friendship was more than casual and less than close. The result indicated that subjects with high empathic ability tended to have the highest value in the area where group interaction and social intercourse were major factors. Empathy was positively related to such value-factors as family life and social service. For the values - comfort, power, and control in social life - an inverse relationship was indicated.

Greif and Hogan (1973) tested the hypothesis that empathic persons are more socially adroit than those who

are less empathic. They used Hogan's empirically-keyed scale
for Empathy. Using a Q-sort description of the "ideally
empathic person", provided by several staff members of the
Institute of Personality Assessment and Research at U. C.
Berkeley, Hogan (1969) assigned empathy ratings to 211 subjects
and selected 64 items which proved highly reliable as being
most characteristic of an empathic person. Greif and Hogan
compared the responses of 57 men with high ratings and 57
men with low ratings for empathy across the combined item
pools of the Californian Psychological Inventory (CPI). An
analysis of the scale's interim correlation suggested three
underlying themes: empathic persons are characterised by
patient and forbearing nature; by affiliative but socially
ascendent tendency; and by liberal and humanistic political
and religious attitudes. In terms of the CPI as a whole,
the Hogan Scale for Empathy is most closely related to
measures of interpersonal effectiveness and social adequacy.
Hogan and Mankin (1970) took an objective interpersonal style
as one index of social competence. In a study asking 32
college students the degree to which they liked one another,
they found a correlation between likability and empathy of
.60. Hogan and Henley (1970) also found a high correlation
between scores for communicative competence and empathy.

Referring to empathy as "social sensitivity",
Rothenberg (1970) developed a series of audio recordings
depicting adults portraying four affective states. A reported
positive correlation between social sensitivity and social

interaction for third and fifth graders was made. The des-
cription of feelings and motives was positively correlated
with peer nominations on leadership, sensitivity, mood,
friendliness and negatively correlated with peer nominations
of cruelty.

Developmental Levels of Social Perspective-taking

Support for Mead's contention that perspective-taking
is basic to the understanding of social experience comes from
Selman's work (1976). Selman's thesis is that new forms of
reflective empathy continue to develop in childhood, adoles-
cence, and adulthood and that these forms are logically and
empirically related to developing forms or levels of perspective-
taking. Selman has carried out empirical, descriptive and
theoretical studies of structural levels in the development
of social perspective-taking. He defined it as a developing
process through which the child comes to understand how his
own subjective view of the self and the other person in an inter-
action relates to the other's view. Levels of perspective-
taking are not directly focussed on the accuracy of person
perception, the correctness of an empathic judgment; rather
they are focussed on the more general structure of the child's
understanding of the relationships between perspectives.
Studies by Selman and Byrne (1974) and Selman (1975) of
subjects 4 years to young adulthood, indicate that each
perspective-taking level stems from the preceding level and
underpins the next.

Social perspective-taking is the basic structural
component of reasoning about certain social categories of
experience (Selman, 1976). Selman has developed procedures
for its assessment in various contexts (for example, games,
verbal interviews, etc.) and across various contents (for
example, interpersonal reasoning, moral reasoning, communi-
cation skills, etc.). Below is a description of the structural
levels which Selman and his associates have inferred or
observed in the development of the social perspective-taking
process.

Level 0. The egocentric level. The child does
not clearly differentiate others' subjectivity from his or
her own. The child does not recognize that another may
interpret the same social event or course of action differ-
ently from the way he or she does.

Level 1. The subjective level. The child
overcomes this ego-centrism and is able clearly to differ-
entiate the subjective perspective of self and other; he
or she begins to understand that even under the same
circumstances, other people's thoughts and feelings may
be either the same as or different from one's own. In
other words, all people have subjective interpretative
abilities.

Level 2. The reciprocal dyadic or self-reflective
level. The child incorporates Level 1 awareness into a new
realization. Now, viewing both the self and other as
subjects, the child realizes that the other can view self

as subject reciprocally.

Level 3. The third person dyadic level. The pre-
adolescent is able to step back from the reciprocal co-
ordination of perspectives and construct a third person
view which addresses the reciprocal dyad perspective and
from which is generated a concept of mutuality of perspectives.

Level 4. The qualitative level. Adolescents
generate a further abstraction from the coordination of all
possible third person perspectives, that is, a societal
perspective. There is recognition that mutual perspectivism
can occur at a number of levels of interpersonal awareness
within the dyad.

Byrne (1975) has extended Selman's model to a new
stage usually occurring after adolescence. The person is
aware of the relativity of perspectives held by himself and
the social group. Social "facts" are seen as being inter-
preted according to one's own system of analysis which, in
turn, is based on one's own culture, history, emotional
state, etc.

In a position consistent with that of Selman,
Hoffman (1975) presented a developmental study of altruistic
motivation, that focusses on the contribution of empathy to
the motive to help as a function of various facets of
cognitive development. He postulated that the empathic
response depends heavily on the actor's cognitive sense of
the other as distinct from himself. Hoffman's broad stages
in the development of the sense of the other include:

    (1) Person permanence. Awareness of another's
        existence as a separate physical entity,
        developed by year 1.

    (2) Role-taking. Development of a sense of
        others as physical entities with feelings
        and thoughts in their own right.

Hoffman pointed out that the emphasis of role-taking research
has been mainly cognitive, dealing with the other person's
perceptions and thoughts and ignoring their affect. He
quoted a number of studies with children aged 2- to 6-years
(Feshbein, Lewis, and Keiffer, 1972; Shatz and Gelman, 1973;
Masangkay et al. 1974) as tentative evidence that role-taking
in familiar highly motivating natural settings may precede
laboratory role-taking by several years.

    (3) Personal identity. Development of the view
        of the other as having his own personal
        identity: his own life circumstances and
        inner states beyond the immediate situation.

Selman and Hoffman, then, each support the importance
of self-other differentiation, related to declining ego-
centrism, as a factor in effective role-taking.

According to role-theorists then, the empathic
process involves the cognitive activity of role-taking or,
using Selman's terminology, understanding reciprocal social
perspectives.

Reciprocal Role-taking and Moral Judgment

Support for the above conceptualization of the empathic response as requiring self-other differentiation, comes from its relationship to the development of moral judgment. According to Piaget (1932), the development of moral judgment requires a shift from egocentrism to reciprocity: from a focus on another's actions to a focus on his motives and intentions. Hogan (1973) suggested that empathy is one of the five components of moral character. The others are moral knowledge, socialization, autonomy and moral judgment. Hogan used his empathy measure interchangeably with role-taking ability. Hogan (1975) stated that the empathic disposition facilitates a relativistic perspective that softens and humanises a child's early authoritarian stage. It serves as a back-up mechanism in promoting pro-social behaviour, in the event of a failure during the first stage of moral development. Hogan and Dickstein (1972) developed a projective measure of moral values that is scored for mature moral judgment. It includes four scoring measures:

(1) concern for the sanctity of the individual;

(2) judgments based on spirit rather than the letter of the law;

(3) concern for the welfare of society as a whole, and

(4) capacity to see both sides of an issue.

In two samples, the correlations between inferred maturity
of moral judgment and empathy using Hogan's Scale for Empathy,
were .48 and .51 (p < .01).

Selman (1971) and Byrne (1975) also found support
for the hypothesis that the development of the ability to
understand reciprocal social perspectives is a necessary
condition for the development of higher levels of moral
judgment. Feshbach (1975) stated that empathy, especially
in terms of its role-taking component, is related to moral
development.

The Affective Component of the Empathic
Response

A different interpretation of the essential component
of the empathic response will now be examined. Though most
researchers accept that empathy involves a cognitive ability
to take the role of the other, many consider that Gribble and
Oliver's Affective condition is the one which gives the
empathic construct its unique property. Feshbach and Feshbach
(1969) noted that "social insight, or the ability to under-
stand and predict another person's feeling and behaviour" is
not sufficient for empathic responding. Kretch and Crutch-
field (1958)/ used empathy to refer to the contagious affective
process which William McDougall (1908, 79) termed "primitive
sympathy", "a suffering with, the experiencing of any feeling
or emotion when and because we observe in other persons, or
creatures, the expression of that feeling or emotion without

perceiving or knowing its origin". Stotland (1969) defined

empathy as "an observer's reacting emotionally because he

perceives that another is experiencing or is about to

experience an emotion" (p. 272). Sullivan (1953) saw empathy

as a form of emotional communion which Kagan defined as

"identification".   For Feshbach   (1975) the process

of empathy implies a shared interpersonal experience. They

proposed a three component model of empathy.

It includes the ability to discriminate (1) the perspective, and

(2) the role of another person, and (3) emotional capacity

and responsiveness. Feshbach's definition restricts the

empathy reaction to a match in affective response between

the perceiver or subject and stimulus or object person.

The subject assumes the emotional attributes of the stimulus

person. This distinguishes empathy from projection where

the characteristics of the perceiver are attributed to the

stimulus person. The necessary criterion for empathy

requires both a similarity of feelings and an appreciation

of the other's feelings from the context as it affects the

observer. Since responsiveness of an individual to the

feelings of another is given great importance, it follows

that researchers with this orientation have been concerned

with the prerequisite ability to identify accurately the

attributes of the stimulus person. Measurement requires

combination of two procedures such that the subject

indicates both his own and another person's feelings. The

procedures used to assess affective empathy involve

presenting the subject with a picture, slide, video type
and/or verbal description of a situation, or a picture of
a person with a particular facial expression, or both. The
person in the picture may be expressing an emotion that is
congruous or incongruous with the particular situational cues.
These procedures have been used by Burns and Cavey (1957);
Feshbach and Roe (1968); Kagan (1971); Borke (1971); Chandler
and Greenspan (1972); Johnson and Shantz (1973); Ianotti
(1979) and Deutsch and Madle (1975).

A widely used measure is that developed by Fesh-
bach and Roe (1968). In their Affective Situation Test,
children are individually administered a series of slide
sequences depicting a boy or girl in different affective
situations. Two or three sequences involve happy events
(for example, having a birthday party) while other sequences
convey sadness (for example, being rejected socially), fear
(for example, being lost), and anger (for example, being
falsely accused). Each slide is accompanied by appropriate
narration with the use of affective terms being completely
avoided. Immediately following each slide sequence, the
child is asked simply to state how he or she felt. In
order for empathy to be scored, the affect reflected in
the response has to be a specific match with the affective
situation observed. A separate assessment is made of the
child's comprehension of this affective situation, the child
being asked at a later point to indicate how the stimulus
person in the slide feels.

Investigations by Kuchenbecker, Feshbach and Pletcher (1974) of middle class white boys and girls from kindergarten, first and second grades, found the expected significant developmental change in empathy scores, using both cognitive indices and those indicating affective sharing.

An interesting finding relating to the different sensory modes of stimuls presentation, was that over-all the visual mode elicited the highest comprehension scores, being superior to the auditory-visual as well as the auditory mode. In contrast, the highest empathy scores were obtained with the audio-visual mode. Feshbach (1975, 28) concluded that the differential effect of the modality variaion on empathy as compared with social comprehension, indicated that "these two categories of behaviour are not only different aspects of the same cognitive processes but are functionally distinct, albeit related, variables".

In contrast with the above considerations on whether the nature of the observer's response to the feelings of another person is cognitive or emotional, and whether empathy is a cognitive product mediated by emotional factors, or an affective response mediated by cognitive processes, Pitcher (1972) denied the dichotomy of affective and cognitive realms. He reflects the view of British analytic philosophy of recent years, of emotions as constituting forms of cognition. Schachter and Singer (1962) suggested that an emotional state may be considered a

function of the state of physiological arousal and of the
cognition appropriate to this state of arousal. The
cognitions arising from the immediate situation, as inter-
preted by past experience, provide a framework within which
one understands and labels one's state of physiological
arousal of anger, joy, etc. This view is based upon the
belief that appraisals or combined valuations and factual
beliefs about some particular situation comprise part of
emotion themselves. Smither (1977, 262) takes the position
that "no general claim can be made about the exact relation-
ship between the nature of emotions and appraisals". For
some emotions, such as are indicated by natural expressions
(anger and fear) appraisals will be less constitutive than
for more conceptually complex and culture-bound emotions
such as pride, envy, remorse, which are not distinctively
evidenced by behavioural manifestation. Natural expressions
are usually involuntary and less dependent on convention
for their meaning. Expressions, which are used in accor-
dance with convention to indicate emotions, may include
verbal utterances which are deliberately used to articulate
feeling states. Verbal depiction is a particularly effec-
tive means of providing a medium for empathy of the more
complex and dispositional kind. Understanding the appraisals
involved in different emotions would require the ability to
comprehend a variety of beliefs, evaluations, individual
motives, and contextual meanings. "Thus the ability to
recognize, as well as to comprehend other's emotional

viewpoints, may require complex schemes of selective per-
ception and interpretation" (Smither, 1977, 263). With
this in mind, Smither criticised the emotion-as-facial
expression orientation of researchers such as Burns and
Cavey (1957); Feshbach and Roe (1968), since only some
emotions are associated with characteristic behavioural
manifestations. Admittedly, these researchers have dealt
with young children whose range of emotions may be narrower
and more overt. Smithers stressed the multitude of skills
and processes involved in the affective aspect of empathy.
There are many ways we come to resonate with another's
feelings: observing reactions, listening to verbal depic-
tions of another's experiences, imagining another's position.

Smither (1977, 267) after an analysis of the
developmental study of empathy, conceptualized empathy as
a family of related skills and processes whose nature in
any one case of empathy depends on particular dimensions
of (a) the situational context of the empathee's feeling
state; (b) the nature of the empathee's feeling state
including certain appraisals about that context; and
(c) the manner in which these feelings are expressed.

Empathy-in-Action

Arising from the counselling-therapy-helping
context, it is not empathic ability however but, rather,
empathy as a basic dimension in an actual interaction con-
text which has been the focus of considerable empirical

study. Barrett-Lennard (1976)referred to it as "empathy-in-action" or "relational empathy". Relational empathy requires more than the understanding of another's perspective or frame of reference: it also stresses the importance of communicating one's understanding of the other's experience to the person being empathised within a non-evaluative and acceptant way. Barrett-Lennard added one extra phase to the relational empathy process: that of received empathy, or empathy as experienced by the person being empathised with. Because of the different orientation taken by the counselling therapy approach, and because of the considerable research that has been done in that area, it will be discussed in a separate chapter.

Combining now Gribble and Oliver's definition of empathy with Barrett-Lennard's formulation of relational empathy, one may set down the following phases as constituting the empathic interactive process:

(1) The attentional phase. Person A, the empathiser, has an empathic set. He actively attends to B who expresses his experience in words or signs.

(2) The experiential phase. Person A knows how person B feels and sees and understands the reason for B's feeling as he does. A resonates to the particular affective and content components of B's experience.

      (3) The communication phase.   This

         involves two steps: (a) person A

         expresses his empathic understanding

         of B via words and/or non-verbal

         signals, (b) person B receives A's

         empathic communication.

This is the formulation which is accepted by the present

investigation. The three phases are discussed in chapters

2, 3 and 4.

CHAPTER 2

THE ATTENTIONAL AND EXPERIENTIAL

PHASES OF RELATIONAL EMPATHY

Research on the structures and skills involved in
the attentional and experiential phases of empathy-in-action
are discussed in the first part of the chapter. The second
part deals with different theories of the process of knowing
others, which are relevant to the experiential phase.

The Attentional Phase

There is evidence for the proposition that one's
empathic response to a particular person in a particular
situation is related to one's personal orientation, values,
and interpersonal competence. Stotland's (1969) exploratory
investigations are relevant. Stotland defined emotion as
having two ingredients: physiological and subjective. It is
a physiological state of arousal which has subjective affective
concomitants. Stotland noted that all measures of the sub-
jective ingredient are potentially unreliable because of
problems of subjects' varying awareness of feelings, of
willingness to report affective states, of different referents,
and of the words used to report them. In Stotland's experi-
ments, a number of subjects, usually 5 or 6, observed another
person undergo either a positive or a negative experience such
as receiving an electric shock. In the experimental condition,

male college students observed another male college student
ostensibly receive an electric shock in his arm a few minutes
after a buzzer sounded. The model jerked his arm as if he
had received a shock. In the control condition the model
moved his arm but subjects were told that he was not receiv-
ing the shock. The observers' emotional reactions were
measured by using two physiological variables — palmar
sweating and vasoconstriction — and by the subjects' ratings
of their own feelings (on a 9-point scale). In general,
separate questions were asked concerning the subject's
feelings of tension and relaxation before, during, and after
the person was subjected to the emotional stimulus and
separate questions about the subject feeling good or bad
during these periods. Stotland interpreted the result as
indicating that any interpersonal process, symbolic or overt,
which causes an individual to imagine himself in another's
position would lead a person to empathise with the other
person. Stotland pointed out that empathy is related to the
set that a person has in viewing the other person.

Stotland and Sherman's study (reported in Stotland,
1969) examined the extent to which empathic responsiveness
depends on whether the observer is imagining how he would
feel if he were in the other person's shoes (imagine-self
set), is imagining the feelings of the person he is observing
(imagine-him set) or, rather than focussing on feelings, is
simply watching closely the physical movements of the other
person (watch-him set). Subjects were provided with either

'imagine-self', 'imagine-him' or 'watch-him' sets and then observed a peer undergo what was described by the experimenter as either a painful, pleasurable, or affectively neutral diathermy treatment. Physiological measurement indicated that the emotional reactions of the 'imagine-him' subjects were actually more closely tied to the occurrences inflicted on the model than were the reactions of the 'imagine-self' subjects. 'Watch-him' subjects appeared unaffected by the model's experiences. The basic assumption is that an individual, in perceiving a social situation, attends to certain aspects or dimensions of it while he tends to ignore other features. According to Schachter's (Schacter and Singer, 1962) differential view of the emotions, an emotional experience requires both the presence of psychological arousal and a set of appropriate cognitions about the environmental cause of that arousal. The present results suggest the possibility that empathic instructions may induce shared emotional experience in part by directing the observer's perspective towards the salient environmental contingencies perceived by the actor.

Stotland stated that the type of social relationship between one person and another influences the amount of empathy, presumably because the form of social relationship influences the manner of perceiving the other and thinking about him. Studies of empathy in children by Feshbach and Roe (1968), Klein (1970), and Rothenberg (1970) all indicate that empathy is more likely to occur if the child is judging

another of the same age, the same sex, or the same race.
For example, Feshbach and Roe's study with middle class first
grade boys and girls indicated that similarity between the
child subject and stimulus child significantly facilitated
empathic responses. Boys were more empathic towards boys
while girls showed more empathy with girls. Feshbach and
Roe pointed out the similarity on one dimension of personal
characteristics enhances generalization of their attitudes
and behaviours including emotional experiences, from the
stimulus person. Panofsky (1978) investigated the effect
of similarity-dissimilarity of race and personal interests
on empathy and altruism in second graders. It was hypothesized
that white children would empathise more with other white
children than with black children. It was hypothesized also
that white children would empathise more with other children
having the same interests than with those having different
interests. Subjects were 48 male and 48 female white middle
and upper middle class second graders from religious schools.
It was found that similarity-dissimilarity of race did not
significanctly affect subjects' empathic sharing or helping
behaviour. Several reasons were given to explain this finding.
These include the decreasing racism in American children,
the experiment's focus on interests rather than on race, and
the uniqueness of the subject population. On the other hand,
similarity of interests did affect subject's empathic and
sharing behaviour. Girls in this experiment empathised more
with other girls having the same interests than with girls

having different interests. Boys, however, did not empathise

any more with other boys having common interests than with

boys having different interests. Panofsky stated that the

best explanation for the positive effect of similarity on

empathy in female subjects was that finding similar stimulus

children more attractive than dissimilar children, female

subjects liked and observed them more. The similarity be-

tween persons linked in mutual attraction has been described

by Byrne (1975). He pointed out that similarity has its

effect because people want their own feelings and attitudes

to be validated. Maccoby's and Wilson's (1957, cited by

Panofsky, p. 65) finding that children attended to and re-

corded more behaviours of those children they found most

attractive supports the hypothesis that attraction might lead

to increased empathy: the more a child attends to a stimulus,

the more he or she will empathise with that stimulus.

These findings regarding similarity may be accounted

for in several ways. One is projective role-taking. It may

also be that accuracy of prediction of other's state may

result from similarity in reality between self and other, or

one may generalize from others one knows who are like the

person one is judging: a kind of normative expectancy.

Besides sex and common interest, researchers have

found that birth-order position affects a child's developing

empathic capacity. Studies by Stotland and Dunn (1962, 1963)

support their hypothesis that later born children empathise

more with someone similar to themselves than with someone

different, while first born children's empathy is not affected

by the degree of similarity. Stotland et al. (1971) used the

concept of social schema to explain their results. They

defined 'social schema' as the cognitive structure people

develop in childhood and which thereafter influences the way

they organize their experiences. They investigated the

similarity/dissimilarity schema and found that, depending on

a person's birth-order, the relevance of the similarity/

dissimilarity dimension varied. Stotland et al. believed

that for the later born, the similarity dimension was part

of a particularly important schema which developed out of a

child's socialization process during which he spent most of

his time relating to peers. It is on this basis that

Stotland et al. predicted that later-born persons would

empathise with those similar to themselves. Their research

provides evidence for the proposition that the type of social

relationship between one person and another influences his/

her empathic set.

Empathic Set related to Maturity of Moral Judgment

Peters (1974) in line with the above view considered that a

reciprocal response of one individual to another requires

that the other is seen as an individual human being who is

subject to pleasure and pain, emotions and desires as one-

self. This is the very process involved in the Piagetian

concept of 'reciprocity' where the other is seen as a self

equal to oneself: a being with his own aspirations and

motives.   Rest (1980, 30) interpreted reciprocity as a

motivation to be moral, where a person's ego boundaries are extended to include others in a social system of 'mutual respect' whereby each individual values the other. This is a characteristic of Piaget's highest stage of moral judgment, that of equity. At that stage, the equal rights of individuals are related to considerations of attenuating circumstances such as motive and intention, age, degree of provocation, and mental health. The adolescent now recognizes the invariant factors underlying social responsibility: "These factors can be summed up as the moral dignity of the human person" (Furth, 1970, 136). It may well be that a personal orientation where the other is perceived as equal or similar to oneself (in his human beingness), yet different in his perspective, is a condition under which empathy is more likely to occur. Such an explanation is consistent with the findings of the positive correlation between perceived similarity and empathy on the one hand and maturity of moral judgment and empathy on the other. It seems then that the empathic response involves two processes. We need simultaneoulsly to maintain self-other differentiation, and be able to understand what the meaning of the experiences of others might be for them, based on our common emotional endownment.

The Relationship between Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Stages and Empathy

In order to examine more closely the possible relationships between moral judgment structures and motivation

to respond empathically, one needs to refer to Lawrence
Kohlberg's stages of development of moral judgment.

The work of Lawrence Kohlberg (Kohlberg, 1971) is
an extension of Piaget's work in the area of moral judgment
development in children. Kohlberg's research supports the
theory that moral thinking progresses through an invariant
sequence and that the developmental change means forward
movement in the sequence. Kohlberg has described six stages
which represent increasingly more complex and differentiated
structures of thought in the area of moral reasoning. They
represent successive transformations of the structure of
reciprocity.

The stages of moral development are set out in
Table 1. In the first two stages, actions are judged in
terms of physical consequences which are readily observed.
They are judged also by how much they satisfy the child's
own needs. In the third stage, justice or fairness is seen
in terms of the child's relationships to those who are near
to him or her and to whom affectionate bonds are made. The
fourth stage is an advance over stage three in that fairness
is extended beyond one's own primary group to people in
general who are protected and obligated by the rules of
society. In the fifth and sixth stages, the adolescent gains
respect for individual rights and such principles as "the
greatest good for the greatest number". It is recognized
that the laws of the society can conflict and that unjust
laws can and should be changed on the basis of higher

Table 1: Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Growth[*]

Basis of Moral Judgment	Stages of Development
POSTCONVENTIONAL Level III moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or sharable standards, rights, or duties.	Stage 6: Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orientation to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust. Stage 5: Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules of expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare.
CONVENTIONAL Level II moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectancies of others.	Stage 4: Authority and social-order maintaining orientation. Orientation to "doing duty" and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectation of others. Stage 3: Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behaviour, and judgment by intentions.
PRECONVENTIONAL Level I moral value resides in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards.	Stage 2: Naively egotistic orientation. Right actions is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally others'. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspectivee. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity. Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation. Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.

* Kohlberg, L. "The concepts of developmental psychology as the central guide to education." In M. Reynolds (Ed.) Psychology and the Process of Schooling in the Next Decade, U.S. Office of Education, and University of Minnesota, 1971.

principles. Kohlberg (1973) in his recent thinking about age related developmental trends in moral judgment, sees principled thinking (stages 5 and 6) as an adult development which is not reached until the late twenties, when certain personal experiences of choice involving questioning and commitment occur.

Turning to the relationship of moral judgment structures to an empathic set it would seem that for a person to perceive the other's state cognitively and respond to it empathically, he/she would need to be at stage 3 of Kohlberg's scale. At that stage there is interest in continuing relationships within an enduring system of cooperation, where each party is commited to the other's welfare. Being nice to each other necessitates a minimum degree of reciprocity. Stage 3, however, limits cooperation to whatever friendships have been established at the time. In order for a person to empathise with people beyond the familiar circle, with individuals and groups from other subcultures, it seems that his/her moral reasoning would need to be at Stage 4. Stage 4 orientation sees human interaction taking place within a society-wide system of cooperation, governed by formal laws with rights and duties assigned to each role position. A Stage 4 person comes to appreciate his/her stake in supporting certain social arrangements. Teachers with a number of minority group children in their classroom, thus, may respond empathically to them because they have come to understand the conditions for human cooperation.

It may be, however, that the relationship between moral judgment and empathy is that of a mutual causal system, one in which components influence one another either simultaneously or alternatively. In the first case a person may extend empathy to another because of a spontaneous affective response. In the second case he/she may be at Stage 4, where his/her understanding of a just social world involves the need to extend empathy to different others who are in a helpee relationship. In a third example a person may believe that it is nice to be empathic to one's pupils with whom one is interacting in a continuous relationship.

The discussion above has highlighted the importance of social relationships, specifically the structure of reciprocity, as significant in the attentional phase (motivation to extend empathy to others). It would seem that, due to the established relationship between empathy and moral judgment, the conditions that have been found to promote maturity of moral judgment would also tend to promote an empathic set. "Opportunities for the training in reciprocal relations may widen significantly the area of healthy relationships" (DeVries, 1966, 11). Research studies of Kohlberg (1963, 1964, 1966) and Turiel (1966, 1969) and their associates point out that, in order to stimulate the development of mature moral judgment, it is necessary to provide children with experiences in the form of role-taking opportunities, of discussions which focus on motives of people's actions, as well as on the reasoning used in moral

judgment. The work of Turiel also stresses the stimulating effect of factors which trigger self-questioning, that represent an awareness of what is morally and logically inadequate in the existing mode of thought.

The Experiential Phase

Cognitive aspect: Person A knows how B feels and sees and understands the reasons for B's feeling as he does.

Affective aspect: A resonates to the particular affective and content component of B's experience.

Structures Underlying the Cognitive Aspect of the Empathic Response

An examination will now be made of the structures underlying the cognitive empathic response. It follows from Smither's discussion that the significance of any particular process in a particular empathic response will vary with the task dimensions of the two forms of empathy. For example, when the situational context of the empathee's feeling state is non-normative, or involves more personal interpretations, then accuracy of role-taking becomes more relevant. However, when the empathee's emotions are indicated by natural behaviour and verbal expressions which would provide clear discriminability, then elicitation of affective associations depending on similarity of self-other may be more significant.

Looking first at role-taking ability, this symbolic

process has been described as "the central component of intelligence" (Weinstein, 1969, 758). Mead (1934) considered role-taking the g-factor in intelligence. Deutsch and Madle (1975, 275) reported that most investigators using situational empathy measures have found that empathy scores increase with chronological and/or mental age (Gates, 1923, 1927; Walton, 1936; Burns and Cavey, 1957; Feshbach and Feshbach, 1969; Rothenberg, 1970; Chandler and Greenspan, 1972; Deutsch, 1974, 1975). Flavell (1968) has defined it as an ability to understand the interaction between the self and another as seen through the other's eyes - implying an ability to make specific inferences about another's capabilities, attributes, expectations, feelings and potential reactions. Selman (1971) has referred to it as understanding reciprocal social perspectives. (Note: the terms role-taking and social perspective-taking are used interchangeably in this study). He stated that it necessitates attending to, per-ceiving, shifting, balancing and evaluating both perceptual and cognitive social object input.

Egocentrism related to Role-taking Ability

There are indications that social perspective-taking is related to declining egocentrism and the presence of decentration.

According to Piaget (1967, 20), a young child remaining "unconsciously centred upon himself" is primarily egocentric and therefore cannot differentiate until about

the age of seven, between his own and other's point of view.
Looft (1972) stated that the esential meaning of egocentrism
is an embeddedness in one's own point of view. Flavell
(1968) distinguished two types of egocentrism. Communicative
egocentrism he defined as the child's failing to discriminate
those role attributes of the other, which are relevant to the
sort of message the child should send to the other in order
to communicate adequately. Perceptual egocentrism refers to
the subject's inability to predict the appearance of the
stimulus display from positions of perspectives other than
his own. One feature of cognitive egocentrism, according to
Piaget (1950, 1962), is centration which refers to the center-
ing of attention on one aspect of an object or event.

Feffer (1959, 1970) extended the decentering concept
to interpersonal behaviour, on the assumption that the same
processes, or at least parallel processes, are involved in
both impersonal cognition (person to object) and interpersonal
cognition (person to person). Effective social interaction
demands that each participant modifies his intended behaviour
in anticipation of the other's reaction to this behaviour.
He needs to realize that "the world is peopled by others ...
Nor are these others simply other I's. The others are you,
him, her, them, etc." (Laing, 1966, 3). In order for the
other's behaviour to become part of self's experience, self
must perceive it. To do so one needs to consider different
perspectives simultaneously in relation to each other, such
that centering on any given viewpoint (usually one's own) is

corrected by another perspective.

Studies of communicative egocentricism (Alvy, 1968; Cohen and Klein, 1968 cited in Deutsch & Madle, 1975) and of perceptual egocentricism (Flavell et al. 1968) indicate that both types of egocentrism decrease and decentering increases with intelligence and age. Concerned with the role that projection, reflecting an egocentric stance, may have in empathic responses, Chandler and Greenspan (1972) in reply to Borke's (1971) research, attempted to control for egocentrism. They found that only older children who were well into middle childhood excelled at role-taking. Burns and Cavey (1957) attempted to develop a task depicting a variety of stimuli which would maximise the probability that decentering is required for accurate responding. They studied the difference between younger (3 to 5 years) and older 5 to 6 years) children's ability to recognize the affective stages depicted in pictures having congruence and incongruence of facial and contextual cues. For example, incongruous cues were depicted as a birthday party scene with cake and presents and with a figure sitting on a chair with a frown, and congruous cues were depicted as a picture of a dentist's office and with a figure sitting on a chair with a frown. In finding out what types of cue dominated children's interpretation of affective states, the researchers used a quantititative index of the number of verbalisations made by the figure's feelings in each picture pair as the dependent variable. All the older children empathised with the character in the picture when the two pictures represented

incongruous cues more than younger children. Deutsch (1975)

has suggested that maybe the younger children's disadvantage

was due to their restricted language development.

Deutsch (1974) constructed an empathy instrument

to test whether 3 and 4 year old children can perceive

affective states as indicated by Borke. The measure was

designed to compare children's verbal responses about situat-

ions in which decentering was and was not required. To

achieve this, there were two video taped episodes involving

positive interpersonal behaviour followed by negative affect,

and two episodes of negative interpersonal behaviour followed

by positive affect. These four episodes were constructed to

represent incongruity, thus determining whether the children

could decenter or accurately describe the affect and inter-

personal behaviour. There were also four parallel congruent

episodes. In one episode the major actor with a pleasant

look on her face was writing at a desk. A second actor en-

tered the room and gave the first actor a cup of coffee. If

the major actor then smiled and stopped working then the

episode was considered as congruous; if the major actor

looked angry, then the episode was considered as incongruous.

Deutsch also controlled for similarity between the judge and

the person to be judged, in order to decrease the likelihood

of an observer appearing to be socially sensitive when, in

fact, he is attributing characteristics to others that are

actually self-description. So adult female actors were used

who, presumably, were equally dissimilar to all children.

Adult judgments of video tape episodes were taken as a stan-
dard. A major assumption was that the test situation involved
approximately the same abilities required to make accurate
judgments about the feelings and behaviour of real adults in
real situations. For each of the eight episodes, the measures
were:

> (1) Affective responses. The accurate verbal labels
> of the affect of the major actor prior to and
> after the interaction with the second actor;
>
> (2) Intrapersonal behaviour. The accurate verbal
> labels of the major actor's behaviour prior to
> and after the interaction with the second actor;
>
> (3) Reasons for the major actor's final affect or
> affective responses.

Results indicated a significant main effect of mental age for
all three empathy measures of the congrous episodes. For
the incongruous episodes, however, there was a significant
main effect of mental age only for the interpersonal behav-
ioural measure. A major finding was that children's accurate
perceptions of affect and affective responses were signifi-
cantly greater ($p < .01$) for the congruous episodes than for
the incongruous episodes. Deutsch also obtained perceptual
and communicative measures of egocentrism. Children, who
scored higher on measures of empathy, were less egocentric
than children who scored lower on empathy measures (Deutsch,
1974).   Deutsch and Madle(1975, 281) held that "the link
between Piagetian theory and empathy therefore was established".

There is evidence that adolescents entering the formal stage exhibit a new type of egocentrism different from the egocentrism of the young child (Elkind, 1967 cited in Looft, 1972). Adolescent egocentrism is characterised by failure to differentiate between objects towards which the thought of others is directed and those which are the focus of the adolescent's own concern. As this investigation is aimed at development of empathic reactions in adults, particularly young adults, what is the relevance of the above discussion of the relationship of egocentrism to empathy? There is, at this stage, very little research on egocentrism and social interaction in adulthood. Egocentrism "within the existing notions of cognitive development, is not even considered to be a concept relevant to adulthood" (Looft, 1972, 80). Looft suggested that there is convincing evidence, however, that some behaviours befitting the egocentric label are manifested by some persons on some occasions in certain contexts. Suggesting that the decentering process sometimes fails, or may not even take place in people at a formal stage, Rockway (1969) quoted by Looft (p. 80) investigated the development of the logical nature of interpersonal judgment in adolescent boys. In a task that required the subjects to predict the behaviour of a person in a programmed case history, Rockway noted an increase in the hypothetical deductive quality of the boys' social judgments and a decrease in egocentric self-focussing sets. He also discerned in twelfth graders another form of self-focussing judgment which Rockway labelled "enlightened

egocentrism". As opposed to the blanket assumption by younger adolescents that one's own reactions are necessarily relevant data, these older adolescents sometimes focussed upon their own reactions to predict another person's behaviour, where it appeared logical to assume that one's self and others were in some way alike. It may be assumed that some young adults may still exhibit some features of adolescent egocentrism in their social interaction, just as there is evidence of immaturity of moral judgment and concrete thinking among adults.

Flavell (1970) suggested that most changes found in adulthood are not truly developmental but are due primarily to experiential factors rather than to biological events (Flavell, 1970, 250). Changes in one's thinking resulting from having lived in a concentration camp or having raised a family etc., are doubtless qualitatively different from the changes defined by (say) the child's transition from preoperational to concrete operational thought. They need however, not be much less consequential for the individual concerned (Flavell, 1970, 251). Experiences may change an individual's theories concerning himself, others, and the human condition in general. Krauss and Weinheimer (1964) used the "stack-the-blocks" game (Glucksburg, Krauss and Weisberg 1966) and Feffer's role-taking task to study decentering in adults. Looft supported this approach in his review of the few existing studies of ego-centric mani-festation in adulthood.

Social Perspective-Taking and One's Conception of the Nature
of Persons

Selman (1975, 1976) and Selman and Byrne (1974)
have argued that apart from its relationship to social
perspective-taking and declining egocentrism, empathic
understanding is a function of the child's conception of the
nature of persons, which he believes develops isomorphically with
levels of social perspective-taking. In a study (Selman,
1975) 47 boys (12 from grades 1 to 5, and 11 from grade 6)
were interviewed on the following measures:

1) four interpersonal relations dilemmas;

2) two measures designed to assess structural
levels of perspective taking (one assessing perspective-taking
level in a problem solving context, the other-developed by
Selman and Byrne (1974) - assessed levels of perspective-
taking in the context of social moral dilemmas);

3) two logico-physical measures adapted from Piaget;

4) a measure of moral judgment adopted from Kohlberg;

5) a sociometric measure of both positive and
negative peer evaluations.

Selman's study indicated that a certain perspective-
taking level is necessary but not sufficient for a structurally
parallel interpersonal stage. Perspective-taking levels may
be seen as developing structures that can be used analy-
tically to understand the structure of interpersonal concepts.
So each developing level of perspective-taking provides a new
organizing principle through which the subject can structure

or view interpersonal relationships. And it is the level of a person's awareness of the nature of persons and their interpersonal relationships that will influence toward what aspect of the other's experience he or she could be empathic (Selman, 1975).

Relating levels of perspective-taking, levels of conception of nature of persons and empathic responses, one may note the following: At level 0, the child conceptualizes persons in terms of objective or surface characteristics. Thus the child is empathic to the physical or quasi-physical manifestations of feelings, for example, crying or physical pain, but not to the directly psychological characteristics. At level 1 it is inconceivable, from the child's perspective, that a conflict can arise such that he may be both happy and sad. One knows another's feeling if he tells it to you. It follows from level 1 conception of persons that now the child becomes empathic towards the perceived subjective desires of the other but these desires are still perceived from self's perspective. At level 2 some subjects believe that it is not possible to know how another is feeling because they have newly discovered that people can hide thoughts from another and that they may not know how they themselves feel. On the other hand, they are able to consider another's feeling by consciously and reflectively putting themselves in the other's shoes. Seeing persons for the first time as self-reflective, the child at level 2 can be empathic towards others' feelings about themselves. At level 3 ability to

step outside the dyad, to see a self defined as a simple
system of traits, enables the pre-adolescent to become
empathic towards other's feelings about the self (as a single
system) as well as to be sensitive towards the self's con-
cern about what others think of 'me'. It is not until
level 4 that the adolescent is aware of and can empathise
with other's deeper psychological system of hopes and
expectations.

Consistent with Selman's view of the mediating
function of one's conception of persons in the inferences
we make about others, is the application of one's personal
system of inter-personal constructs in the social inference
process (Kelly, 1955, Crockett and Delia [quoted by Hale
and Delia (1976)]). As Hale and Delia note, "Interpersonal
constructs are the cognitive structures within which the
behaviour, appearance, and utterances of others are inter-
preted and given meaning" (Hale and Delia, 1976, 198).
Individuals form qualitatively different kinds of inter-
personal impressions since a perceiver's constructs consti-
tute the psychological counterparts of the characteristics
and traits that he attributes to others. However, whereas
Selman sees social perspective-taking as a basic structure
which underlies one's level of interpersonal relations, Hale
and Delia conceive of perspective-taking as involving a
second order construal process in which one uses one's
system of personal construct to construe how a situation
appears within the construct system of another. Hale and

Delia (1976) tested the hypothesis that the more complex one's system of interpersonal constructs, the better one should be able to construe the perspective of others in social situations. Subjects were 49 student volunteers. A written version of the Social Perspective-taking Task, employed in a study of egocentrism among the aged, was developed for the measurement of subjects' level of social perspective-taking. The scoring system was based on the assumption that the most basic process involved in representing an event from another's point of view is suspending one's own evaluation of the act and/or the other person. The complexity of subject's interpersonal construct systems was assessed with the two peer role version of the Role Category Questionnaire developed by Crockett (Crockett's measure is based on a structural perception of cognitive complexity). The highly significant positive correlation (r = .61, p < .01) confirmed the expected relationship between level of cognitive complexity in the interpersonal domain and ability to represent the perspective of others in the social situation. So the structures underlying the experiential phase of the empathic response include self-other differentiation, role- or perspective-taking ability, and the level of one's conception of the nature of persons.

Relationship between the Form or Level of a Structure and its Content

Selman makes an important distinction between the level of one's social perspective-taking structure and its content. Perspective-taking levels are skeletal structures of social reasoning in search of some content to which they can be applied (e.g. contents such as communication skills, interpersonal relations, moral reasoning). Selman (1977) explained that in the real world these "content" domains intersect with one another. For theoretical purposes he has found it useful to explore the role of perspective-taking in each area separately and each in relation to the other. It also appears that the age of functional emergence of a given level will vary to a certain degree as a function of the content within which it is applied, the mode of assessment (e.g. real or hypothetical situations) or the context (e.g. under stress). In a discussion on the relationship between the form of a structure and its content, Selman (1977) stated that logical implication of the claim that a given level of perspective taking (A) is necessary but not suffi-cient for a parallel interpersonal stage (B) is that there can exist in reality only 3 or 4 possible relations between the two. At any given stage there can be subjects without the given level for either perspective-taking or inter-personal reasong ($\bar{A}.\bar{B}$): with that structure for both per-spective-taking and interpersonal reasoning (A.B), or with the perspective-taking level but not the interpersonal level

(A.B̄). But according to the model there can be no subject at given interpersonal stage who does not also have the parallel perspective-taking level (Ā.B)

In practice, Selman claimed, the logically prerequisite perspective-taking level may develop synchronously as a function of the same conditions that stimulate development in interpersonal reasoning. Logically, a level of perspective-taking is a deeper structure which underlies the more surface structure of interpersonal or moral reasoning; it cannot develop after it. Psychologically however, the relation may be better described as a feedback system in which interpersonal experience stimulates interpersonal reasoning which in "turn stimulates and is in itself stimulated by the restructuring of perspective-taking levels" (Selman, 1977, 4). One must keep in mind that the terms structure and level are relative terms. Each perspective-taking level is a content in relation to each of the general (more formal) Piagetian stages, but a structure in relation to (more content based) interpersonal and moral stages.

What Underlies the Affective Aspect of the Empathic Response

How does A come to resonate to the particular affective and content components of B's experience?

Aronfreed (1968, 292) stated that empathy is "elicited by ... the expressive behaviour of another person". His research (1968) indicates that an affective response to the experience of others is not instinctive but depends, at

least in part, on the child's having previously experienced
that affect. This is consistent with Hoffman's (1975)
explanation of empathic distress as the learned response
based on the classic conditioning paradigm, in which cues
obtained from another and from the situation evoke associa-
tions with the observer's own past pain, resulting in an
empathic affective reaction. Hoffman considered, however,
that this appears to be a primitive involuntary response
relying on the pull of surface cues and minimally on higher
cognitive processes, attention, and effort. According to
Hoffman, this indicates that we are programmed in such a
way that our emotional distress will often be contingent,
not on our own, but on someone's else's misfortune. Hoffman
(1975) linked the development of one's cognitive sense of
the other to one's affective response to cues about the
other's inner states. When a child acquires a sense of the
other as separate from himself, it seems reasonable to
assume that the earlier involuntary empathic distress changes
gradually into a more reciprocal sympathetic concern for the
victim, which Hoffman calls "sympathetic distress". This
transformation is hypothesised to occur in three stages
(Hoffman, 1975, 614):

> (1) With the emergence of the sense of the other
>   as a distinct self, the affective portion of
>   the child's global empathic distress - the
>   feelings of distress and desire for its
>   termination - is expanded to the separate

self and other that emerge. Despite the limi-
tation of this initial level of sympathetic
distress, it is a significant advance since,
for the first time, the child feels concern
for the other as distinct from the self;

(2) At about two years the child has acquired a
sense of the other as a separate physical entity.
His empathic proclivity continues to direct his
attention away from himself and towards others.
He will still tend to attribute his own feel-
ings to the victim but the affect aroused in
him by another's distress may be presumed to
motivate more active efforts to put himself in
the other's place and find the true source of
his distress;

(3) The third level is a synthesis of empathic
distress and a mental representation of the
other's general plight. At the highest level
of sympathetic distress, the individual can
process various types of information - that
gained through his own empathic reaction,
immediate situational cues and general knowledge
about the other's life.

The empathic affective response seems to be partly related
to an involuntary tendency to respond emotionally to the
affective state of another; partly it is based on classical
conditioning where cues of pain or joy from another and from

the situation evoke associations with the observer's own

past experiences of that affect.

There is limited evidence on how to promote affec-

tive sharing of the other's emotion. Though research suggests

a relationship between emotional responsiveness and awareness

of similarities between oneself and the person with whom

one is empathising, the evidence is tenuous at this stage.

In fact, little is known about the ability to respond affec-

tively and its relation to the ability to suspend evaluation,

to understand others' perspectives and the scope of their

experiences. Chandler (1974, cited in Deutsch and Madle 1975)

has also pointed to the inadequacy of extant procedures for

assessing affective sharing.

The above discussion of the processes, structures

and skills involved in the experiential phase indicates that

there is a body of considerable theory and research on the

cognitive aspect of empathic understanding. Evidence relating to the

affective aspect is limited. It is this bias in the liter-

ature that has led to the decision to focus primarily in the

intervention program on the cognitive aspect of empathic

understanding: on developing in student teachers the ability

to know how another person feels and sees and to understand

the reasons for him/her feeling that way.

The Process of Knowing Others

Tagiuri (1969) reviewed the general properties of the process of knowing others as set down by different theories. The inference theory suggests that we know about others through a swift process of inference or analogy of which we are seldom aware. We infer the state of another person because the circumstances, behaviour, or sequence of events are similar to those we have met in previous situations and with which we ourselves have had personal experience.

As Peters put it: "we extend to others the understanding which we have from our own case of the system which is our personality" (Peters, 1974, 40). Where the empathiser is similar in background to the subject he has the advantage of being readily able to use appropriate norms for making his judgment. This theory accounts well for findings that similarity between judge and others aids accuracy of judgment. The most extensive application of an explanation of person cognition or person perception in terms of inference processes has been presented by Sarbin, Taft and Bailey (1960) in their work on clinical inference. They considered that intuition and empathy are unnecessary elements in explanations of how we know others. They maintained that a broadened syllogistic inference model, with both major and minor premises stated in probabilistic terms, can adequately account for the process of clinical inference, and for person cognition.

They distinguished five major phases in the infer-

ence process: (Tagiuri, 1969, 416).

1.   The postulate system of the judge or diagnos-
tician, his tacit or explicit premises (for example, team
sports require cooperation; cooperative people tend to have
many friends).

2.   A syllogistic major premise, derived from the
postulate system (for example, people who enjoy team sports
tend to be cooperative).

3.   Search for and observation of occurrences
relevant to the major premise (for example, Jack plays
football).

4.   Instantiation or conversion of an occurrence
into an instance of a general class (for example, football
is a team sport).

5.   Inferential product or conclusion (for example,
Jack is probably cooperative).

The first two phases would be the product of the
individual's structures of social perspective-taking and
interpersonal relations, particularly his concept of persons.
At the postulate stage the inferrer sets up working principles
based on different influences. One is his particular exper-
ience with members of the category into which the person
object is instantiated and experience with the person himself.

The inferrer is also influenced by his contact
with postulates derived from authority, for example, stereo-
types. There is evidence that the tendency to use stereo-
types is particularly noticeable in highly ethnocentric

persons when they make judgments about minority, groups,
e.g. "All Jews are pretty much alike" (Oser and Hammond,
1954) had the highest loading on prejudice in an anti-semitism
scale.

The use of analogy provides another basis for the
inferrer to formulate his postulate. Analogy may come from
some other system, or another person or observer's own model.
Relevant here is Tagiuri's (1969) observation of the tendency
to assume similarity especially with people one likes. The
tendency to assume similarity seems to be strengthened when
the judge likes the object person (Secord, Backman and
Eachus, 1964). Bronfenbrenner (1958) also found support for
the hypothesis that the more favourable the judge's orienta-
tion toward the person or group being judged, the more likely
he is to predict that the attitudes or perception of this
person or group toward a particular content will be similar
to his own. The analogistic error, that of assumed similarity
has also been noted among persons characterized as authori-
tarian. Postulates may also be constructed using psychological
models derived from one's experience of people, what Tagiuri
calls one's implicit personality theory.

Implicit personality theory refers to the assump-
tions one makes about the nature of persons. The work of
Ash (1946) on impression formation gave some indication on
the way in which trait information about a person is processed
and integrated. Tagiuri stated that "most people, given some
trait information about another person, generally go on to

make inferences about a great variety of other traits not included in the data given" (Tagiuri, 1968, 423).Bruner, Shapiro and Tagiuri (cited in Tagiuri, 1969) found that high predictability in inferences to other traits could be obtained by following certain inference rules for pairs and triplets of "given traits".

The second phase of the inference process is the syllogistic major premise, derived from the postulate system. Sarbin, Taft, Bailey (1960) maintained that the optimum situation for making valid inferences is for the inferrer to have available a rich pool of classes. This is why the most accurate judges of others have been shown to be the most intelligent persons. (Tagiuri, 1969; Taft, 1955) and also to possess the most complex cognitive structures Bieri (1955). Bieri (1955) hypothesised that there should be a positive relationship between how well an individual's system of constructs differentiates people in the environment and how well the individual can predict the behaviour of these people. Bieri designated the degree of differentiation of one's system of constructs for perceiving one's social world as reflecting its cognitive complexity-simplicity dimension. A construct system which differentiates highly among persons is considered to be cognitively complex. He assessed 34 students on the degree of cognitive complexity using Kelly's (1955) Role Construct Repertory Test. The results supported his hypothesis. He reported that cognitive complexity varies inversely with the tendency to assume

similarity and directly with accuracy as measured in his

study. A particular finding was that the cognitive behaviour

measured related more directly to the accurate prediction of

differences between self and others than to accurate pre-

diction of similarities between self and others. This is

interesting in view of the relations between self-other

differentiation and role taking. The correlations found

by Bieri were significant but low, indicating that additional

factors are operating in predictive behaviour. Bieri's

findings support the theories of Weinstein (1969), Peters

(1974) and Hoffman (1975) regarding the development of one's

sense of the other, moving from an objective view of people

towards individuation, where the other is seen as having

his own personal identity, life and circumstances.

Sarbin, Taft and Bailey (1960), in their debate

on the value of wide versus narrow categories for classify-

ing persons, pointed out that narrow categories required

more careful observation and attention to cues and appear

to be greater sources of information about objects than

are wide ones. Wide undifferentiated classes give rise to

stereotyped thinking. When we meet people for the first

time we tend to use stereotypes to understand them. As

Oliver pointed out: "As more is learned about the person,

an increasing number of stereotypes are called up qualifying

each other and being qualified by each piece of information"

(Oliver, 1975, 120). Baker and Block (1957), quoted by

Sarbin et al. (1960, 197) asserted that their judges sought

stereotypes as aids in prediction. Under some circumstances, cultural stereotypes lead to more accurate predictions than do differentiated inferences. Gage (1952) reported that "familiarity with a particular subculture" was a greater contribution to accuracy than were clues from expressive behaviour of the stimulus person.

The next phase is search for and observation of occurrences relevant to the major premise. This involves attention by the perceiver to the stimulus properties of the person with whom he is empathising and his situation. This phase will be enlarged in the discussion on information about the other derived from external cues.

At the fourth phase there is the instantation of an occurrence into an instance of a general class. Tagiuri (1969, 422) has noted that tendency by the inferrer to maximize balance and to avoid dissonance of elements. Individuals differ in their modes of handling incongruities in the cues. They may ignore one or the other, or ignore the conflict. Sarbin et al. also noted the influence on this phase of the "outcome value" of the use of probabilistic cues. This value is a function both of the perceived situation (i.e. the risks) and of the needs and desires of the observer. It can play a significant role in the instantation of an object where emotional involvement is high and the cues are uncertain.

The final product is "the result of the combination of the various instantiations derived from the taxonomic

sorting of the occurrences" (Sarbin et al. 1960, 208).

In summary, it seems that individual differences in inferences about people may arise from the different postulates held by observers. These differences in postulates are in turn based on differences in experience, motivation and personality.

Einfuhlung Theory

Processes other than analytical inference may be involved in our comprehending the states of mind of others. T. Lipps in 1907 introduced the term 'Einfuhlung' or empathy to mean 'objective motor mimicry'. We partially imitate the other person with slight movements, thus creating for ourselves inner cues that give us an understanding of his feelings or characteristics. This process may involve inferences we draw from cues from our own mimicry.

The Phenomenological and Psychoanalytical Theories

The Phenomenologists and Gestaltists maintain that the state of the other person's mind is reflected in a patterned expression that directly produces in the beholder a patterned sensory and central excitation which, in turn, conveys the person's state of mind. The evidence is patterned throughout at all the levels of the process-psychological, electrochemical and neuromuscular in the object person, and physiochemical, electrochemical and psychological

in the beholder (Arnheim, 1949).

A variation of this view of the process of person perception is found in psychoanalytical theories of identification. The psychoanalytic view of empathy is relevant here. Therapists working in the psychoanalytic tradition see empathy as a form of trial identification which requires the empathiser to focus attention on the feelings and situation of the other person. Katz (1963, 41) listed four phases in the empathic process following Theodor Reik's outline. The first phase if that of identification - the most fundamental activity of the entire sequence. At this stage the empathiser relaxes his conscious controls, loses his self-awareness, and becomes absorbed in the personality of another and his experiences. The second stage is that of incorporation which consists of the act of taking the experience of the other person into ourselves. Both these phases which have their origin in Freud's psychoanalytical theory, reduce social distance; both are forms of making a connection between the subject and the object. The third phase is that of reverberation — we reverberate or resonate to another's feelings. In this phase the internalized other and our own self interact upon each other (Katz, 1963, 44). It is this phase which is relevant to the above finding of a positive correlation between similarity and the affective component in the empathic response. According to Katz (p. 45), the value of reverberation consists in the fact that something familiar to us is evoked by our interaction with the experience of others.

Being human beings, we have within ourselves the same impulses
and the same potentialities for experience that any other
human being has. Because we share this common emotional
endowment, we are able to understand from within ourselves
what the meaning of the experience of others might be for
them. It follows — from the psychoanalytic view — that
empathy to some extent is a product of a biological endowmment.

It is probable that a combination of the explana-
tions reviewed above account for the phenomena of knowing
and understanding others. Various processes may be used by
different individuals and by the same individual in different
circumstances. "Inference and analogy; sensory cues derived
from empathic responses; and immediate response to external
configurations and patterns that are expressions of qualities
of a person out there — all these seem to be involved."
(Tagiuri, 1969, 416).

Oliver (1975) set down three conditions which are
involved in A's coming to know B's feelings. First, one
must be able to detach one's self from his own position if
one wishes to know how another feels. Secondly, one must be
able actively to construct another way of apprehending
possible objects of emotion from another's point of view.
Such reconstructing requires such cognitive processes as
reversible thought, of calculating the effects of relevant
factors. Thirdly, reconstructing the other's point of view
requires us to work out how one set of beliefs and values
cohere in another person's appraisal even though this

association of beliefs and values would normally be foreign
to us. Knowledge of conventions, rules, and assumptions
which underlie the other person's way of life must be known.
There may be an indefinite number of ways of life which an
individual may participate in, and which may provide the
significant assumptions or rules on any one occasion. In
order to correctly reconstruct another's point of view, one
may avail oneself of some of the established forms of enquiry
which have been developed to investigate human affairs. An
example that Oliver gave is Freudian theory which is a
classical attempt to provide a model for the understanding
of specific things of particular individuals. The use of
literature allows one to widen one's understanding of the
interaction of beliefs and conventions in the lives of
characters. An implication of Oliver's proposition then, is
that any study of the nature of human beings, their motives
and feelings revealed through the reading of literature,
psychology, or interacting in a variety of settings would
deepen one's knowledge of recognized systems of beliefs and
of related psychological and environmental matters which
underly behaviour.

How to Stimulate Role Taking Ability and its Appropriate
Application

    As discussed above in relation to promoting an
empathic set, there is an obvious overlap between factors
stimulating maturity of moral judgment and those that promote

the development of general role-taking accuracy. Like Turiel,

Hogan (1973) assumed that one of the factors related to the

development of empathy is that a person has had practice in

role-taking. Being required to adopt an alternative per-

spective vis-à-vis one's parents should facilitate the

development of role-taking skills. Hogan pointed out that

both rejecting and over-indulgent parents fail to stimulate

children's natural empathic tendencies.

Hoffman (1976), in discussing how one can promote

the development of the sympathetic distress response in

children, suggested that one ought to provide the child with

opportunities for role-taking and for giving help and res-

ponsible care to others. These, with corrective feedback

when he is unable to interpret available cues, should foster

both sympathetic distress and awareness of the other's per-

spective, as well as the integration of the two. Empathic

responding could also be modeled by parents who communicate

their own thoughts and feelings as well as the presumed

inner states of the persons to whom they are responding

empathically.

In line with Hogan (1976), Hoffman put forward

the hypotheses that sensitivity to the needs and feelings

of others may be fostered by allowing the child to have the

normal run of distress experiences, so as to provide a broad

base for empathic and sympathetic distress in the early

years. Weinstein (1969) suggested that projective role-

taking, an immature form of role-taking which, however, is

a step towards recognizing the other as a being — with
separate internal states — is dependent upon several parental
practices. One, is encouraging children to imagine themselves
in the other's place and pointing out the similarities as
well as differences between them and others. Footle and
Cottrell (1955, cited in Weinstein) consider parent-child intimate
communicative relations important. Such relations would
involve making affective responses, both positive and nega-
tive, clear to children, so that they could get a more
accurate sense of the impact of their acts. Weinstein ad-
vocated that parents actively promote reciprocal role-taking
behaviour by looking at people's reasons for behaviour,
using disciplinary practices which focus on motives rather
than consequences of an act, pointing out instances in which
parents' acts are being shaped by the probable effect on
others, including the child himself. Weinstein also pointed
out that authoritarian child rearing is likely to inhibit
the development of individuation, where the other's internal
state is inferred on the basis of his responses. The intol-
erance of ambiguity, related to the authoritarian personality,
is likely to lead to an over-commitment to ambiguity-resolving
stereotypes, particularly positional stereotypes.

It seems then that one can expect individual dif-
ferences in the ability to respond empathically on the basis
of varying biological endowment and socialization experiences.
At the same time, one's personal orientation towards others
and one's role-taking ability can be changed by providing

opportunities for social interaction in both naturalistic

settings and laboratory training in imaginative role-taking.

Clore and Jeffery (1972) carried out a study exploring the

effects of emotional role-playing on inter-personal attitudes

towards the disabled. The role-playing consisted of travel-

ling about the campus in a wheel chair for one hour. The

experimental design involved three treatment groups: role-

players, vicarious role-players, and controls. The role-

playing and vicarious groups were both significantly different

in their empathy scores from the controls. Subjects, either

directly or vicariously, experienced feelings related to the

anxiety, impotence, and exhaustion of one day in a wheel

chair. Clore and Jeffery considered that "the processes at

work in emotional role-playing appear similar to those pro-

posed by Bandura (1969) to account for observational learning."

(Clore and Jeffrey, p. 110). Presumably the direct and

vicarious experience of role-playing is associated with

the salient elements of the situation. Like the behaviours

in modeling, the emotional responses induced by role-playing

are then coded and stored, to be retrieved when similar

situations are presented. Thus a backlog of varied role

experiences would seem to be essential to the development

of the ability to change perspectives that typifies social

maturity. Role-playing by observations of films and drama

and reading literature may also be effective.

Sarbin (1968) concluded that the essential element

in any sort of skill sequence in role-taking seems to be a

process through which the individual somehow apprehends
certain attributes of the other individual. Sarbin proposed
that the estimate of these attributes formed by the role-
taker must be a synthesis of two sources of information:
(a) knowledge of people and their behaviour in various
situations, that is, knowledge of certain norms; and
(b) perceptual input from the overt behaviour of the other
person or from other cue sources in the immediate situation.
These sources of information will be discussed in the next
chapter.

CHAPTER 3

SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED IN THE
PROCESS OF UNDERSTANDING OTHER'S PERSPECTIVE

How is it that one acquires knowledge of people and
their behaviour? The two sources of information that will
be discussed are: one, sources within the perceiver; two,
external sources, i.e. input from the overt behaviour of the
other persons and from cues in their immediate situation.

Internal Sources

Peters (1974) proposed that it is our knowledge of
the system which constitutes our own general human charact-
eristics that enables us to understand the behaviour of
others. This is consistent with Mead's theory that the mind
develops within the social process "when that process as a
whole enters into or is present in the experience of anyone
of the given individuals involved in that process" (Mead,
1934, 133). Peters argued that in making sense of the
behaviour of others we rely on concepts, rules, and assump-
tions which both they and we have internalized in the early
years of our initiation into human life. These structure
our own behaviour as well as our understanding of the behaviour
of others. Moreover a reciprocal response of individual to
individual requires that the other person must not be viewed
in the context of any extraneous purpose whether individual

or shared. Using Kohlberg's approach to the development of
moral judgment, Peters suggested that there are levels of
personal relationship which correspond to levels of under-
standing of people and levels of affective response to them.
He proposed four levels:

> (1) The Pre-Rational level of experience and of
> Reaction to Others. Understanding of people
> is based on their classification on the basis
> of similarity without any importance attached
> to the identify of objects. For example, a
> person who reacts violently to anyone in a
> position of authority over him.

> (2) The level of Egocentricity. Paralleling
> Kohlberg's Instrumental Relativist Orientation
> level where right and wrong are defined in
> relation to what is satisfying to the self,
> there is an instrumental view of people.
> Others are identified and named but are classi-
> fied mainly in terms of their frustrating or
> pleasure-enhancing properties. Note, at both
> the above levels one would expect little
> accuracy in role-taking.

> (3) Level of Realism. One conforms to rules in
> order to obtain approval or to avoid disappro-
> val. At this level others would be viewed
> much more as status holders, as global persons
> whose attributes were determined mainly by

roles. Understanding of others would there-
for tend to be in terms of knowledge of
stereotypes — what could be expected from a
father, a soldier, a woman. Later discussion
of accuracy measures will indicate that much
of empathic understanding is, in fact, based
on knowledge of stereotype's behaviour.

(4) Level of Autonomy. Rules are now seen as
alterable; the individual as a chooser.
Individual's understanding of other types of
life is now more individualistic and objective.
He can view another as an individual existing
in his own right who makes decisions for which
he is responsible. This level closely parallels
that of Hoffman's third level of the develop-
ment of the sense of the other.

Another theorist who is concerned with the knowledge
upon which we base our understanding of other's behaviour,
and thus accurately anticipate his behaviour, is Weinstein
(1969). He related the genesis of empathy to the emerging
capacity to distinguish self from non-self in line with some
of the other role theorists. He discussed the various forms
of the process of inference about others. One form is pro-
jective role-taking. "If I were confronted by this sort of
situation, how would I act, feel, think?" Researchers on the
empathy process have, on the whole, tried to eliminate pro-
jection in the development of measures of accurate empathy

since it is seen to reflect egocentrism. One can, however,
obtain an accurate picture of the other's perspective by
projection where there is a similarity between the role-taker
and the one whose role is being taken. Like Rockway's (1969)
adolescents, enlightened egocentrism seems justified when
one is dealing with people who have undergone similar
socialization experiences.

Positional role-taking, akin to Peter's Level of
Realism, involves evoking the stereotypic role expectations
associated with the particular social position.

A more differentiated stereotyping is placing the
other into a particular personality category, for example,
nice guy, ambitious, etc. Placement is based on the recogni-
tion of one or two features held by the perceiver to be
central to the category. At the next level, individuation
of the other's system of meaning is mapped on the basis of
his responses. This conceptualization is in line with Selman's
structurally developmental view of social perspective-taking,
interpersonal relations and conception of persons. An obvious
feature of the above conceptualizations as revealed by Table 2
is the considerable overlap and agreement that an empathic
response requires self-other differentiation.

Knowledge of people and behaviour, our mode of
perceiving people, are based on constantly developing struc-
tures of perspective taking, of interpersonal relations
and conceptions of persons, of moral judgment, all arising
from our interactions in the interpersonal domain.

Table 2: Theories on the Relation between the Development of One's Cognitive Sense of the

Other and One's Empathic Response

Selman (1976)	Hoffman (1976)	Peters (1974)	Weinstein (1960)
Levels of Social Perspective taking as the structural basis for stages of interpersonal relations conceptions. Perspective taking level. *Undifferentiated: Level 0 - The egocentric level. The child does not clearly differentiate others' subjectivity from his/her own.	Development of the cognitive sense of others related to the meaning of one's affective response to other's inner states. 1. Gradual emergence of a sense of the other as distinct from self (person permanence). The affective portion of the child's global empathic distress is extended to the separate self and other that emerge.	Genesis of empathy. 1. Emerging capacity to distinguish self from non-self. At 3, most children respond in ways that show recognition of the meaning of affect-connected cues as separate from their own feelings at the time. Shown in expressions of sympathy in response to distress in others.	Levels of personal relationships which correspond with levels of understanding of people and levels of affective response to them. 1. Pre-rational level of experience and reaction to others. Classification of people purely on basis of similarity - no proper identification of individuals. 2. Egocentricity Instrumental view of people: others picked out and named, but classified in terms of their frustrating or pleasure-enhancing properties.

Table 2: continued

Selman (1976)	Hoffman (1976)	Peters (1974)	Weinstein (1960)
Level 1 - The Subjective level: child is able to clearly differentiate the subjective perspectives of self and other: All people have subjective interpretive abilities. Level 2 - The Reciprocal Dyadic or Self-Reflective Level: Now viewing both self and other as subjects, the child realizes that other can view self as a subject reciprocally. ("He is thinking about my thoughts and feelings - I am thinking about his.")	2. Role-taking. Sense of others as physical entities with feelings and thoughts in their own right. Still a tendency towards projection, but emerging awareness that others have independent inner state may lead towards more active efforts to put himself in other's place and find true source of his distress.	2. Empathy extends beyond real pay-off for role taking is to anticipate his behaviour. (i) Projective role taking. (ii) Positional role taking - involves evoking the stereotype role expectations. (iii) Personality stereotyping involves placing others in a particular personality category.	3. Realism. Rules out there, con-conforming to them connected with obtaining approval and avoiding disapproval from peers and authority figures. Others viewed as global persons whose attributes determined mainly by roles. Understanding of others could be in terms of typologies based upon roles.

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Selman (1976)	Hoffman (1976)	Peters (1974)	Weinstein (1960)
Level 3 - The Third Person Dyadic. Preadolescent is able to step back from the reciprocal coordinates of perspectives, (3rd person view, which addresses the reciprocal dyad perspectives and from which is generated a concept of mutuality of perspectives.) **Level 4 - The Qualitative System.** Adolescent generates a further abstraction from the coordination of all possible 3rd person perspectives - a societal perspective can compare and qualitatively contrast sets and levels of perspectives. There is a recognition that mutual perception can occur at a number of levels of interpersonal awarness within the dyad.	3. **Personal Identity.** Synthesis of empathic distress and a mental representation of other's plight. Development of view of other as having his own personal identity - his own life circumstances and inner state beyond the immediate situation. At the high level of sympathic distress the individual can process various types of information (that gained through his own empathic reaction, immediate situational cues and general knowledge about the other's life).	3. **Individuation:** other's system of meanings is mapped on the basis of his responses.	4. **Autonomy:** (i) rules alterable. (ii) individual as a chooser. (iii) authenticity and genuineness. A more individualized and objective view of others - parallels the type of life of which he himself is capable.

Information Gained from External Cues

A second source of information, which we use in making inferences about other people, is the perceptual or external input from the overt behaviour of the other person or from other cue sources in the immediate environmment. This area has been investigated by research under the heading of Person Perception or Person Cognition. Cues from another person, which provide part of the knowledge upon which we base our inference about another's state, may be verbal or non-verbal. The empathee may well be expressing verbally much of what he feels and thinks at the particular moment. And this type of communication — to the extent that it is open and honest and coming from a person who is verbally articulate — certainly is one source of information.

Figure 2:   Information Gained from External Cues

Importance of Non-verbal Behaviour in Empathic Communication

Research on person perception has stressed non-verbal cues as most significant sources of information about another's state. Mehrabian (1968) in measuring verbal and vocal language modalities and combining these channels with

the facial non-language modality found that the total message of affect is 7% verbal, 38% vocal, and 55% facial. That is, 93% of affect was communicated non-verbally. Davitz (1964) expressed the view that the non-verbal aspects of any communication are of prime importance in understanding the message expressed. "No matter what verbal or logical-mathematical meanings are expressed, the very modes by which these meanings are communicated also contain stylistic, non-verbal elements which have emotional meaning" (Davitz, 1964, 201). The task of non-verbal communication research has been to discover the unwritten rules established by centuries of communication through language without words.

Jecker, Maccoby and Breitrose (1964, quoted by Knapp, 1971) and Allen and Atkinson (1978) investigated students' non-verbal movement in the classroom as a form of feedback to the teacher of student's comprehension. Jecker et al. found relevant categories of non-verbal behaviour. They included (a) the amount of time the pupil watched the teacher, (b) the number of times he looked away, (c) amount of blinking, lowering or raising of eyebrows, general body movements, mouth movements. Their studies indicated that non-verbal behaviour is extremely important in teacher-student interaction in regular classroom settings (Grant and Hemmings, 1971). In addition to serving as a discriminatory or directional cue, non-verbal responses from students also provide positive and negative reinforcement for performance of the teacher role.

Carkhuff's human relation training model which postulates certain facilitative conditions for communication has generated research in the non-verbal communication areas. Carkhuff's facilitative conditions (discussed more fully in Chapter 4) include empathy, respect, genuineness, warmth. Taking their orientation from Carkhuff's model, Tepper and Haase (1978) studied verbal and non-verbal cues in a multi-channel communication paradigm to assess their effect on the communication of empathy, respect, genuiness. Counsellors and clients rated video-taped interactions between counsellor and client each portraying a different combination of verbal message, trunk lean, eye contact, vocal intonation and facial expression. Results of the ratings of empathy, respect and genuineness revealed that non-verbal cues in the paradigm accounted for significantly greater message variance than did the verbal message. Previously unstudied cues of vocal intonation and facial expression with these dependent variables proved to be significant contributors to the final judgments of facilitative conditions. Tepper and Haase (1978) had previously found that the ratio of non-verbal to verbal message variance was 2:1 in the judged communication of empathy. Facial expression accounted for 26.05% of the variability in judged empathy followed by the verbal message (16.94%), eye contact (6.03%), trunk lean (3.14%) and vocal intonation (1.14%). Tepper and Haase (1978) concluded that the cues manipulated in their study clearly operate as a system and depend heavily on the relative balance between

the cues in terms of the message which is ultimately perceived. A study by Gafner and Shores (1978) was concerned with student perception of teacher warmth through verbal, non-verbal and combined channels of communication. Seventy-five high school students reacted to a video tape using a teacher warmth rating scale. They defined warmth as "teacher behaviour that is perceived by students as empathic, caring and contributing to a relaxed mutually respectful atmosphere" (Gafner and Shores, 1978, 3). Post hoc analysis indicated that students were aware of affective states conveyed by teachers and their warmth was perceived primarily through non-verbal channels, specifically smiles, nods, gestures, body movements, use of time. Selected students who were asked to identify behaviours contributing to their perceptions mentioned only teacher's use of eyes.

Keeping in mind the importance of non-verbal cues as a source of information about another's state, what do we know at present about the perception and accurate interpretation of these cues? Part of the problem plaguing the development of reliable criteria for the interpretation of non-verbal behaviours has been the inadequacy of stimulus materials and the imprecision of measurement techniques. Methodological problems related to such measures will be discussed in the chapter on measurement.

What is non-verbal communication and what are the ways of classifying it?

Gladstein (1974) in his review of research on non-verbal communication, identified two views. The broad view of non-verbal communication held by researchers such as Birdwhistell (1952, 1970, quoted by Gladstein) includes everything except the words that exist in transactions between people. The narrow view differentiates non-verbal communication from non-verbal behaviour. Non-verbal communication (NVC) must have intention and must have purpose. This is the view taken by Ekman (1964) whose research concentrated upon observable behaviour which is assumed to carry meaning. One empirically based finding identified by Gladstein is that NVC can be reliably classified in the counselling - therapy situation. The main areas of NVC which have been studied have been mentioned in Mehrabian's studies (1972). Mehrabian obtained data concerning kinestics (including eye, head, shoulder, hand, leg, foot, etc. movements),paralanguage (including speech length, verbal reinforcers, speech error rate) and proxemics (distance between subjects, trunk lean, and touching). One notable attempt to systematize body language was made by Birdwhistell. In viewing body motion as a socially patterned system of behaviour having communicational potential, he developed a system for categorizing body motions. He assumed that, although basic motions are unique to the individual, those of many people can be combined into groups of similar motions having the same message: in

parallel with the linguistic system of combining individual

phonetic sounds into more general phonic classes and higher

classes of morphemes with definite communicational content.

Birdwhistell was not concerned with determining the meaning

of specific body motion but rather emphasized the need for

an accurate microscopic system of codifying behaviour for

purposes of clinical, anthropological or other studies of man.

Eldred and Price (1958) developed a classification

system for paralanguage to include alterations of pitch,

of volume, of rate. A variety of classification systems

have been developed to measure NVC in the counselling therapy

research (Deutsch, 1963; Cullen, 1966; Dunning, 1971, all

quoted in Gladstein, 1977). There is now also a growing

interest in increasing teachers' sensitivity to non-verbal

cues. As Koch (1971) pointed out, this approach is especially

important as children are not so verbal as adults and often

do a poor job of expressing themselves. A child begins life

as a totally non-verbal person and gradually learns to use

verbal expressions. The less intelligent and the younger

he/she is, the less adept he/she will be at expressing him/

herself verbally. The new interest in non-verbal cues in

the classroom is part of the observational approach to child

study where teachers are asked to record specific behaviours

of pupils in a particular time span.

Research on Person Perception and Judging Another's Emotional
State on the Basis of Non-verbal Cues

General findings. Tagiuri noted that the two
external sources of information — the object person and the
situation — yield highly determinate judgments. Due to years
of conditioning where certain cues are associated with certain
expressed verbal and non-verbal behaviours, we tend to know
both that certain situations tend to evoke feelings A, B,
and C and that a certain expression of behaviour reflects
feelings C, D, E. Given this particular situation and given
the person's expression, we judge that the feeling is
probably B. Secord and Backman (1964) studied physiognomy
as a source of impression formation. Though they were not
concerned with reading emotional states from facial expres-
sions, one relevant finding repeatedly confirmed is that the
judges show marked agreement in attributing certain personality
impressions to faces with particular physiognomic character-
istics. In the 1960s, Davitz initiated a series of studies
on the communication of emotional meaning using non-verbal
behaviour. In the area of sensitivity, studies were made on
the ability to understand vocal, facial, musical, graphic and
metaphorical modes of communicating emotion. Their most
significant finding was that, although individuals indeed
differ in their ability to communicate, the results demon-
strate incontrovertibly that non-verbal emotional communication
is a stable, measurable phenomenon. Stability and consistency
held for accuracy and error in the identification of meaning.

Beldoch's (1964) study compared the ability to identify emotional meanings expressed in different media, music, graphic and vocal. He found scores in all three media were positively related to each other as well as being positively related to verbal intelligence. Verbal intelligence, however, did not account for the common variance among the three measures of sensitivity. Davitz and Mattis found that sensitivity to vocal expressions was positively related to sensitivity to facial expressions. The tendency to attend selectively to emotional meanings was also stable.

Research on facial affect. Early research in the area of facial affect concentrated on developing a reliable method for measuring facial expressions, resulting in conflicting reports on the reliability of affect communication. Schlosberg (1952, 1954) proposed a new approach. Using Woodworth's (1938) affect categories of happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, and contempt, Schlosberg proposed two dimensions of facial expression: pleasantness-unpleasantness (UP) and attention-rejection (AR) plus a third dimension (SP) for the level of activation of the expressed emotion. Schlosberg and others have used a variety of dimensional analysis methods and scaling procedures to see whether the three dimensions were maintained and to study their scalar properties. Triandes and Lambert (1958) replicated and extended this work in a cross-cultural investigation. These

further studies led to the conclusion that facial expressions

can properly be described by a two dimensional surface with

a relatively long UP dimension and a shorter AR axis.

Building on Schlosberg's formulation, Ekman (1965)

investigated the issue of unitary emission of affect cues

by obvious units of human communication (face, body, hands)

arbitrarily divided for purposes of measurement. An extended

study (Ekman and Friesen, 1968) proposed four body areas for

non-verbal cue interpretation (body acts, body position,

facial expression and head orientation) and two types of

information about affect (nature and intensity). Based on

his observations, Ekman proposed that the face is an affect

display system while the body indicates efforts regarding

affect. Posed as opposed to spontaneous facial behaviour

was judged as showing the same emotion across literate

cultures as well as pre-literate cultures. According to

Gladstein (1974), Elkman's neuro.-cultural explanation fits

most current research at least for facial behaviour. For

him the pan-cultural muscular movements in the face document

the biological basis while the specific meaning given to

facial displays shows the cultural differences. This common-

ality influenced Ekman and his colleagues to return to

emotion specific categories as the basis of measurement

rather than the Schlosberg's emotion dimension approach

(Ekman, Friesen and Tomkins, 1971).

Ekman et al. (1971) stated that seven emotion cate-

gories have been found in judgments made from still photo-

graphs of posed facial behaviour. They are: happiness,

surprise, fear, anger, sadness, disgust/contempt and interest.

There are few experiments which allow observers free choice

of response and show them facial behaviour in motion from

spontaneous situations. Such experiments may well show a

more extensive list. Ekman and his co-workers have constructed

the facial affects scoring technique (FAST) for the measure-

ment of facial expressions. The FAST technique utilizes

three facial areas: brows, forehead, eyes, lids, bridge of

nose, and lower face. Appraisal is by description of the

position of the features and wrinkles, tension and relaxation

in specific features. FAST has succeeded in predicting how

observers will judge emotion for six emotion categories,

regardless of possible psychological or physiognomic differ-

ences across a sample of 28 stimulus persons. Ekman, Friesen

and Tomkin's FAST has validity for predicting the recognition

value of high-agreement, single-emotion photographs. It

needs still to be determined whether FAST can predict

stimuli judged to be blends and emotions recognized from

spontaneous facial behaviour.

Coleman (1949) and Hanawalt (1944) found that the

discriminations of negative emotions made solely from the

upper half of the face are frequently as accurate as those

made from full face expressions. On the other hand, the

lower half of the face provides more reliable cues for dis-

criminating positive emotions.

It seems then that there are ways of classifying

the affect communicated by facial expressions but with vary-
ing reliability. As indicated earlier in the discussion of
the methodological problems of person perception, facial
expression is only one of many cues that a person utilizes
in inferring another state. In 1928, Fernberger concluded
that "if the stimulus situation is indicated, the emotional
state is judged in accordance with that situation rather than
in accordance with the facial expression" (Tagiuri, 1969, 402).
Tagiuri stated that Fernberger's conclusion may still apply
to many of the current experiments. In the real life
situation, facial expression is one important aspect of the
sequence being judged. Hebb (1946) made the additional
point that an important cue for judging emotion is knowledge
of the baseline state of expression preceding the emotional
expression being judged.

Body movements, positions and gestures. Scheflen
(1964) found that configurations of posture and body position-
ing indicate at a glance a great deal about what's going on
in an interaction. Scheflen posited that even though
behaviour may appear to be a continuous stream of events,
specific behaviours make up communicative programs that may
be grouped in standard units. Scheflen identified the larger
units of postural communication as points, positions, and
presentation. An example is when the typical American
speaker takes a position of the head and eyes and holds it
for a few sentences. This unit of fairly static postural

behaviour, Scheflen called the point because it loosely

corresponds to making a point in a discussion. A sequence

of several points forms the next larger unit of communication

called by Scheflen the position. A change in position is

indicated by a gross postural shift. Scheflen noted that

positions would be held sometimes for as long as twenty

minutes by the therapist. The largest unit suggested by

Scheflen is the presentation comprising the totality of posi-

tions in the particular interaction. Scheflen observed that

there are only about twenty-six traditional American gestures

and even fewer culturally standard postural configurations.

One problem pointed out by Gladstein is that many early

studies classifying non-verbal behaviour like kinesics

did not report any reliability data. One study which does

report reliability data in the area of kinesics is that of

Island (1966). He used a classification system involving

seventeen categories for describing the three body areas of

head and face, arms and hands, and body torso. Using films

of counselling, he had judges mark movements within each

five-second time interval. As a result of carefully training

his judges, using very specific categories, he was able to

establish a high degree of agreement among the four judges.

Proxemics. An early study on proxemics using formal

experimental evidence was conducted by James (1932). Using

thirty photographs of a masked male model as stimulus material,

he developed four postural categories. Approach or withdrawal

based on the position of the body in relation to the receiver,
and expansion or contraction based on the combination of
bodily configurations (bowed or raised head, expanded or
sunken chest, raised or sloped shoulders, etc.). He found
that subjects generally interpreted the stimulus the same way
within the four categories proposed. Investigating the factor
of distance between communicators, Little (1965) found that
effective communication was positively correlated with a
small intervening distance. A comprehensive series of experi-
ments on proxemics and attitudes was conducted by Mehrabian
(1965, 1967, 1968, 1969) and Mehrabian and Williams (1969).
Mehrabian (1969) summarizing the literature on the signifi-
cance of distance between communicator and addressee found it
correlated with the degree of negative attitude inferred by
or communicated to the addressee.

Eye contact and emotional states. A few explora-
tions have been made of the relationship of visual behaviour
to emotional states. Kanfer (1960) and Doehring (1957)
investigated the relationship of eye blink rates and anxiety
states. Ruckmich (1921) and Woodworth (1938) studied visual
behaviour in relation to judgments of emotional expression.
Gladstein (1977) quoted Argyle's and Dean's (1965) and
Kendon's (1967) suggestion that smiling, interaction distance,
eye engagement, and the intimacy of the verbal content are
all related to this dimension of intimacy. Ellsworth and
Carlsmith (1968) found that with positive verbal contact,

frequent eye contact produces more positive evaluation.

Paralanguage. In the NVC area one finding which
is supported by empirical literature is that "we know most
about paralanguage in the counselling therapy process"
(Gladstein, 1974, 38). Gladstein considered that the classi-
fication system produced by Matarazzo et al. (1968) is the
best empirically based paralanguage measure. Using a
therapist-patient interaction model, these researchers ob-
tained highly reliable findings for duration of utterance, dura-
tion of latency, and percentage of interruption using both
audio tapes and written transcripts of real therapy sessions.
Duncan, Rice and Butler (1968) compared the paralanguage
characteristics of peak and poor therapy hours. Specifically
they obtained from audio tape, measures of intensity, pitch,
vocal lip control and non-fluencies as unfilled hesitation
pauses. By comparing therapists' peak and poor interviews,
they were able to find paralanguage differences including
the following: In the peak interviews, the therapist used
(a) normal stress with open voice, (b) normal stress with
over soft intensity and overflow pitch, and (c) non-fluencies
with the exception of filled pauses. They interpreted this
as meaning that the therapist was displaying seriousness,
warmth, or was relaxed. "In those moments when open voice
was present, the therapist would sound especially close,
concerned and warm. The absence of filled pauses is also
notable." (Duncan, Rice and Butler, 1968, 569). By contrast

the poor interviews indicated: (a) flat stress, (b) normal
stress with over soft intensity and normal pitch, and
(c) inappropriate stress.

A study by Rubenstein and Cameron (1968) used some
sophisticated hardware in measuring paralanguage. Using a
sonograph they identified three indices of vocal change:
frequency, amplitude, and duration. These were then compared
for patient responses when emotional content was involved,
and when neutral content existed in therapy interviews. They
concluded that we recognize that patient's emotional change
by certain voice changes that can be measured best by
frequency differences.

Summarizing the findings in the NVC area, one can
say that NVC can be reliably classified and a high degree of
consensual judgment obtained. The more information is pro-
vided in the form of cues from the object person and situation
the more accurate the judgment is likely to be. Paralanguage
is the one area where most reliable classification system
and measures have been developed.

Increasing a Person's Sensitivity to
Emotional Expressions of Others

An important element implicit in most of the research
is the ability of the observer to learn to interpret non-
verbal behaviour. Exline (1972) and Ekman (1971) indicated
that observers, given a little practice can easily use a
particular measurement technique with a high degree of accuracy

Mattis (in Davitz, 1964) compared the performance of a con-
trol group of twenty-one undergraduate college students with
twenty-three experimental subjects on their ability to
identify emotional expressions on the tape developed by
Beldoch (in Davitz, 1964). The experimental subjects received
a variety of experiences. They were divided into sub-groups
of three or four subjects each. The first listened to a
practice tape in which speakers recited the alphabet trying
to express each of the emotional meanings contained in the
Beldoch test. Subjects tried to identify the emotional
meanings expressed on the practice tape, then the practice
tape was replayed and before each item subjects were told
emotional meaning the speaker was trying to express. Then
each subject attempted to express each emotional meaning
contained in the tapes and these expressions were discussed
by the other members of that subject's sub-group. These
training sessions lasted approximately fifteen minutes and
after training, the subjects once again took the Beldoch
test. The correlations for both the experimental and the
control groups were significantly different from zero (beyond
the .01 level) indicating that most of the increment for
both groups occurred with those subjects whose initial scores
were relatively low. Comparing the increment of scores in
the two groups by an analysis of covariance a significant F
ratio was obtained. Thus the results support the hypothesis
that training increased accuracy of identification. Mattis's
aim was to determine whether or not any kind of short term

training affected the stable difference in test performance and his findings demonstrate that the particular procedures he used did indeed have such an effect.

Hansford (1977) aimed at changing the awareness of and sensitivity to non-verbal cues of trainee teachers. Using a peer micro-teaching program, the study also endeavoured to examine the relationship between various conditions of controlled feedback, personality dimension of dogmatism, and change in non-verbal perceptiveness. Subjects were seventy-four trainee teachers from an Australian University. Hansford used a 35 mm sound film consisting of 220 two-second auditory and/or visual segments. Respondents were provided with an answer sheet containing 220 pairs of descriptions and asked to select the best description to the non-verbal cue that they had just seen and/or heard. There were three treatments. One was peer micro-teaching with public feedback. A second was peer micro-teaching with private feedback and the third, no micro-teaching. This program ran two hours each week over seven weeks. Results indicated that there was a much greater likelihood of closed minded or dogmatic subjects experiencing positive change in non-verbal perceptiveness when involved in the treatment peer micro-teaching with public feedback. There were individual differences in the extent to which subjects perceived and used non-verbal cues. Hansford noted that despite the recent upsurge of interest in non-verbal communication, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence regarding the non-verbal receptive-

ness of individuals in various social settings. With regard
to classrooms, the ability of teachers both to react accurately
and to send congruent non-verbal messages could well be
related to job satisfaction and teacher effectiveness.

In a series of experiments Kagan and his associates
(1967) attempted to increase a person's affective sensitivity
by a method called Interpersonal Process Recall (IPR). It
is a procedure through which a client views and reacts to
a replay of an immediately preceding counselling session
by the medium of television videotape. The original coun-
sellor leaves the scene and the client interacts with a
new individual referred to as an interrogator or recall
counsellor. The recall session is transcribed. The role
of the third person is to facilitate the client's analysis
his underlying thoughts, feelings, images, expectations,
and his general pattern of interaction with the counsellor.
The interrogator tries to keep the client focussed on the
feeling and content of the original relationship. The IPR
technique was varied in several instances in the course of
the studies comprising the project. Simulation techniques
and measurement procedures were developed. IPR was found to
have significant value in teaching the client to interrogate
himself and gain insight through the self-confronting experi-
ence afforded by the videotape. It was also used in coun-
sellor education supervision. It helped counsellors to
become more sensitive to clients' non-verbal behaviour as a
result of hearing clients describe the feelings they were having at

certain times during the interview when non-verbal behaviour was being enacted. This provided supplementary information to what was observed on the videotape.

As part of his project, Kagan and his associates using the material from recorded IPR sessions, attempted to develop and validate an instrument to test the subject's ability to detect and identify the immediate affective state of another — the Affective Sensitivity Scale. Though admitting that the reliability coefficients obtained were far from ideal, Kagan expressed the view that, even with the present reliability, it would seem that the scale and instrument had some practical and certainly a great deal of theoretical value. In attempting to validate the measure Kagan found the instrument responsive to experiences of an intensive nature such as a T group. The T group or encounter group provided very intensive brief interpersonal experience in studying one's own emotions, the emotions of others, and one's impact on others in a group. Though the instrument recorded only small group gains after very intensive group experience, large pre- to post-training changes among individual members were recorded.

Danish and Kagan (1971) speculated that some individuals are strongly resistant to change, and the kind of experiences used to improve affective sensitivity may actually encourage such people to defend themselves more tenaciously and to decrease their scores on the scale. In fact, Kagan has found a positive correlation between the Affective

Sensitivity Scale and the K score of the MMPI. A high score on the K scale has been found to be positively related to openness on the Rokeach dogmatism scale. This is consistent with the findings of Hansford on the negative relationship between dogmatism and non-verbal perceptiveness. On this basis, Kagan suggested that a sensitivity growth producing experience for a low scoring individual would be one which would provide him with the means of assessing and reorganizing his own personality structure. He would need to recognize his own emotions and his distortions of the communications from others. He might, then, need to practise using his new and less distorted perceptual labels.

The above discussion has emphasized that different aspects of non-verbal behaviour (such as facial expression, body movements, proxemics, eye contact) have been shown to convey information about a person to an observer with considerable reliability. Evidence has also been presented that persons low on dogmatism are able to increase their sensitivity to non-verbal cues after training.

This chapter has examined research related to the process of understanding others' feelings and perspectives. Sources of knowledge coming from within the perceiver as well as those coming from external cues were discussed. Discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 has indicated the complex nature of the construct of empathy. The attentional and experiential phases involve the structures of social perspective-taking, of reciprocity, levels of conception of persons; and based upon these structures, the processes of perception of people and of inference about their perspectives.

CHAPTER 4

THE COMMUNICATION PHASE

Discussion in Chapter 1 of theory and research
relating to the structures and skills involved in the empathic
process led to the conceptualization of relational empathy
as an interactive process involving three phases. The first
two phases, the attentional phase and the experiential phase
were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Theory and research
relating to the communication phase are dealt with in this
chapter.

The communication phase involves two steps:
(1) Person A expresses his empathic understanding to B by
means of words and/or non-verbal signals, and (2) Person B
receives the empathic communication.

Step One of the Communication Phase

The most significant contribution to this phase of
the empathic communication process has come from the formu-
lations originated by Carl Rogers (1957) in the counselling
therapy context, operationalized by Charles Truax (1967),
and refined by Robert Carkhuff to produce the Human Resource
Development Model (1969a, 1969b, 1971). As this study
uses a modified version of Carkhuff's Human Resource
Development Model (Gazda, 1977) in training student-teachers
in the communication phase skills, the background, rationale,

evaluation and research related to the model will be discussed
in some detail.

Communication of Empathic Understanding
as a Facilitative Condition in the Interpersonal Relationship

Carl Rogers (1957) developed a theory of therapy
and personality change, specifying that certain conditions
in the interpersonal relationship between counsellor (or
therapist) and client account for constructive personality
change. He stated that for therapy to occur, it is necessary
that the following conditions exist:

> (1) That two persons are in contact.
>
> (2) That the first person, whom we shall
> term the client is in a state of incongruence,
> being vulnerable, or anxious.
>
> (3) That the second person, whom we shall
> term the therapist, is congruent in the
> relationship.
>
> (4) That the therapist experiences uncon-
> ditional positive regard towards the client.
>
> (5) That the therapist is experiencing an
> empathic understanding of the client's internal
> frame of reference.
>
> (6) That the client perceives, at least to a
> minimal degree, conditions (4) and (5), the
> unconditional regard of the therapist for him,
> and the empathic understanding of the therapist.
>
> (Rogers, 1959, 213).

Thus empathic understanding, congruence and unconditional
positive regard were "the necessary and sufficient" conditions
for client growth. (Note: the words "congruent" and "genuine"
have been used interchangeably).

On the basis of clinical experience and research,

Rogers, Truax, and Carkhuff have set down that these core conditions do not only facilitate the therapeutic process but also apply to all effective interpersonal processes. These core conditions are particularly relevant to interpersonal encounters between those persons designated by society as more knowing or helpers (parents, teachers, counsellors) and those designated as less knowing or helpees (children, students, clients). It may be noted that the core conditions essential to facilitative interpersonal relationships have changed over time and from author to author as indicated in Table 3.

Table 3: Core Conditions Facilitating Interpersonal
         Relationships

Rogers	Truax	Carkhuff
Empathic under-standing.	Accurate empathy.	Empathic under-standing.
Unconditional positive regard.	Genuineness.	Genuineness.
Congruence.	Non-possessive warmth.	Respect.
	Concretness.	Concreteness.
	Self-disclosure.	Confrontation.
	Potency.	Self-disclosure.
		Immediacy.

The only condition which can be said to be the same for the above three authors is empathic understanding. While this condition has endured, the others have changed, either in name or in meaning. Building on Roger's theory, Truax and Carkhuff (1967) developed an integrated, didactic and experiential approach to training counsellors that taught them to communicate the core conditions of inter-personal effectiveness. In an effort to systematize counsellor training. Carkhuff (1969a, 1969b, 1971, 1972) refined and elaborated on his work with Truax, producing the Human Resource Development Model, HRD. He identified the core conditions of therapeutic relationships and cate-gorized them under two headings: the facilitative dimensions and the action dimensions. The facilitative conditions or dimensions, characterized by sensitive and responsive components, are empathy, respect, genuineness and concrete-ness. The action dimensions are self-disclosure, confronta-tion and immediacy. The following definitions of Carkhuff's core conditions come from Egan's model, a modified version of Carkhuff's HRD model designed for training in groups (Egan, 1976).

ACCURATE EMPATHY: The helper communicates an accurate understanding of the feelings, experiences and behaviours of the client from the client's frame of reference. Such empathy helps to establish trust and rapport and in-creases the level of the client's self exploration.

CONCRETENESS: The helper assists the client speak

about concrete and specific feelings, experiences and be-
haviours in specific situations. He encourages relevant
disclosure rather than story telling. Concreteness is most
important in the early stages as it leads on to action
programs.

GENUINENESS: The helper is always himself. He
is not phoney; he does not hide behind professional roles,
he is spontaneous and open; he is non-defensive.

RESPECT: The helper's verbal and non-verbal be-
haviour indicates that he is 'for' the client, working for
his interests. He is initially non-judgmental but gradually
helps the client place demands on himself. He shows regard
for the individuality and the resources of the client.

SELF DISCLOSURE: The helper is ready to disclose
anything about himself that will enable the client to under-
stand himself better but he actually discloses himself only
when it will help rather than distract the client. He
discloses himself in a way that keeps the focus on the client.

CONFRONTATION: The helper challenges discrepancies
in the client's life and in the client's communication with
the helper. He invites him to explore these discrepancies.
He challenges the client to employ unused resources.

IMMEDIACY: The helper talks about what is happen-
ing between himself and the client in the here-and-now of
their relationship, as a way of helping the client explore
his interpersonal style and of helping him see himself from
alternative frames of references.

Within the context of this thesis, which is con-
cerned with improving teacher-student interpersonal relation-
ships rather than therapy, discussion will centre on the
core facilitative condition of empathy. Rogers, Truax,
and Carkhuff have considered it the most critical of all
facilitative conditions. Its meaning, however, has changed
from author to author.

Rogers first addressed the concept of empathy in
his book, Client-Centered Therapy, as follows:

> This formulation would state that it is the
> counsellor's function to assume, in so far as
> he is able, the internal frame of reference of
> the client, to perceive the world as the client
> sees it, to perceive the client himself as he
> is seen by himself,... and to communicate some-
> thing of this empathic understanding to the
> client.
> (Rogers, 1951, 29)

Rogers focussed on empathic understanding by the counsellor
of his client. For him the concept was phenomenological in
nature and as such difficult to measure. This aspect of
empathy is well illustrated by the following elaboration:

> When the client's world is thus clear to the
> therapist and he moves about in it freely, then
> he can both communicate his understanding of
> what is clearly known to the client and can also
> voice meanings in the client's experience of
> which the client is scarcely aware.
> (Rogers, 1957, 99).

The position is very close to Gribble and Oliver's
conception of empathy as involving a knowledge and an
affective condition.

Truax, one of Carl Roger's students, in attempting

to operationalize the therapeutic process, focussed on the

communicative phase of the empathic process. He was concerned

with empathy as an interpersonal skill rather than as an

internal condition. In an introduction to a scale for the

measurement of accurate empathy, Truax pointed out that:

> Accurate empathy involves both the sensitivity
> to current feelings and the verbal ability to
> communicate this understanding in a language
> attuned to the client's current feelings.
> (Truax, 1967, 555)

> To communicate this perception in a language
> attuned to the client that allows him more clearly
> to sense and formulate his confusion, his fear,
> his rage or his anger is the essence of the
> communicative aspects of accurate empathy.
> (Truax, 1967, 104)

Truax was attempting to reduce empathy to specific

behaviours which could be more easily observed and therefore

measured. It is on this basis that he developed the Accurate

Empathy Scale, outlined in the following pages.

Robert Carkhuff emphasized empathy as "perhaps the

most critical of all helping dimensions" (Carkhuff, 1969b, 83).

Carkhuff's major contribution to the concept of empathy was

his definition of "additive empathy". It involves going

beyond the material which the helpee presents:

> The accurately empathic therapeutic person not
> only indicates a sensitive understanding of the
> patient's apparent feelings, but goes further to
> clarify and expand what is hinted by voice, posture,
> and content cues.
> (Truax and Mitchell, 1970, 318)

In summary it may be said that, to Rogers, empathy

was an internal state of one person's trying to understand

another. In Truax and Carkhuff's desire for more accurate
and reliable measurement, the condition has developed until
it is now regarded as a skill rather than as an internal
state of being. Either directly or by implication, empathy
has become identified with such terms as "skill", "reinforcer",
"ability", and "response". Most of the measures of empathy
developed within this framework are measures of a person's
ability to communicate accurate empathy, rather than measures
of empathy itself. An implication of Truax and Carkhuff's
approach is that empathy - as well as other therapist
conditions (genuineness and warmth) - can be taught to aspir-
ing helpers.

Since the evidence of the efficacy of Carkhuff's
HRD model has come from research which measured the conditions
and procedures of the model by means of the Accurate Empathy
rating scale, it is necessary to examine the features of
the scale and the criticisms that have been levelled at its
validity and reliability.

The Accurate Empathy Scale

In 1967, Truax developed the Accurate Empathy Scale (AE)
whose purpose was to provide criteria by which to assess a
person's level of functioning on the core condition of empathy.
Accurate empathy was defined as one person's sensitivity to
the here-and-now communication especially the feeling com-
ponent, of another person and the ability to express this

understanding in ways regarded as appropriate by the other

(concreteness, genuineness, and warmth). Empathy, as well

as the other core conditions, were operationally defined and

rating scales were developed on the basis of judges' repeated

ratings of segments of audio-tape recordings of theraphy

sessions of a small number of high-, moderate-, and low-level

functioning therapists (as assessed by expert judges). The

original scales (which were 9-, 7-, and 5-point scales) were

modified by Carkhuff into solely 5-point scales. These

assess the facilitative dimensions of the helper. On all

scales, Level 3 is defined as the minimally facilitative

level of interpersonal functioning, which means that any

responses by the counsellor at lower levels do not facilitate

the therapeutic process but may, in fact, take away from it.

The Accurate Empathy Scale (AE) is shown in Table 4. Some

brief comments clarifying the empathy scale follow, with

examples of responses to the following helpee situation -

Male: "I am so fat, I haven't got any chance with girls."

(Gazda, 1977).

Level 1. One's response seems to indicate an

unawareness of even the most obvious feelings of the other.

The response does not indicate even the slightest under-

standing of what the other is attempting to communicate.

Example: "Since you know what it is, why don't you do

something about it."

Level 2. One's response indicates some under-

standing of the other's most obvious feelings. The response

Table 4: Accurate Empathy Scale[*]

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5
One person seems unaware of even the most obvious feelings of the other. No empathy, no accuracy. Responses such as questions, solutions to problems, sympathy, support and evaluative statements are common at this level.	Some accuracy to other's most obvious feelings. Less obvious feelings ignored. Description of feelings attempted but better words available.	Often accurate to more obvious feelings. Displays an awareness of less obvious feelings. Responses to this level tend to be good paraphrases - they are interchangeable.	Almost always accurate to feelings. Aware of less obvious feelings, occasionally accurate to less evident feelings. Responses at this level are tentative and accurate.	Always accurate to more obvious feelings. Aware of less obvious feelings and most always accurate to less obvious feelings. Responses at this level communicate that "I am with you".

* R. C. Conclin. Accurate Empathy. Unpublished manuscript, University of Calgary, 1975.

to feelings is approximate but a better word or phrase is available to describe the feeling. Example: "Oh, that's nothing to worry about for a guy that's been as popular as you. The right girl is going to come along."

Level 3. <u>One's response indicates an accurate understanding of the other's most obvious feelings</u>. Less obvious feelings are recognized but their nature is misunderstood and labels cannot be attached to them. One neither adds nor detracts from the other's communication. Responses at this stage tend to be accurate paraphrases of the communication - the two being interchangeable. Example: "I guess you feel kind of left out. You figure your weight is keeping you from being more successful with the girls."

Level 4. <u>One's response indicated accuracy with regard to the obvious feelings and occasional accuracy with regards to less obvious feelings</u>. One adds something of significance to the other's message. Example: "It is depressing to see everyone around you have fun and not being part of it. You don't know what will happen to you if you don't improve your appearance."

Level 5. <u>One's response indicates complete accuracy with regard to the obvious feelings and usual accuracy with less obvious feelings</u>. The accuracy and tentativeness allow the other to continue self-exploration and/or understanding at deeper levels.

Validity of Scale

Rappaport and Chinsky (1972; Chinsky and Rappaport, 1970), have claimed that the AE Scale has not been shown to measure what it purports to measure. They speculated that the rating on the AE Scale reflects therapists' qualities other than those included in the definition of the construct. There is some support for this claim. Bozarth and Krauft (1972) found that empathy ratings correlated moderately ($r = .46$, $p < .01$) with a characteristic labelled Good Therapist and with another called Likeability ($r = .27$, $p < .01$). Caracena and Vicory (1969) found Accurate Empathy ratings to be significantly and positively related to the number of words spoken by the therapist and the proportion of the therapist-client conversation spoken by the therapist. Caracena and Vicory interpreted this to indicate that, "Judges ... may be forced to depend upon superficial objective interviewer behaviours that are more readily available to them than is information about an abstract variable such as empathy" (Caracena and Vicory, 1969, 514).

Carkhuff (1969a) has developed seven scales which purport to measure separate dimensions of therapists' behaviour. Results however, from recent studies have challenged the independence of the scales. A factor analysis by Muehlberg, Pierce and Drasgow (1969) found a "good guy" factor, which accounted for 89% of the variance among empathy, regard, genuineness, concreteness and self-disclosure ratings. Support for the notion of global therapist quality is provided

by Shapiro (1968) who reported that the ratings by clients

of therapists on an understanding - no understanding dimension

correlated lowest with AE (.67) and highest with warmth (.87)

and genuineness (.73). "Although proof for global quality is

not definitive, evidence for the independence of the scales

is clearly lacking" (Gormally and Hill, 1974, 543). While it

may be conceded that the AE Scale is able to predict certain

outcome measures, the predicting variables may be other than

empathy as defined. Correlates of empathy such as counsellor

commitment, interest and involvement, perhaps partially

expressed through talkativeness, may play a role in the

predictive value of the AE. Beutler (1973) estimated the

consistency of eight therapists acting with 54 inpatients

from one segment to another within the same session, and

from one patient to the next. His results suggested that

the AE may not be a stable quality of the therapist but

instead may reflect a dyadic or relationship variable.

McWhirter (1973) carried out a study on the discriminant

validity of the measure. Counsellor trainees were rated by

coached clients using the Barrett Lennard Relationship

Inventory and by trained judges using the Truax-Carkhuff

rating scales. Correlation coefficients between measures of

empathy, warmth, and genuineness and total scores on the R.I.

were not significant at the .05 level. This result may be

explained, according to McWhirter (1973), by the possibility

that clients based their judgment on total interaction

whereas judges used only verbal interactions on audio taped

interviews. He referred to Shapiro's (1968) data which

suggests that the visual cues account for one-third of the

variance in therapeutic conditions.

Another problem, identified by Gormally and Hill,

is the difficulty of quantifying helper responses. Carkhuff's

scale lacks operational specificity which makes it difficult

to maintain objectivity and standardization of the scale

used in ratings. If standardized training on the scale is

not provided similar to methods in Truax and Carkhuff (1967),

use of the rating scale measurement may vary across studies.

They also raise the point that research needs to determine

if a Level 3 is minimally facilitative, and whether there

are two different levels below the Level 3.0 in the empathy

scale. It appears that below 3.0 trainees learn the form

of empathic responses and that 3.0 is an upper limit for

brief training. Above Level 3, trainees need to incorporate

a sense of timing, persuasion, confidence, appreciation of

client dynamics. Carkhuff and his associates have attempted

to provide further evidence for the validity of the scale

by research on counsellor level of functioning, as measured

by the AE Scale, and client outcome.

Research on counsellor level of functioning and client outcome

The rationale for the use of the Truax-Carkhuff

rating scales has been the research-based claim by Carkhuff

that the scales are related to the process and positive

outcome of counselling and psychotherapy (Truax and Carkhuff, 1967). Resnikoff (1972a) has criticised the actual research evidence for this claim from the viewpoint of rigour. One study on schizophrenic patients reported by Truax and Carkhuff (1967) indicated a high positive relationship (.77) between therapists' level of functioning on AE Scale and a composite outcome measure; a combination of psychological test change data, diagnostic evaluations of personality change, and the measure of time-out in hospitals since the beginning of treatment. Significant relationships were reported for nonpossessive warmth (.47) and therapists' genuineness (.66). A second outcome criterion was based upon two experienced psychologists' blind evaluation of the degree of change in personality functioning based on the Rorsharch and M.M.P.I. The correlations of outcome with Accurate Empathy was .48, with non-possessive warmth it was .70, and with genuineness .45. That is, for the blind evaluations of change, the proportion of variance in the outcome measure which was accounted for by any of the three therapist's measures, was approximately 22%. This Resnikoff does not consider as strong evidence of support for therapist behaviour and client outcome relationship. However, the first composite criterion of outcome does offer strong support for the connection.

To counter the criticism that outcome studies involving the many process variables have been undertaken largely in psychiatric and rehabilitation settings, Stoffer (1970) attempted to test the hypothesis that genuineness,

non-possessive warmth and accurate empathy on the part of
the helping person will produce positive outcomes when used
with elementary school children. Thirty-five adult female
volunteers worked individually with 35 children who were
experiencing behavioural and academic difficulties. Early
and late helper-child interviews were tape recorded and
rated on each of three variables. Each helper and each
child completed a Relationship Inventory. Rating of helpers
in late interviews on non-possessive warmth, accurate
empathy and the total scores on the childrens' Relationship
Inventories were significantly related to positive behavioural
change. Indications of behavioural change included gains on
an individual intelligence test, an achievement test,
reduction in teacher rated behaviour problems, and gains in
motivation.

Aspy (1967) recorded and assessed classes of third
grade school teachers to determine the level at which they
were functioning in their classroom interactions. Indexes
of student performance were assessed in order to determine
their relationship with teacher level of functioning. The
students of the highest level teacher gained an average of
2.5 academic years over the course of one academic year, while
the students of the lowest level teacher gained an average
of 6 achievement months over one academic year. In
addition the students of the lower level functioning teachers
were significantly more truant than those of the higher level
teachers. Aspy has not made it clear whether there were any

other variables which may have been responsible for these differences. It may well be, for example that students of the lower level functioning teachers had poorer academic results because of higher amount of truancy.

Gladstein (1977, 76) has criticized Aspy's claim that his studies indicate that students' cognitive gain positively and significantly related to the teacher's level of empathic understanding, as well as to students' attendance ratio, I.Q gains, attitudes about self. He has pointed out that Aspy looked only at the analyses that came out statistically significant and what proportion of these were in the significant direction. From this, Aspy concluded that the majority of significant findings indicated that empathy was related to student improvement. However, Gladstein found that if one looks at all of these analyses (n = 142) for all the grades and years of the project, for the achievement data (student classroom learning) one finds that only 18.3% were statistically significant in the predicted direction (Gladstein, 1977, 77).

Resnikoff (1972a) also cited a number of studies where there is no relationship reported between level of therapist or helper functioning and client outcome. One such study of Kratochvil, Carkhuff, and Berenson (1969) involved 80 fifth grade students, their teachers and parents. The study examined the relationships between parent- and teacher-offered levels of facilitative conditions and indices of student physical, emotional, interpersonal and intellectual

functioning. Levels of facilitative conditions offered by
parents and teachers were determined by their levels of
discrimination and communication (measures explained on
p. 123-4). Student levels of functioning were measured by
two indices of physical functioning, two indices of
emotional functioning, two indices of intellectual function-
ing, and one index of creativity productivity. Levels of
communication were assessed by experts' mean ratings of
teachers' and parents' written responses to   written
student stimulus expressions crossing physical, emotional,
interpersonal, and intellectual problems with depression,
elation, and anger effect. Parents' and teachers' levels
of discrimination were defined in terms of deviations of
their ratings from experts' ratings of written helper
responses to the same written student stimuli. The result
indicated that the cumulative effect of parent- and teacher-
offered levels of facilitative conditions on student func-
tioning was not significant. When the highest and lowest
functioning teachers at each grade level were compared,
support for the existence of a positive relationship between
teacher level of functioning and student functioning appeared
only when the criterion measuring student level of functioning
was important at grade level (e.g., reading ability) and
the highest functioning teacher was functioning near minimally
facilitative levels.

Research on Counsellor Level of Functioning and Client's Self-Exploration

To establish the connection between counsellor functioning and client outcome, some studies have attempted to show the connection between counsellor functioning and counsellor-client process in therapy and then between client process and outcome. Resnikoff refers to the studies by Holder, Carkhuff, and Berenson (1967) and Piaget, Berenson and Carkhuff (1967) as demonstrating the connection between the level of therapist's functioning and client exploratory behaviour. Client exploratory behaviour was rated on the Depth of Intrapersonal Exploration Scale. The scale (Carkuff, 1966 cited in Resnikoff, 1972a) ranges from lowest level, where the client does not explore himself at all, to the highest level where the client is searching to discover new feelings concerning himself and his world. Experimental manipulation of the therapists' levels of empathy, warmth and genuineness showed client exploration to be a function of counsellor level of functioning. With high functioning counsellors, who later purposely lowered the conditions offered, low functioning clients tended to deteriorate in exploration while high functioning clients appeared to continue functioning at high levels independent of the counsellor's manipulated lower condition. Assuming then the relationship between counsellor functioning and client exploration, the connection between client exploration and client outcome has been

investigated. Truax and Wargo (1966), in looking at the

effects of group therapy, declared that self-exploration

was not critical in accounting for the effects of counselling

with delinquents. Another study, using time-limited group

therapy (Truax, Wargo and Carkhuff, 1966) found successful

outpatients engaged in greater self-exploration than out-

patients who showed less improvement in group therapy. In

another study of 160 hospitalized patients in groups,

patients with high levels of self-exploration showed greater

improvement than patients with low self-exploration. However,

while differences did appear between groups, the relationship

between client self-exploration and outcome was not high

enough to account for much of the variance in outcome. On

this basis, Resnikoff (1972a) concluded that, "The connection

between therapist's level of interpersonal functioning,

client exploration and client outcome, is very tentative".

Further light on the validity of the AE Scale

comes from Gladstein's (1970) investigation of the relation-

ship between empathy and counselling outcome. Gladstein

(1970) set out to make a comprehensive search of the empirical

research literature published and unpublished, to determine

whether recent evidence does in fact show that empathy does

affect counselling outcomes in the manner Rogers and others

believe. Gladstein did not confine himself to the effects

of empathy as measured by the Truax-Carkhuff scales. Studies

were selected if firstly, the concept of empathy was meausred

empirically regardless of the specific type; and secondly,

if counselling outcomes were also measured in some empirical manner. In his 1970 analysis, Gladstein found "very little evidence to support the current belief that empathy facilitates counsellor outcomes" (Gladstein, 1970, 24). In a recent review (1977) he analyzed seven studies that fitted the established criteria. Of the seven, one (Altman, 1973) showed positive results while one (Shelton, 1969) showed negative. The remaining five resulted in both negative and positive findings depending on the types of empathy and counselling outcomes being measured in the same study. Upon further analysis of the data Gladstein suggested that "when client data are used to determine empathy, it will probably produce a relationship to counselling outcome as rated by the clients" (Gladstein, 1977, 75). In the eight studies reviewed in 1970, which used objective empathy measures the two with positive findings shared only one element in common - the AE Scale.

Summing up, there seems to be some gap in the research support of the rating scales. However, inspite of the above criticisms related to the validity of the AE rating scale, there is a body of research evidence indicating that the dimensions on which Carkhuff focusses bear some relationship to outcome. Barrett - Lennard asserted that "it is safe to say that a very substantial pattern of supporting evidence now surrounds the principle that the discriminated relationship variables represent or reflect dimensions of fundamental importance in human interaction

and its effects" (1969, 5).

Reliability of the AE Scale

In a summary of several research studies, Truax and Carkhuff (1967, 45) report interclass reliabilities for the empathy scale ranging from .50 to .95 with a medium of .87). Rappaport and Chinsky (1972; Chinsky and Rappaport, 1970) have questioned the high reliability reported for the AE Scale. They have raised the questions of whether the high reliability is less likely to be found when larger numbers (greater than 10) of therapists are rated, and whether the reliability of AE is inflated by lack of independent judgments. Bozarth and Krauft (1972) took up Rappaport and Chinsky's point regarding the reliability of the AE Scale. Since Chinsky and Rappaport (1970) reported that the reliability of the AE Scale exceeded .70 in only one instance when more than 50 therapists were rated, Bozarth and Krauft used 34 to 55 therapists in twelve blocks. Interclass reliabilities in excess of .70 were obtained for ten out of twelve blocks of 100 ratings. Thus Chinsky and Rappaport's contention that high reliability is unlikely when the number of therapists is large was not borne out by the data. Reliability for one randomly selected sample was .76, while for more than one segment it was .68. Bozarth and Krauft concluded that a single randomly selected sample per therapist may be as reliable as more than one segment. From the above research,

therefore, it seems that the reliability claims of the AE Scale are well based.

The use of the AE Scales appears to be justified as long as its limitations are kept in mind. The emphasis of Carkhuff's Human Resource Development model and the relevant scales seems to be on the training of communication of empathic understanding to the helpees, and it is on this basis that it has been included in the communication phase of the empathic process, an important, yet not the only, variable involved in empathic interpersonal relationships.

Carkhuff's Human Resource Development Model

Carkhuff's Human Resource Development Model views "helping" as a set of skills which can be taught to a wide variety of persons. The emphasis on systematic training - particularly for para-professionals - has extended the reach of the mental health services. Carkhuff has specified the following developmental stages which constitute the helping process. In the initial phase, the helper communicates empathy, respect, and genuineness to achieve a sharing relationship. This allows the helpee to engage in self-exploration and gain insight into his problem areas. In the second phase, as the helper continued to show empathy, respect, and warmth, while beginning to communicate at appropriate levels of specificity, genuineness, self-disclosure, and confrontation, the helpee reaches a level of self understanding. Once a

relationship has been established, the helper begins to
communicate high levels of immediacy and confrontation which
facilitate the helpee to take constructive action steps.
Ultimately the helper teaches the helpee to be an effective
helper. Carkhuff and Berenson (1967) found a number of
important dynamics related to the condition of empathy in
interpersonal relationships. They held that the level at
which an individual functions with others reflects the level
of his attitudes and comprehension of himself, that is, the
individual who feels empathy for himself, and respect and
genuineness in a wide range of feelings and experiences,
also is able to show these conditions in relationship to
others. "The degree to which the helper understands and
accepts himself is related to the degree to which he under-
stands and accepts others" (Carkhuff, 1969a, 35). Carkhuff
and Berenson emphasized the underlying understanding by the
individual therapist of himself and others, and de-emphasized
techniques employed to communicate this understanding. The
therapists's effectiveness is related more to his depth of
understanding, than to his ability to use the particular
technique of reflection of content and feeling in the early
phases of counselling.

Client's change seems to be most highly related to
high measures of empathic understanding.   This finding is
in line with both client-centred and psychoanalytic thinking.
The client-centred approach is built around two central
theorems.   First, there is in the individual the

capacity to understand the factors in his life that caused

him unhappiness and pain and the capacity to reorganize

his self-structure in such a way as to overcome those factors.

Secondly, the individual's inherent powers will operate if

a congruent therapist can establish with him a relationship

involving a depth of warm acceptance and understanding.

The psycho-analytical approach emphasizes empathy

as a diagnostic tool: "Measures of empathy most highly

predictive of change integrate the client-centred notion of

reflection of feeling and the analytic emphasis upon diagnos-

tic accuracy" (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967, 27).

As already noted, empathy in the counselling

context requires accurate and sensitive discrimination, or

perception by the counsellor of the helpee's area of function-

ing. Discrimination requires intense focussing on the other

person: "Since it allows us to note subtle non-verbal

communications - the minute facial, postural, and gestural

clues that often contradict or multiply the meanings of

another person's communications" (Truax and Mitchell, 1970,

317-18). Carkhuff has developed a discrimination procedure

which involves presenting the prospective helper with varying

examples of high-, moderate-, and low-levels of helper-

offered conditions, whether taped or in writing, such as

those presented in Carkhuff and Berenson (1967), and asking

the prospective helper to identify the levels at which the

helpers in the respective excerpts are functioning. Those

whose ratings agree closely with those of experts, are

considered "high discriminators". Tapes of high, moderate, and low levels of both real life and role-play counselling have been developed and employed effectively in assessing training programs.

The second aspect of empathy is effective communication by the helper, which enables the helpee to experience being understood and facilitates movement towards deeper levels of self-exploration and self-understanding. Carkhuff interprets most of the evidence, both experiential and empirical, as pointing towards the level of communication of the helper as a critical variable in effective helping processes.

The procedure for assessing level of communication consists of casting trainees in the helping role. The prospective helper is given a mental set "to be as helpful as you would ordinarily be if a distressed person came to you in a time of need" (Carkhuff, 1969a). The helpee in turn might be either a real-life helpee or, more frequently, a standard helpee. The standard helpee most often is either a trained or an untrained person who is cast in the role of helpee, with a set to discuss as fluently as he can, according to how facilitative his helper is, any areas of real concern to him. Assessments can be made then of both the level of facilitative and action oriented conditions offered by the helper.

A number of studies support Carkhuff's contention that the level of communication of the helper is the critical

variable in effective helping processes. Effective communi-
cation in turn is made possible by sensitive and accurate
discrimination, a function that is necessary but not sufficient
for high levels of communication. In a study by Carkhuff,
Collingwood and Renz (1969), senior-seminar psychology
undergraduates went through an exclusive didactive experience
in discrimination training. The extent to which the subjects
correctly identified the level at which helper responses were
given in the situation presented to them, and the level of
their own communication when cast as helpers, were assessed
prior to training. Following training, the same instruments
were again administered in conjunction with a standard
interviewee. The findings indicated that the groups function-
ing initially at low levels of discrimination and communication
(below Level 2) gained significantly in discrimination with
only minimal changes in communication. The discrimination
index did not predict any changes in communication. The
conclusion was that interaction with a high level trainer,
if the focus is exclusively upon didactive discrimination
training, will lead to little or no generalization to
communication.

In another study, findings of a program to train
parents to communicate effectively with each other showed
similar results. In this program which emphasized practice
in communication and discrimination, the discrimination and
communication indices were administered before and after
training. In addition, the parents were also cast in the

helping role with each other and with their children in order
to assess the effects of training. The results indicated
that the communication index is the best predictor both of
the degree of change and the absolute level of functioning
following training.

Carkhuff (1969a) indicated that there is substantial
empirical support for the proposition that it is the level of
the trainer's communicative functioning which is the critical
ingredient in effective training: "In general the trainee's
level of communication moves in the direction of the trainer's
level of functioning; when the trainer is functioning at a
high level, the trainee gains significantly and rapidly;
when the trainer is functioning at a low level, the trainee
does not gain or he deteriorates" (Carkhuff, 1969a, 87).
Carkhuff has been interested in developing selection proce-
dures of persons who can make maximum use of training programs
and offer maximum treatment benefits to distressed persons
seeking their help. Carkhuff (1969a) cited a number of
studies (Carkhuff and Banks, 1969; Carkhuff and Griffin,
1969a, 1969b) as supporting the contention that those parents,
teachers and counsellors, functioning initially at the highest
level (as assessed by the Indices of Discrimination and
Communication) in human relation workshops and lay counsellor
training programs, were found, in conjunction with a high
level trainer, to be functioning at the highest levels
following the training experience. Carkhuff and Berenson
found that higher level functioning persons are disposed to

exploring themselves at higher levels, and persons, disposed towards exploring themselves most highly gained the most from the training experience. Carkhuff has found that trainees who enter training above Level 1.7 gain significantly more and achieve significantly higher absolute levels of functioning following training with a high level trainer. Any generalizations, however, are qualified by the highly complex interaction between initial trainee and trainer levels of functioning.

Carkhuff's human resource development program is both experiential and didactic. The combination of didactic-intellectual and experiential-accepting orientations is implemented in a structured training program with three major thrusts

1) A therapeutic context in which the supervisor communicates high levels of accurate empathy, non-possessive warmth and genuineness to the trainees themselves;

2) A highly specific didactic training program using the rating scales for "shaping" the trainees' responses toward high levels of empathy, warmth and genuineness;

3) A focussed group therapy experience that allows the emergence of the trainee's own therapeutic self through self-exploration and consequent integration of his didactic training with his personal values, goals and life style.

Helpers are trained in discriminating levels of empathic understanding and communication displayed by other helpers to helpee stimulus expressions (which may be from

real life or role play). They are also trained in communi-
cation skills. Role playing has been found to be an
effective means for developing effective communication in
helping. Programs emphasizing practice in communication
have demonstrated significant inprovement in the inter-
personal skills of teachers and teacher's aides (Beerman,
Carkhuff and Santelli, 1969; Carkhuff and Griffin, 1969).
Trainees are also exposed to effective communication by the
trainer. With high level functioning trainers, high levels
of communication enable the trainee to experience warm and
sensitive as well as directionful and forceful communication.
The trainee is thus provided with the same experiential base
as the helpee is to be offered. At the same time the trainer
establishes himself as the model of an individual who can
sensitively share experiences with another person as well as
act upon such experiences.

Research on Training using the HRD Model.

Research on the effectiveness of training programs
using the HRD model presents, according to Gormally and Hill,
a "massive complex and diffused body of literature" (Gormally
and Hill, 1974, 539). The measurement problems pointed out
by Gormally and Hill, include specification of what outcomes
should be measured and upon whom, individual versus group
assessment, time limitations of measures, and the use of
rating scales. Resnikoff (1972a) questioned the comparative

effectiveness of the didactic experiential HRD model since
most studies which demonstrate the effectiveness of the HRD
have not compared the effects with proper control groups -
alternative treatment plus placebo, and no-treatment control.
The question put by Resnikoff is: "If the training is effec-
tive, what is it better than?" (Resnikoff, 1972a, 50). In a
detailed discussion he shows that most of the studies reported
showing the effects of training by the Carkhuff model have
been of the single group, pre-test, training, post-test
variety. One such study, by Hawn (1977), investigated the
extent to which human relations training caused immediate
and long-range changes in empathic behaviour of pre-service
and in-service teachers as indicated by ratings obtained
using a modified form of the Carkhuff scale. Forty-one
subjects participated in 30 hours of systematic human
relations training using the HRD model. This research study
reported that mean scores for the trainees showed significant
gains over the short range period of human relations train-
ing, and over the longer two-year period of the project.
It was concluded that the Carkhuff systematic human relations
training model was an effective training procedure for these
interns and teachers. However, this study is open to the
criticism voiced by Resnikoff: not having control groups
randomly assigned from the same subject pool does not allow
for true comparison of gain over time. The amount of gain
in a training group should be compared with the amount of
gain which would occur in that sample without the experience

of training. And even with the use of a no-treatment control group, the only conclusion which may be drawn is that the training is better than no training. Conclusions cannot be drawn as to what couselling dimensions lead to what indices of change.

Gormally and Hill have identified three areas of weakness in the control group methodology for human relations training: (a) specifying control procedures, (b) placebo controls, and (c) the instructions given to subjects in interview situations. The specificity of control groups is important since it is difficult to replicate research if factors which were controlled are unclear. For example, Berenson, Carkhuff and Myrus (1966) used a trainee control group as a placebo control, but it is unclear what happened in that group. The study compared an experimental group (Group A) which employed research scales and the quasi-therapeutic experience, a placebo or training control group which did everything the experimental group did, with the exception of the use of the research scales and the quasi-therapy experience (Group B), and a no-treatment control (Group C). The focus of the research was to determine what counselling training dimensions lead to what types of change. The subjects were evaluated on ratings along the dimensions of the research scale in standard or "coached client" interviews, reports by the "coached clients", reports from the trainees, and inventory reports from significant others. The results were mixed: Group A differed from Group C on all

indices - tape rating, interview report, self report, report
of significant other; Group B differed from Group C on two
of the four indices. Group A and B, the experimental and
trainee control groups, differed on two of the four indices
but not on the rated levels of interpersonal functioning.
One problem was that the training was of limited duration
and that the lack of significant difference on the individual
tape ratings may be a function of the amount of training time.
Apart from the problem that the study tells us what the
control group did not receive by way of training but not how
the group was conducted, it has another serious flaw:
"Control groups can function as a true control only if the
subjects are equally| cognisant or ignorant of the measures
on which they are being evaluated. The experimental groups
knows on which criteria they will be evaluated, while the
control groups are simply unaware of which behaviours are
desired" (Resnikoff, 1972a, 51).

Both studies quoted above illustrate another
difficulty of the HRD research studies, that is, that criteria
for trainee improvement have been a paper and pencil nature,
psychometric nature (M.M.P.I., Q-sorts various anxiety scale
measures), rather than of a more observable behavioural nature
(such as number of days out of hospital, work production,
specific social behaviour, external observation of coping
from significant others such as teachers, parents, super-
visors). Thus the ability to discriminate correct responses
and write the necessary facilitative responses in the laboratory

situation may not translate into natural setting.

Kagan (1972) has discussed this problem. Kagan speculated on what is actually learned by those who have passed through the HRD program. He distinguished two phases. In the first phase, trainees become technically correct and thus meet criterion requirements but it is not till the next phase that a critical mass is achieved and that the trainee intuitively applies the as yet unwritten formulas which permit appropriate use of the therapeutic response and cueing skills. How much training is needed before one reaches a point of "critical mass" is not known. The answer might lead to new ways of training.

Summarising the Evaluation of the Human Resource Development Model

Carkhuff's HRD has been found to be effective in increasing trainees' functioning on the facilitative conditions that have been operationally defined in the rating scales. The reliability and the validity of the rating scales has been criticized by Chinsky and Rappaport. The criticism regarding reliability has not been substantiated. As far as validity is concerned, there is evidence that the Accurate Empathy Scale may be measuring more global qualities of the therapist than the ones set down. However, the scale does seem applicable if one is asking the question about the responding person and focussing in particular on the quality or level of his communicative expression. There is also

evidence to indicate that a significant amount of variance in outcome studies can be accounted for by the condition of empathic understanding and communication within the helper-helpee interaction as measured by the scale. In spite of the fact that the model has been criticised on the basis of rigor, Gazda et al. (1973, 22) state, "that they know of no other model for human relations training which has been so thoroughly researched and so carefully developed". Carkhuff's model certainly has made important contributions in emphasizing selection of personnel for training, in specifying some of the ingredients of effective helping relations, the skills of an effective helper, and procedures for assessing the effectiveness of the helping relation.

Step Two of the Communication Phase

Some studies have attempted to determine the relationship between perceived therapeutic conditions and outcome by computing correlations of clients' perception of the level of therapist's functioning as measured by the Relationship Inventory, with pre- to post-change in therapy measured by a variety of outcome instruments. The Relation-ship Inventory (R.I.) developed by Barrett-Lennard relies on the receiving person's description of the other's response in their relationship. The R.I. yields scores on four theore-tically fundamental but related axes of interpersonal response. Each of 64 items is answered on a 6-point anchored scale and

answers to 16 of the items provide the measure of empathic

understanding. These items tap the total empathy cycle at

the received empathy phase. From the beginning, a basic part

of the rationale developed by Barrett-Lennard has been, "that

it is what the client (or other person in life-relationships)

himself experiences that affects him most directly" (Barrett-

Lennard, 1962, 2). According to Barrett-Lennard, this is a

logical, rather than theoretical, proposition. Studies in

which the R.I. measure and the Truax-Carkhuff scale are both

being used in predicting outcomes have usually shown that

the R.I. index of received empathy is more strongly predictive

(e.g., Feital, 1968 cited in Barrett-Lennard, 1972; Kurtz and Grummon,

1972). Kurtz and Grummon used six different measures of

therapist's empathy, correlated them with each other and

with a measure of therapeutic process and with several outcome

measures. The composite measure of outcome was based on the

Tennesse Self-concept Scale, M.M.P.I., therapists judgments,

and an in-process measure of client self-exploration. The

relevant results for the present discussion showed the R.I.

empathy from client data (representing the received phase of

the empathic communication process) was much more strongly

related to outcome than any other empathy measure used. The

significance level ranged from .06 to .001 on the 5-component

outcome indices and exceeded .01 (r = .55) for the composite

index. Tape-judged empathy from the Truax-Carkhuff scale

ranked next in accuracy with one significant correlation with

the component outcome measures (r = .30 with the composite

index).

Mason and Blumberg (1969) investigated the relation-
ship between the student's perception of the quality of
interpersonal relations that exists between him and the
teacher in which the student defined   the classroom in which
he learned most and the classroom in which he learned least.
The instrument used was the Relationship Inventory. Results
indicated statistically significant differences in inter-
personal relationships between the two groups on the regard,
empathy and congruence subscales of the Relationship Inventory.
That is, students in the learn-most classroom perceived
themselves as receiving more regard, more genuine understand-
ing from their teachers than those students in learn-least
classrooms.   Gurman's (1977) major review of work using the
Relationship Inventory reports satisfactory reliability co-
efficents (discussed more fully in Ch. 7, p. 268). Resnikoff
(1972a, 47), however, pointed out that the relationships
between the relationship questionnaire and tested outcomes
were quite low for deeply disturbed persons (Truax, Tunnell
and Wargo, 1966), higher and significant for a sample of
juvenille delinquents (Truax, Wargo, Carkhuff, Connell and
Glenn, 1966), and mixed for a group of outpatients in time-
limited psychotherapy (Truax, Wargo, Tunnell and Glenn,
1966).   In all these studies the proportion of variance of
the outcome measures which accounted for client's perception
of therapeutic levels of functioning ranged from 0% to
approximately 18%.

It must be pointed out however, that the relationship
questionnaire differs significantly in format, content,
scales and scoring method, from the Relationship Inventory.
In the author's view these studies do not invalidate the
evidence of studies using the R.I. (such as that of Kurtz and
Grummon) which indicate that received or experienced empathy
is an important phase in the empathic interpersonal process.

Relationship between AE, R.I. and Other
Measures of Empathy

Refering back to Kurtz and Grummon's significant
study published in 1972, which provides a comparative
analysis of results from six measures of therapists' empathy,
it is interesting to note that with the possible exception
of client-perceived and tape-judged empathy, the empathy
measures are unrelated to one another. Other studies,
(Caracena and Vicory, 1969; Fish, 1970; McWhiter, 1973)
also report low and insignificant correlations between judge
rated accurate empathy and R.I. empathic understanding.
Within this sample a near significant coefficient, $r = .31$,
was obtained between the R.I. measure of empathy and the Truax-
Carkhuff scale measure. This is quite explicable on theore-
tical considerations, where the two measures, whilst obviously
overlapping, do measure different phases of the empathic
process. The Kurtz and Grummon study points to the simplicity

of defining a relatively few dimenions as the indicators of good therapeutic behaviour. The empathic process itself has been shown to be a complex process containing a number of phases and involving capacities and skills differing not only from one instant to another of the empathic response but also from situation to situation and from person to person.

Summary

The discussion so far has pointed out the multi-faceted nature of the empathic process. It seems that there are several meanings and operational definitions in simultaneous use.

Empathy: An Internal Condition

Symbolic interactionists (Mead, Cottrell, Cooley, Dymond) are concerned with the structures and processes involved in empathic understanding, that is, they focus on empathy as an internal condition where the empathasiser is able to take the perspective of the other, particularly other's view of the self - reciprocal role-taking. Central to reciprocal role-taking is self-other differentiation, a developmental aspect discussed by Selman (1976), Hoffman (1976), Weinstein (1969). Selman and Byrne have studied the developmental stages in social perspective-taking structures and their relationship to structures of inter--

personal relations and moral judgment.

Other researchers (Stotland, 1969; Feshbach, 1975; Hoffman, 1976) emphasize the affective sharing by the empathiser of the empathee's feeling, as the unique feature of the internal state labelled "empathy" and are interested in how the development of the cognitive sense of others is related to the meaning of one's affective response to the other's inner state.

For Carl Rogers, the concept is phenomenological in nature. This supposition is supported with the use of such terms as "condition", "attitude" and "experiencing". To Rogers, empathy is an internal state rather than a behavioural attitude which is more affective in nature than cognitive or psycho-motor.

For psychologists who focus on the internal state involved in the empathic process, the type of conditions which stimulate its development are experiential in nature. They are concerned with the development of social perspective-taking structures and more mature structures of moral judgment and conception of persons. The type of experiences which would promote this development are ones requiring interaction, opportunities for role-taking, for focussing on the inner feelings and thoughts of others, and the reasons for their actions, so that one can develop more valid social categories, a greater sensitivity to assumed similarity, and a conception of persons as complex and often conflicting systems of values, beliefs, and attitudes.

Empathy: An Interpersonal Skill

      Charles B. Truax, in operationalizing the psycho-
therapeutic process moved from the phenomenological to the
behaviouristic perspective. Of what he termed "accurate
empathy" he wrote:

> Accurate empathy involves more than just the
> ability of the therapist to sense the patient's
> private world as if it were his own. It also
> involves more than just the ability of the
> therapist to know what the patient needs. Accurate
> empathy involves both the sensitivity to current
> feelings and the verbal facility to communicate
> this understanding in the language attuned to the
> client's current feelings.
> <div align="right">(Truax, 1967, 555)</div>

      Truax, then stresses the communicative aspect of
accurate empathy. The word "ability" suggests that the
therapeutic condition of empathy is subject to the same
characteristics as other abilities and can be learned more
often in an external fashion. Truax saw empathy as a
teachable skill which could be "learned and sharpened with
practice" (Truax and Mitchell, 1970, 313).

Empathy: A Facilitative Condition

      Robert Carkhuff included the condition of empathy
as a critical one in his total human resource development
model, though he has not described that condition in the
same detail as did Rogers and Truax. Conklin (1975) noted
that it seems that it is as though the nature of the
condition has been stated frequently and that others were

researching the concept in enough depth to satisfy Carkhuff.
One of the most descriptive definitions offered by Carkhuff
was in his book The Art of Helping:

> Empathy is a word which we use when one
> individual is hearing or understanding another.
> Empathy involves crawling inside another person's
> skin and seeing the world through his eyes ...
> The Indians used to talk of walking in another
> man's mocassins before judging him.
> (Carkhuff, 1972, 58)

In Truax and Carkhuff's desire for more accurate,
reliable measurement, the condition has developed until it
is now regarded as a skill rather than an internal state of
being. Empathy has become identified with such terms as
'skill', 'ability', and 'response'. The distinction between
empathy as an internal condition, a state of being, and as
a behavioural attribute has not always been made clear in
the literature. It is not always clear what aspect is being
noted by the researcher. Sometimes it is the verbal responses
(language content) which are used as a criterion in one
situation while vocal tone and non-verbal cues are used on
other occasions. "If we considered the internal state of
being with the other person as actual empathy then attributes
such as words, body language, facial cues, and eye contact
are ways in which actual empathy can be communicated. Most
measures of empathy are then measures of a person's ability
to communicate actual empathy, rather than measures of
empathy itself" (Conklin, 1975, 42).

Carkhuff's human resource development model purports
to teach persons the ability to increase their empathy through

the use of programmed instruction techniques. Now it is
this approach which seems to have many problems. Though it
is true that we can teach persons new ways of putting words
together, we can increase their vocabulary and even modify
their physical posture and voice, there is little evidence
that we can change their internal feeling states in such a
way that they are aware of what another is communicating. It
does apear that persons who have an empathic set (related
to their conception of persons and their level of moral
judgment), who have role-taking ability, and who are low on
dogmatism and prejudice are more likely to perceive accurately
and respond to another's internal state. But whether the
various processes and skills involved in relational empathy
can be developed and whether there is transfer to actual
helping situations are still open research questions, to
which this report is attempting to find some answers.

This chapter completes the discussion of theory and
research relating to the three phases of relational empathy:
the attentional phase, the experiential phase and the
communicational phase. Chapters 5 and 6 examine training
programs which have aimed at promoting the development of
structures and skills involved in empathic interpersonal
relationships.

CHAPTER 5

SENSITIVITY TRAINING, CHANGES IN SELF-PERCEPTION

AND THE EMPATHIC PROCESS

Sensitivity training, human relations training, encounter groups, T groups are all manifestations of a notable recent cultural phenomenon - concern with personal growth and interpersonal relationships. These growth group approaches which Egan (1970) puts in the genus Laboratory Training, are taken to be a response to the increasing alienation of urban man and an appreciation of the importance of satisfying interpersonal relationships in the effectiveness of organizations and groups. Variants of laboratory human relations training methods have become a basic element in programs of teacher training, therapy , executive development, personality development, group counselling and organizational change. These growth group approaches are relevant to this investigation since some of the training methods that have been evolved have the same as or similar theoretical bases to the development of empathic interpersonal relationships. Sensitivity training is based on the theory of symbolic interactionists such as Cooley (1902), Goffman (1959), Mead (1934) who have suggested "that the antidote to alienation is the development of the sense of self through experiences in intensive small, face-to-face groups" (Anderson, 1978, 86). Egan (1970) has set down the elements common to most, if not all, laboratory experiences:

(1) <u>Learning through actual experience in the</u> <u>small group</u>. The most important learning takes place through interaction in the small face to face conversation group itself. Focus is upon the analysis of the "here and now" data derived from the group's perceptions of the behaviour of participants themselves during group sessions.

(2) <u>A climate of experimentation</u>. Focus is upon trying out new behaviour in the training group. The laboratory possesses a degree of behavioural freedom not always found in the real life situations.

(3) <u>Group size</u>. This has to be small enough to allow members the opportunity to contribute to the interaction of the group but it must be large enough to allow participants to space their contributions according to individual need.

(4) <u>Feedback</u>. Group members, both individually and corporately, try to reflect on the behaviour in which they are engaged. Both giving and receiving feed back with respect to input behaviour. The group processes its own behaviour as a group and the behaviour of the individuals in the group.

(5) <u>Communication of emotion</u>. Emotional issues are not ignored but are dealt with to the extent called for by the goal of the group.

(6) <u>Support</u>. A laboratory is an opportunity for the responsible lowering of defences that tend to rigidify personality and distort reality.

(7) The immediate and primary aim of the leader

called the trainer, is to improve effectiveness or change
behaviour of normal people in the organization or natural
group setting, rather than to change personality or character.

Self-Other Understanding

There are theoretical and empirical bases for asser-
ting that there are important relationships between "self"
and "other" concepts in both children and adults (Mead,
Sullivan, Piaget). The two major competencies, from the
structural, social-cognitive point of view, associated with
the ability to empathise are self-other differentiation and
the development of the ability to take multiple perspectives.
As Selman has elaborated, role-taking is understanding the
nature of the relationship between self and others' perspec-
tives. Appreciating others' perspectives necessitates an
awareness and knowledge of one's own perspective. It is a
failure to make this differentiation which results in projec-
tive role-taking and, unless self and other are similar, in
inaccurate person perception. Perception of another's
perspective can, of course, be based on real similarities
between oneself and the other, in which case, an analogy can
justifiably be used to aid the inference process. Thus,
individuals who have had varied opportunities of role experi-
mentation, have a wider repertory of roles with which they
are familiar, and which they can more readily understand.

In order to understand the other's internal frame
of reference, and differentiate it from one's own, one needs

to develop a sense of one's own identity or an accurate self
concept. Katz (1963, 115) described the psychologically
healthy individuals as having ego strength because they can
empathise with themselves in the sense of being able to
objectify their own experiences. In Mead's terms, the healthy
individual is able to arouse in himself the kind of response
that he arouses in others. He incorporates within himself
the role expectation of others. "The poor empathiser is the
individual who cannot see himself objectively" (Katz, 1963,
113). Neuber and Genthner (1977) used 49 male and female
college students in a study designed to evaluate Erikson's
concept of ego identify as an indicator of intrapersonal and
interpersonal psychological adjustment. Subjects' identity
status was established with Marcia's rating system. Marcia's
(1966) measure consists of a semi-structured interview and
an incomplete sentence blank. The interview is tape-recorded
and replayed for judging. Scoring uses theoretical criteria
from Erikson and empirical criteria from a pilot study to
determine an individual's specific identity status along a
continuum of ego-identity achievement. The criteria used to
establish identity status consist of two variables, crises
and commitment, applied to occupational choice, religion and
political ideology. Intrapersonal adjustment was defined by
Genthner's Personal Responsibility Scale and interpersonal
adjustment by Carkhuff's scale for global level of facilita-
tion. The results indicated that subjects high in ego
identity were rated significantly higher on measures of intra-
personal ($p < .01$) and interpersonal adjustment ($p < .008$)

than subjects low in ego identity.

Studies by Levy, one of the associates of Davitz in the 1964 studies of emotion, showed a significant positive correlation between self-perception or ability to identify one's own vocal expression of feelings, with other-perception. Taft (1955) reported that persons who showed insight into their own status with respect to their peers on individual traits could also rate their peers accurately on these traits. However, when overall indices were obtained of the subject's self-insight and the ability to judge others, the relationship was not so clear.

Following Mead's theory, interactions with other selves, making up the social group, allow individuals to check and compare the different images others have of them, and integrate them into a unified self-concept. We learn through social experience and through observing the consequences of the message we sent, whether a given symbol or abstraction has the same meaning or value for ourselves as for others. Sherwood's (1965) self-identity theory combines the symbolic interactionist formulations of Cooley and Mead, with the Lewinian concept. It is assumed that self identity is a function of subjective public identity, SPI, (the person's conception of his objective public identity), which in turn is a function of his objective public identity, OPI (percep-tions by referent others of the person). Sherwood further holds that objective public identity influences the person's self identity only to the extent that it is communicated to

and received by the person.

The type of interaction, then, which would promote
development of a realistic self-concept is one where there
is open and honest communication providing accurate feedback
to the individuals involved. This enables individuals to
identify factors within themselves that may lead them to dis-
tort the cues coming from others. These may relate to how
others perceive the world, including how they perceive
themselves.

Both the symbolic interactionists and the proponents
of newer group approaches believe that involvement in empathic
relationships within the group increases the sense of self
and decreases feelings of alientation. At the same time, open
communication allows one to note similarities which are found
in all human beings and their motivation systems – a condition
which research shows increases one's affective response to
another's feeling.

Sensitivity Training and its Effect on Empathy

Many of the laboratory training groups, termed
sensitivity training groups, are aimed at inducing greater
sensitivity to self, to the feelings and perceptions of other
people, and to the general interpersonal environment.
Sensitivity is seen as an input process involving greater
awareness of and perceptions of others. It is equivalent to
the second phase, the experiential phase, of the empathy

process, where person A knows how person B feels, and sees and understands the reasons for B's feeling as he does.

What evidence is there that growth group experience do increase empathy and, if so, what kind of group experiences? Gibb (1970, 8) noted eleven different kinds of sensitivity training groups. One needs to note that this classification is complicated by the fact that trainers continually experiment with training designs, intervention styles, and new techniques. This of course makes replication studies and evaluation research on the effect of these activities most difficult. One notable exception are the practitioners of T group training, who have been strongly research orientated. Eighty-nine of the 106 studies reviewed by Gibb have been performed on T-groups; 43 of which gathered data on the standard heterogeneous groups in the centres sponsored by the National Training Laboratories at Bethel, Maine. The studies, which have attempted to evaluate whether experience in sensitivity training groups does lead to improved empathy, have tended to use predictive measures where participants are asked to predict response to other participants.

One important variable is the kind of interaction that takes place within the laboratory training group. A study by Dunette (1969) gives support to the theoretical formulations discussed above, regarding the importance of open reciprocal personal interactions in the development of the self-concept. Dunette believes that the main goal of most T groups is to make perceivers more aware of their own perceptual

filters; to help them know more fully how they are perceived by others; and to help them be more aware of, and sensitive to, the attributes of specific others in their social world. After T group training, trained perceivers ought to depart from assumed similarity and stereotypic prediction strategies and adopt strategies of greater social differentiation. His study confirmed this hypothesis. Ten, 5-member, same sex, T groups made up initially of strangers drawn from college students, met for 2-hours weekly for 6 weeks. In addition, three control groups, which played games, discussed weather but avoided any discussion related to interpersonal factors, were organized. Each person described himself on a manifest needs, specific preference adjective checklist. Each group member also had four separate questionnaires, one for each member in his group, which required each perceiver to predict the needs and preferences of every other group member. At the end of the T group sessions, new empathy questionnaires were completed. Then 3 research assistants listened to and rated the taped T groups. Results showed that 3 of the presumed T groups had not really functioned as T groups. The top 6 groups were designated as interactive. The empathy questionnaires were such that just one of two possible alternatives was correct for each item - like a True-False test. Thus, if a perceiver simply guessed, his chance HIT RATE was .50, HIT RATES above .50 denoted increasing amounts of differentiated empathic accuracy and HIT RATES below .50 suggested that the perceiver was probably trying to use

assumed similarity or stereotypic strategies. The groups
were ranked in order of their average gain in HIT rate
between the first and second testings. This ranking correlated
.57 and .30 respectively with rankings based on personal
interaction and member-centred interaction. The interactive
groups were also superior in the relative increase in per-
ceivers' knowledge of others between beginning and end of the
experiment. In the limited sessions used, it appeared that
greater empathy was developed in exactly those groups showing
more and higher quality of interpersonal interaction.

Myers, (1969), used 69 participants in a workshop
developed to determine whether an instrumented feedback
procedure based on sociometric ratings, would help the members
of laboratory training groups increase in sensitivity to others.
It was found that subjects in the experimental groups who
filled out sociometric questionnaires and received feedback
on their mutual ratings showed a significantly greater increase
in sensitivity during a three day period than control subjects
who were not exposed to sociometric procedure. Myers inter-
preted these results as strong support for the assumption
that, by receiving feedback on their behaviour, members of
the T group will become more sensitive to interpersonal
relationships and social interactions. It may be, of course,
that members of experimental groups began giving one another
the ratings that they had received earlier, that is, they
were becoming more conformist to group norms. Gage and
Exline (1953), Wedel (1957) and Bennis et al. (1957) cited

by Gibb (1970) all found no change in the ability of partici-
pants to predict responses of others. A typical measure used
was that of Gage and Exline's study carried out on 68 subjects
in a National Training Laboratory group development session.
The study dealt with accuracy of social perception, defined
as the degree to which an individual's perceptions of the
characteristics of other individuals or groups, agree with
what is actually the case concerning those others. The measure
used was Estimation of Group Opinion (EGO) test which asked
participants how many people in his group agreed with 50
statements concerning group process. Gage and Exline found
that accuracy in predicting (a) group's opinion, (b) satis-
faction with meetings, (c) ratings of productivity, did not
correlate highly or positively with perceived effectiveness
in the group's work. They also came to a tentative conclusion
that similarity and sociometrically measured "sensitivity to
the feelings and attitudes of others" were positively related.
This was an example of the error that "since you are similar
to me, I feel you are understanding and sensitive". Sikes
(1964) found that participants were more accurate in predic-
ting the responses of other members of a test discussion group
than were members of the control group that had no training.
They predicted how members ranked others in the discussion
group. As Gibb (1970, 15) pointed out, however, the results
were not confirmed in a second study of a different training
group.

Burke and Bennis (1961) examined changes in percep-

tion of self and others in a human relations training group.
They used a group semantic differential test, (GST) and the
D statistic, a generalized distance formula which takes both
mean differences and covariances into account. The concepts
from the GST were (1) the way I actually am in this group;
(2) the way I would like to be in this group; (3) person
concepts (the name of each individual in the group in
alphabetical order). Each concept headed a separate page
followed by a series of 19 bi-polar rating scales against
which the concept was rated. Changes in the mean perception
of each member by the others in the group were significant.
In other words, by the end of the session, the accuracy of
members' perception of others was increased. This study had
no control and there is no way of knowing whether increased
accuracy was due to improvements in social perspective-taking,
or was merely related to greater information upon which
inferences about others could be made. This comment applies
to some of the other studies discussed. The results of these
studies certainly do not give substantial support to the
hypothesis that experience in the sensitivity training groups
will lead to improved ability to know and feel another person's
frame of reference. The practice of sensitivity training has
outrun both theoretical formulation and organized research.
The resulting turmoil has made many behavioural scientists
treat the whole area with suspicion. There is no substantial
scientific proof that laboratory training has an overall
learning effect, but research evidence indicates that the

methodology does bring about changes in people.

Sensitivity Training and Changes in Self Perception

Sherwood (1965) whose theory of self-identity was discussed above, hypothesized that the more objective public identity (OPI) is communicated by the observer and received by the subject, the more self-identity changes in the direction of the OPI, that is, the more accurately does the person see himself from the perspective of others. He also hypothesized that subjective evaluation changes in the direction of objective public evaluation. A natural experiment was conducted during 1961 Summer sessions of the National Training Laboratory (N.T.L.) in human relations training using 6 training groups each of 10 to 13 members. They met 20 times for sessions of approximately 2 hours over 2 weeks. Interaction with a T group consisted primarily of members' analyses of their own behaviour and that of others and sharing these feelings and observations. A self-identity questionnaire, a subjective public identify, and an objective public identity questionnaire were given to the 68 subjects at the end of their training. Self-identity, self-evaluation, as well as objective public evaluation questionnaires were given at the beginning and at the end of their training.

The results indicated that self-identity changes in the direction of objective public identity and self-evaluation changes in the direction of objective public

evaluation. In other words, involvement in the group leads
to a person's achieving a more accurate self-perception.
He comes to evaluate himself along the same manner as is
used by the group in evaluating its members. The changes
in self-identity were found to be dependent upon:
(a) the differential importance of various peers for the individual
(subject's first two friendship choices were designated as his
strong referent public; his last two choices as weak refer-
ent public). Sherwood found that OPI and evaluations of
strong referent publics had more influence on person's
self-identity and evaluation than did weak referent publics;
(b) the extent to which peer perceptions were communicated
to him. The operation of assessing whether person's OPI was
communicated to him by the members of his group and whether
it was received and accepted by him was the similarity
between SPI as reported by the person and OPI as reported by
other group members;
(c) Individual's self-involvement. Self-involvement is
defined as the extent to which a person evaluates himself
along the same dimension and values as are used by the group
in evaluating its members.

The training group seemed to have a great deal of
influence upon self-identity and self-evaluation. Sherwood
considered that this was probably due to the nature of the
research setting where active membership was largely confined
to one group.

A study by Burke and Bennis (1961) also found that

the congruity between members' self perception and the per-
ception of them by others increased as they met together
during a period of human relations training. Though signi-
ficant, this change was small over a period of time. Changes
in the perception of the individual by others were greater
than changes in the individual's perception of actual self.
Gibb (1970) referred to another two studies which reported
a statistically significant increase after training in the
ability of participants to predict how they are seen by other
participants in a ranking or in a semantic differential
measure (Gibb, 1953; Carson and Larkin,1963, cited in Gibb, 1970).

As Gibb (1970, 19) pointed out, these changes in
self-perceptions may serve as a powerful mediator of other
potential changes during group training. In learning about
one's self and about other's perspectives, the individual
becomes aware of tendencies and impulses in himself that
block accuracy of self and other perception. Stocks (1952, cited in
Gibbs, 1970) in a detailed analysis of individuals undergoing group exper-
ience, found that the persons who made few changes in
perception of self tended to make few changes in observable
behaviour. Those who did show more unstable perceptions of
the self tended to make greater changes of behaviour in the
group and following the group experience. These data corro-
borate Piaget's hypothesis regarding the significance of the
state of disequilibrium as leading to cognitive restructuring.

Dunette (1969) summarized the many factors affecting
the accuracy of prediction based on interpersonal perception.

As Fig. 3 shows, he viewed the process of getting to know a specific other person as essentially a matter of getting and processing information about the person in the context of other information one already has about himself, others he has observed, and stereotypes he has formed. The dashed lines defining the skins of the perceiver and the specific other represent personal filters tending to block and distort the knowledge transmitted. The relative permeability and fidelity of information transmission for each individual's filtering system depends on the nature of his defence mechanisms, the nature of his interpersonal motives and a large number of cognitive factors. As discussed above, there is evidence that empathy is negatively related to dogmatism and prejudice (Kagan and Shauble, 1969; Hansford, 1977). "The prejudiced individual is more apt not to face these (unacceptable) tendencies openly and thus to fail in integrating them satisfactorily with the conscious image (phenomenal self) he has of himself" (Adorno et al. 1950, 474).

Rubin (1967) investigated whether sensitivity or laboratory training is a change strategy which would provide the psychologically safe environment in which an individual can alter his self-concept. He hypothesized that the changes in self-acceptance would be associated with changes in prejudice: the higher an individual's level of acceptance, the lower would be his level of prejudice. His third hypothesis was that, as a result of participation in a sensitivity training laboratory, an individual's level of self-

Figure 3: Dunette's Model of Information Processing and Behaviour Prediction in Interpersonal Perception*

*(Dunnette, 1969, p.31)

acceptance will increase and his level of prejudice will decrease. Self-acceptance was defined as willingness to confirm ego-alien as well as ego-syntonic aspects of the self and to accept rather than deny their existence. The Dorris, Levinson and Hanfmann (1954) Sentence Completion Test was used to measure the level of an individual's self acceptance. The assumption was made that the more willing a person is to admit the personal relevance of ego threatening material, the greater his level of self-acceptance. Prejudice was defined as the extent of an individual's willingness to accept others in terms of their common humanity no matter how differently they may be seen from himself (Harding and Schuman, 1961). The delegates to the American Summer Programme in Sensitivity Training constituted the laboratory population studied in this research. The program was two weeks in length. The number of subjects was 30 and in the control group, was 11. As predicted, as a result of sensitivity training, self acceptance went from 55% to 67% while prejudice went from 46.2% to 42.0%. The differences between these means were significant (p < .01). The change in the experimental group was significantly greater than that in the control. The relationship between self-acceptance and prejudice also was borne out. Those who increased a great deal in acceptance, decreased significantly more in prejudice than those who decreased in self-acceptance or increased only a moderate amount. Rubin raised the question whether these changes were in fact due to the independent variable, sensitivity training. As he pointed

out, even in the training group the core element of the total

program, many phenomena occur over two-week period (for

example, feedback upon one's effect on other people) "Ideally,

in any change study, the researcher would like to have

additional experimental controls to be able to compare the

effect of sensitivity training versus some other change

strategy, or to control for various elements within the

training group." (Rubin, 1967, 237). Within the design

utilized, it was possible only to compare changes over a

period of ordinary activity with changes assumed to result

from sensitivity training, making a hawthorne effect a possi-

bility. There was evidence, however, which suggested that

it was not just an unusual experience which was generating

the results. This statement is supported by the fact that

changes were observed only on those variables which were

hypothesized to change and no changes were observed in those

hypothesized to remain stable. If a hawthorne effect were

operating, the variables influenced should be random rather

than following the theoretically predictable pattern

observed.

There is, then, fairly clear research evidence that

sensitivity training does lead to changes in self-perception

and self-acceptance. Gibb, in his review of sensitivity

training programs as a medium for personal growth and improved

interpersonal relationships, came to the conclusion that

"sensitivity training is having a significant impact upon

many institutions. Although methodological impurities in the

studies reported herein contribute ambiguity to a statement
on the specific effects of training, there is little doubt
that sensitivity training does produce significant change
in people when it is conducted under optimal conditions"
(Gibb, 1970, 22). The effects of training, however, seem to
be "more enduring when integrated in long-range programs of
institutional change and growth" (Gibb, 1970, 23).

What Kind of Group Experiences are Most Appropiate
for Increasing Empathy?

Anderson (1978) has pointed out that one problem
of the growth group approach is that in the studies, group
process and outcome variables have not been related. His
research compares short term variants of three such approaches
- Rogerian encounter, Gestalt sensory awareness, and self-
directed\encounter - in relation to inter-member empathy and
cohesiveness and outcomes of decreased feelings of alienation
and increased sense of self-autonomy. The differences in
approach are thought to be in their focus upon member-to-
member interaction and the influence of this focus on
members' feelings of being understood and the group's cohes-
iveness as experienced by members. The underlying questions
were:

(1) Do short term growth group experiences con-
tribute to these outcomes?

(2) What approaches were best? and

(3) How do these outcomes relate to the development of interpersonal empathy and cohesiveness among members of the group?

The three approaches compared have similar self-actualization and interpersonal effectiveness goals though they differ greatly in leader-centred versus group-centred prescriptions for structuring the experience and in the leader's foci for intervention in group process.

Roger's underlying assumption was that an encounter group can generate "a psychological climate of safety" through the leader's lack of early judgment and non-domination of the experience. The Gestalt sensory awareness theory (Perls, 1971; Stevens, 1971), has as its underlying assumption that the group leader provides sensory awareness experiments that lead to increased perceptions of self. The third approach is the self-directed or leaderless encounter group experience copyrighted by Berzon and Reisel (1976). This program lacks an explicit theoretical framework but borrows heavily from the other two approaches. Leaderless, it uses the non-domination principle of Rogerian encounter using audio taped directions for structuring each session, it closely resembles the experimental approach of Gestalt sensory awareness. With simultaneous emphasis on the Gestalt here-and-now awareness of experience and the Rogerian focus on member interaction, the lack of a leader is assumed to enhance members' freedom. Besides the use of structured experiences, the major differences between leaderless groups and the Rogerian encounter

groups are the Rogerian leader's presence as a model of
process behaviour, as an assessor of obstacles to group
process development and as information giver regarding these
obstacles to possible group action. When the three approaches
were evaluated by Anderson in terms of the theory of symbolic
interaction, their order of predicted efficacy was
(1) Rogerian encounter, (2) Self-directed encounter group,
and (3) Gestalt sensory awareness. The eighty subjects
involved in this study were predominantly young adult college
students. They were given tests of alienation, self autonomy,
cohesiveness, and empathy. Anderson's operational definition
of empathy was the degree of discrepancy between sociometric
ratings received and anticipated.

Developmentally, Anderson expected that increased
accuracy of anticipated and received sociometric ratings is
the result of the ability to make increasingly accurate
perceptual predictions about other persons after being with
them for longer periods of time. An adapted version of the
Interpersonal Perception Method (I.P.M.) developed by Laing,
Phillipson and Lee (1966) to analyze dyads was used to
measure the degree of accurate interpersonal perceptions in
terms of self-other perspectives (HowI see me,how I see you,
how I see you seeing me, etc.). All treatment subjects
were post tested with the IPM subscales, Understanding, Under-
stood, and Feelings of Being Understood. Half of these
treatment groups were pretested with these scales at the
conclusion of their sixth hour. Results showed that all

growth group experiences significantly decreased feelings of
alienation and increased sense of self-autonomy. The order
of efficacy on outcome was (1) Self directed encounter,
(2) Rogerian encounter, and (3) Gestalt sensory awareness.
Although mean scores of IPM Understanding both at time one
and time two were in the efficacy order of (1) Leaderless
encounter, (2) Rogerian encounter, and (3) Gestalt, the
differences among methods on role-taking empathy development
were not statistically significant (p < .08). However, both
with Understanding and Understood, the differences on the
pre-test and post-test socres showed an increase. Although
there was no significant difference among the groups on these
two variables, it appears that all groups did in fact increase
accurate role-taking empathy skills. Group methodological
differences, however, were found in the third IPM subscale,
Feelings of Being Understood. This score was determined by
asking members to rate themselves on group-related traits
and to predict how two other members of the group would rate
them on these same traits. The self-directed encounter
and Rogerian encounter groups had higher scores than the
Gestalt group. Correlations also revealed a strong unexpected
relationship among the IPM scales and between|Feelings of
Being Understood and cohesiveness in the experience - the two
variables most related to outcome efficacy. (Obtained by
deriving a total rank score from the ranks on the six outcome
variables.) The difference for members on high outcomes did
not seem related to role-taking empathy skills as much as

predicted, but rather to whether one was understood and felt understood during the experience. These variables seemed to contribute to the feelings of cohesiveness in the group and in turn to whether participants decreased their feelings of alienation and increased their sense of self-autonomy in the experience. The fact that self-directed encounter groups in the study were clearly superior to Rogerian encounter groups and that these two were superior to the Gestalt sensory awareness experience on all outcomes, supported Anderson's hypothesis that member-to-member interaction is the essence of groups' socialization experiences. Anderson has suggested that the findings of this study have a number of implications for working with groups. Five of the most significant are (Anderson, 1978, 102):

(1) The need to respect the natural curative factors of the intensive small group experience.

(2) The need to focus on member-to-member interaction if interpersonal attitude changes are desired.

(3) The need to gather feedback about important process variables from the group as a whole.

(4) The need to make legitimate human relations training an objective.

(5) The need to consider symbolic interaction theory as the basic theoretical framework.

A clearer and more definite application of symbolic interaction theory to human relations training requires that emphasis be placed on the dynamics of interaction and the self,

This would focus attention of group leaders more specifically on the problems and processes of interaction as well as on the processes enhancing the development of the self.

Summarizing the research on sensitivity training in relationship to the empathic process, there is no clear cut evidence supporting the efficacy of sensitivity training in increasing empathic skills. However, it does produce changes in self-perception in the direction of greater congruence between one's self perception and the perception of self by others. This is one of the basic structures underlying the ability to empathise. The type of sensitivity training which will tend to decrease feelings of alienation and increase the role-taking empathy abilities of participants is one where emphasis is placed on "interpersonal perception, the self concept, the reflexive self in social interaction, shared definitions of situation" (Anderson, 1978, 105).

The following chapter examines training programs aimed at interpersonal relationship enhancement which take their orientation from developmental psychology.

CHAPTER 6

INTERVENTION STRATEGIES AIMING TO PROMOTE

PSYCHOLOGICAL GROWTH OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

The present investigation is concerned with the
design and evaluation of an intervention program aimed to
promote in teacher trainees the structural changes and the
skill acquisitions which are involved in the empathic inter-
action process. Preceding chapters have attempted to
differentiate between the various phases of empathy-in-action
and to identify and examine the skills and processes involved.
Each phase and the experiences which have been found to
stimulate its development are presented in Summary form in
Table 5.

Theory and research indicate that development of
more mature structures of moral judgment, social perspective-
taking and conception of the nature of persons are essential
components of the attentional and experiential phases of the
empathic process. Carkhuff, his associates, and researchers
using his Human Resource Development model and its variants,
have shown that trainees in the helping professions can be
trained in the skills of empathic communication.

Table 5: Phases, Structures and Skills of the Empathic

   Process and Experiences that Promote its Development

Phases in the empathic process.	Processes, structures and skills involved in the empathic response.	Experiences that have been seen to be related to the development of empathy.
The Attentional phase.	- The structure of reciprocity, charac- teristic of mature level of moral judg- ment.	Experiences that seem to promote more mature moral judgment: - Interindividual ex- changes in the form of discussions and cooper- ative effort among peers, which produces dissonant information requiring decentering and a move- ment away from ego-centrism. - Discussions which focus on motives for people's action and on the reasoning used in moral judgment. - Being required to focus on the feeling of the person one is obser- ving, i.e., having an imagine-him set.
The Experiential phase. a. Cognitive capacity to take the role of the other.	- Detaching oneself from one's own position. - Understanding re- ciprocal social per- spectives. This requires self-other differentiation and the ability to take multiple perspectives. - More mature level of conception of the nature of persons.	- Social interaction, particularly specific group interaction pro- viding for verbal exchanges which force one to differentiate between one's own and other's perspectives. - Imaginative role taking. - Open communication in small face-to-face groups as found in sensitivity training. One becomes aware of factors within oneself which may lead to per- ceptual distortion.

Table 5: continued.

	- A high degree of differentiation of one's system of constructs for perceiving one's social world.	Also feedback from others allows one to check one's view of others with their own self-perception. - Opportunities to become familiar with a variety of sub-cultures so that one can develop more accurate social categorization in the inference process. - Exposure to models who have an empathic set. - Processing in the form of structured examination of relevant experiences.
b. Affective sharing of the other's feelings.	Emotional capacity and responsiveness.	Becoming aware and focusing on similarities between oneself and the person or persons with whom one is empathising. - Focusing on other's feelings. Exposure to models who through non-verbal and verbal cues indicate the internal condition of empathy.
The Communicaion phase.	-Attending to and perceiving accurately the verbal and non-verbal cues emitted by the empathee. - Active listening. -Responding to the empathee in such a way as to indicate one's empathic understanding of his thoughts, feelings, and concerns in a language attuned to the empathee's current feelings.	Acquisition and practice of the skill using such training models as Carkhuff's human resource development and variants of it such as Egan's model, may be effectively combined with Kagan's Interpersonal Process Recall method which increases a person's affective sensitivity and ability to communicate empathic understanding. - Exposure to models demonstrating the skills of the communication phase.

The evidence related to the efficacy of programs
aimed at structural change is more tentative. What follows
is a review of some intervention programs which have aimed
to produce structural change, referred to as "psychological
growth", and which have based their strategies on cognitive
developmental theory. The intervention strategies which
have been shown to produce changes in subjects along the
dimensions involved in the empathic process will be identified,
so that they can be incorporated, where appropriate, in the
present intervention program.

George Miller in the 1969 American Psychological
Association's Presidential Address, challenged psychologists
to discover and implement a means to "give Psychology away
...to begin with people where they are ..." and educate them
in the principles of psychology with which they may solve
their own problems, achieve their own objectives, make con-
sistent effective decisions, and form satisfying interpersonal
relations. The theme of the 1977 Mid-Winter Conference of the
Minnesota Personnel and Guidance Association was "Fostering
Human Development through Deliberate Guidance Approaches".
G. D. Miller (1977, 1) pointed out that looking at human
development through the developmental psychologies as a way
of formulating appropriate interventions in schools and
colleges represents somewhat of a shift for education and
guidance:

> The aim of developmental approaches is to
> promote psychological growth along some personal
> dimension derived from developmental psychology

> (ego, social, intellectual, moral, career,
> etc.). Inother words, deliberate inter-
> ventions are efforts to move people to a
> higher state in their personal development
> often covering some of the same psychological
> concerns as traditional forms of helping but
> they are conceptualized in terms of develop-
> mental growth.
> <div align="right">(G. D. Miller, 1977, 1)</div>

Kohlberg (in G. D. Miller, 1977, 25), traces the

interest in "deliberate psychological education as far back

as Socrates and certainly to Dewey, whom Kohlberg quotes as

saying in 1895, that "the aim of education is growth or

development, both intellectual and moral... Only knowledge

of the order and connection of the stages of psychological

development can ensure this. Education is the work of supply-

ing conditions which will enable the psychological functions

to mature in the freest and fullest manner." (G. D. Miller,

1977, 26).

The studies to be reviewed have taken Dewey's in-

junction to heart. They have taken what we know about human

development in terms of developmental theory and have

attempted to create environments (curricula) which would be

effective in promoting growth aspects described by the theory.

Psychological educators in examining developmental

theories (Piaget, Kohlberg, Loevinger, Perry, etc.) appear

to have identified the following assumptions as relevant for

education: (Miller, 1977, 3)

1. The process of psychological development is

an important aim of education and should not be

left to chance factors in the school as in the

case now in most schools.

2. A good place to start conceptualizing human development is by examining key aspects of developmental psychology, especially cognitive development.

The following theoretical concepts emerge:

(a) Human development can be explained in terms of stages of growth of internal organizing structures with each stage having its own unique qualitatively different characteristics.

(b) Each stage contains and builds on those preceding it and represents progressively more complex structures.

(c) Complexity of structure provides the basis for an adaptive personal framework.

(d) Even though the structures are considered quite stable and irreversible, growth does occur over time and can be influenced with appropriate psychological interventions.

3. The counsellor with the knowledge of developmental theory and relationship enhancement skills can play a key role in the school as psychological or developmental educator. As for the process of development, structural developmental theory argues that cognitive reorganization underlies such developmental patterns of reasoning and stresses that the child is actively

constructing his way of interpreting his world
rather than passively being changed by either
external or internal forces.

Though intervention programs aiming at positive
psychological growth were initially aimed at school popula-
tions, they have now emerged at college level. The inter-
vention studies which aim at developing a cognitive structural
approach to the development of adults, specifically that of
teachers and counsellors, are based on cognitive structural
research which indicates a relationship between teachers'
conceptual complexity levels and their effectiveness with stu-
dents. Sharon Oja (in Miller, 1971) in a review of research studies
in the area, refers to the study of Harvey, Hunt and Schroder
(1961) as lending support to the hypothesis that teachers
at higher conceptual complexity levels are more flexible,
stress-tolerant, adaptive teachers. They may be more able
to function in highly student-centred environments, where
their role is to utilize the learner's frame of reference
and to encourage the students to question and hypothesize
(Hunt and Joyce, 1967). However, two studies, by Brock (1975)
and by Hanson (1975; both cited by Oja) indicate that junior
college students seem to operate at a concrete level of con-
ceptual functioning and are not able to benefit from the
somewhat abstract format of courses at that level. Brock
found a mismatch between the curriculum and the developmental
level of the students. Similarly, Hanson's study, which
examined the general developmental level of a large sample

of junior college freshmen in the same environment, found

that students manifested substantial concrete thinking,

little ability to take perspectives, and only a rudimentary

sensitivity to feelings in others.

The studies to be reviewed are among an ongoing

series of studies intended to further develop and evalute

the psychological education approach originated by Ralph

Mosher, Norman Sprinthall and Lois Erickson (cited in Miller,

1976). Their curriculum was part of the Deliberate

Psychological Education Project (D.P.E.) associated with

the Alternative Education Programs in Minnespolis public

schools and developed through the University of Minnesota.

The D.P.E. project, aiming at facilitating growth in adoles-

cent thought advocated direct teacher involvement during the

formation process of deliberate psychological education

curriculum. It seemed reasonable and warranted to include

teachers at this point of curriculum development if one

could be assured that teachers' psychological growth and

development was at an appropriate level. However, indications

that this might not be so come from the finding that most

females stabilize at stage 3 or the conventional level of

moral judgment as measured by the Kohlberg Scale (see p. 38

of this report). This stage is well below the more mature

post-conventional level where moral value resides in /autono-

mously held ideal principles of justice.

It is worth noting that the State of Minnesota

has a Human Relations requirement (HR 521) which states that

all certified personnel in the schools must complete a
human relations component while in the teacher training.

The Sprinthall-Mosher Model takes the developmental
approach to psychological growth drawing heavily on the
developmental structure models of Piaget, Kohlberg, Loevinger
and Perry. Since most of the studies based their evaluation
on movement along the scales derived from these models, the
scales as well as the related models will be described briefly.

Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Judgment Development

Kohlberg's stages of moral development were des-
cribed in Chapter 1. Kohlberg considers that the need for
intervention to promote the development of moral judgment
arises because most people become locked-in at the conventional
level of moral reasoning. The main experiential determinants
of moral development according to Kohlberg, seem to be the
amount and variety of social experience, the opportunity to
take a number of roles and to encounter a number of perspec-
tives. Having experience and practice in taking another's
point of view is the source of the principled sense of equality
and reciprocity. The opportunity for moral role-taking is
an essential contribution to the development of moral judgment.

The major research findings using Kohlberg's dilemmas
and scoring system give support to general tenents of Stage
Theory. Rest (1974b) in a review points out that the findings
regarding age trends (the higher the age, the higher the stage)
in various cultures support the developmental aspect of

thinking in the moral judgment area. Correlations of Kohlberg's
scale with I.Q., with Harvey, Hunt and Schroder's Conceptual
Systems, and with Loevinger's Ego Development Scale support
the cognitive developmentalist's emphasis on the rationality
of moral development. Research results on the relation of
moral judgment to moral action and feeling show modest but
statistically significant relationship with delinquency
(Kohlberg and Freundich, 1974), student activism (Haan, Smith
and Block, 1968), cheating behaviour (Kohlberg,
1969), teacher peer ratings of moral conduct (Kohlberg, 1969),
and to measures of guilt (Duma and Mosher, 1967). Kohlberg's
stage theory has received various criticism, specifically
the possible bias in the definitions of the higher stages,
as well as its orientation towards male rather than female
subjects. Its major features, however seem relatively
accepted. Though research has not fully answered the question
whether moral problem solving on hypothetical dilemmas in a
test situation represents the way a subject would think in
actual moral dilemmas, one may assume that valid moral judg-
ment assessment does depend on the subject using problem
solving strategies that are typical of him.

The Defining Issues Test - A Test of Moral Judgment Development

The standard method of moral judgment assessment
employed by Kohlberg involves interviews and scoring judges.
It is time consuming, complicated to use and has reliability
problems. As a result, the intervention studies in the D.P.E.

program have used the Defining Issues Test, an objective

test of moral judgment development devised and tested by

James Rest et al. (1974b) at the University of Minnesota.

On the assumption that persons at different stages

of moral judgment have distinctive ways of defining moral

situations, the moral judgment scores on the DIT attempt to

tap the basic conceptual framework by which a subject

analyses a social moral problem and judges the proper course

of action (Rest, 1974b). The DIT consists of 6 moral dilemmas.

A subject reads each dilemma and then is presented with

twelve "issue statements" which define the issues of the

dilemma in ways representative of the reasoning at Kohlberg

Stages 2 through 6. The subject's task is to rate and rank

the issue statements in terms of their perceived importance

in making a decision about a dilemma. The issue statements

are stage-keyed and the ranking yields stage scores repre-

senting the relative importance the subject attributes to

each stage. Research has focussed on stages 5 and 6 and a

"principles" or P-score reflecting the usage of these stages

ranges from 0 to 95. It is often expressed as a percentage.

The stability of DIT P-score is evidenced by a test-retest

correlation of .81 over a two-week period.

A number of studies by Rest et al. (1974b) and other

researchers using the DIT (quoted by Rest, 1974b, 5-4) have

shown the DIT to have considerable construct validity. Its

P-scores have shown significant correlations with age (.62

to .67); with stage scores on the Kohlberg scale (.68);

with cognitive capacity measures such as a comprehension
test of social-moral concepts (.52 to .67) and with attitude
tests (Law and Order test and Libertarian Democracy test),
indicating certain value commitments consistent with principled
thinking (.60 to .63 respectively). As the DIT has been
selected for use in this investigation, it is more fully
discussed in the following chapter).

Jane Loevinger: Stages of Ego Development

Another stage model that has been used in interven-
tion programs using the development approach is that of Jane
Loevinger.

The concept of ego development has been variously
described and studied. Loevinger's research (1970, 1973,
1976) has led to an expanded outlook on the concept. For
Loevinger, ego is the "master trait" and is reflected in the
way a person reasons about moral issues, relates to others,
the type of issues that worry him and the degree of complexity
in the way he thinks. The Loevinger-Wessler Model of Ego
development describes advancing stages of personality develop-
ment, a moving away from selfish concerns and conforming
tendencies, through the self-criticism condition involved in
resolving concerns of self with others, to an integrated stage.

Table 6 shows Loevinger's "Milestones of Ego
Development". Characterized by stages of development and a
structural approach, Loevinger's theory of Ego Growth defines
seven qualitatively different stages: presocial-symbiotic,

impulsive, selfprotective, conformist, conscientious, auto-
nomous and integrated. Each stage builds on, incorporates
and transmutes the previous one. The task of the first
stage can be described as differentiating self from non-self
which Loevinger (1970; 1976) defines as the "construction
of reality", the realization that there is a stable world
of objects.

The second stage is the impulsive stage. It is
during this period of development that the children confirm
their separate identity. This is accomplished in part by
acquiring the word "no" and also by expressing their wishes
and impulses. So their way out of their initial, vital,
symbiotic relation with their mother is to express their
impulses. The impulse to do something predominates over the
calculation of long-term gains.

At the self-protective stage, the first step is
taken towards self-control of impulses. Children at this
stage understand that there are rules, but they are obeyed
in terms of immediate advantage. The main rule is "Don't
get caught". With progressive growth, those wishes can be
coordinated over a longer and longer time span so that
children are not being controlled just by immediate reward
and punishment but are beginning to plan for a more and more
distant future.

The next stage, the conformist stage, is "the great
watershed" according to Jane Loevinger (1976). It is
here that children start to identify their own welfare with

that of the group. Children now accept the rules of the
group, the family. The conformist obeys the rules simply
because they are group accepted rules, not primarily because
he/she fears punishment. The chief sanction for transgres-
sion is shame and disapproval. Children now see behaviour
in terms of its externals rather than in terms of feelings
in contrast to persons at a higher level.

The fifth stage is called the concientious stage.
Loevinger (1973) states, "the person at the conscientious
stage evaluates and decides for himself what rules he will
give his allegiance to". Thus rules are no longer viewed
as absolutes, that is, the same for everyone all the time.
The child now sees a rich variety of individual differences.
The sanction against transgression is guilt. Interpersonal
relations are seen in terms of feelings and traits rather
than actions. A person at this stage is less likely than the
conformist to feel guilty for having broken a rule but more
likely to feel guilty if what he/she does hurts another
person, even though it may conform to the rules.

The next stage, the autonomous stage, reflects the
capacity to acknowledge and to cope with inner conflicts, i.e.,
conflicting needs, conflicting duties and conflict between
needs and duties. The autonomous person is able to unite and
integrate ideas that appear as incompatible alternatives to
those at lower stages. There is a high toleration for
ambiguity. The autonomous stage is so named partly because
the person at that point recognizes other people's needs for

Table 6: Some Milestones of Ego Development*

Stage	Code	Impulse Control Character Development	Interpersonal Style	Conscious Preoccupations and Cognitive Style
Presocial			Autistic	
Symbiotic	1-1		Symbiotic	Self vs. non-self.
Impulsive	1-2	Impulsive, fear of retaliation.	Receiving, dependent, exploitive.	Bodily feelings, especially sexual and aggressive. (Stereotyping, conceptual confusion).
Self-Protective	Δ	Fear of being caught, externalizing blame, opportunistic.	Wary, manipulative, exploitative.	Self-protective, trouble, wishes, things, advantage, control.
Conformist	1-3	Conformity to external rules, shame, guilt for breaking rules.	Belonging, superficial niceness.	Appearance, social acceptability, banal feelings, behaviour (Conceptual simplicity, stereotypes, cliches).
Conscientious-Conformist	1-3/4	Differentiation of norms, goals.	Aware of self in relation to group, helping.	Adjustment, problems, reasons, opportunities (vague). (Multiplicity).
Conscientious	1-4	Self-evaluated standards, self-criticism, guilt for consequences, long-term goals and ideals.	Intensive, responsible, mutual, concern for communication.	Differentiated feelings, motives for behaviour, self-respect, achievements, traits, expression. (Conceptual complexity idea of patterning).

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Individual-1-4/5 istic.	Add-Respect for individuality.	Add: Dependence as an emotional problem.	Add: Development social problems, differentiation of inner life from outer. (Add: Distinction of process and outcome).
Autonomous 1-5	Add: Coping with conflicting inner needs, toleration.	Add: Respect for autonomy, inter- dependence.	Vividly conveyed feelings, integration of physiologi- cal and psychological, psychological causation of behaviour, role concep- tion, self-fulfilment, self in social text. (Increased conceptual complexity, complex patterns, toleration for ambiguity, broad scope, objectivity).
Integrated 1-6	Add: Reconciling inner conflicts, renunciation of unattainable.	Add: Cherishing of individuality.	Add: Identiy.

Note: "Add" means in addition to the description applying to the previous level.

* Miller, G. D., Developmental Theory and its Application in Guidance Programs St. Paul, Minnesota Department of Education, 1977, 24.

autonomy, partly because it is marked by some freeing of the
person from oppressive demands of conscience in the preced-
ing stage. A crucial instance can be the willingness to
let one's children make their own mistakes. The autonomous
person, however, typically recognizes the limitations to
autonomy, that emotional interdependence is inevitable.

At the highest stage, the integrated stage, the
person proceeds beyond coping with conflict to a reconcilia-
tion of conflicing demands. A new element in this period
is the consideration of a sense of identity. Loevinger (1976)
suggests that probably the best description of this stage is
that of Maslow's Self-Actualizing Person.

Loevinger's Sentence Completion Test

The Loevinger Sentence Completion Test (Loevinger
and Wessler, 1970) is a psychometric measure for judging
levels of ego development as just described. The sentence
Completion Test (S.C.T.) is a subjective measure consisting
of 36 sentence stems. It is the task of the subject to com-
plete each of the sentence stems according to what the
subject feels is important. Each of the 36 items derives a
response which is considered a clue to the subject's character.
From the 36 responses it is possible to construct a picture,
a total protocol rating (T.P.R.) of the subject's character
placing him/her in one of the stages, just described, or in
a transition between two of the main stages. The subjects
are asked to complete the sentences in writing: thus placing

a limitation on the age range for which the instrument is appropriate. Loevinger considers age 11 as representative of the outside limit of usage.

Following is an example of a possible progression for completing the sentence, "My main problem is ...": An impulsive stage 2 response: "...when am I going home?" A stage Δ response (Delta in the scoring scheme indicates a change or transition condition between major steps 2 and 3): "... that I am boy crazy".
A stage Δ-3 response: "... my boyfriend".
A self-protective stage 3 response: "... my weight".
A self-protective to conformist stage 3-4 response "... keeping from getting tired and nervous".
A conformist stage 4 response: "... that I depreciate myself".
A conformist to conscientious stage 4-5 response: "... I often don't realize I have any".
(Note: The above examples come from Miller-Tiedeman and Niemi, 1977, 136).

Kohlberg (1977, 30) pointed out that Loevinger's test, like any other written test and any projective test, has many limitations. But studies demonstrate that Loevinger's test does have relationship to age development and to other measures of social development that one would expect. For example, Loevinger's measure of Ego Development correlates with age and IQ controlled, with that of Kohlberg's stages. Her interpretation of the ego differs from that of Kohlberg. Loevinger sees the ego as the master organ or agency in any

given test response. Kohlberg, speaking from a cognitive
developmental view, holds, like Piaget, that cognitive
development is central in any given response and that it is
necessary but not sufficient for ego and moral development:
"Adolescents and adults may be at a high cognitive stage
and at a relatively low ego or moral stage." Mature moral
standards are seen as the outcome of a set of transformations
of the child's perceptions and orderings of a social world
with which he/she is interacting. Limited social participa-
tion and restricted environment will retard this particular
aspect of cognitive functioning (Kohlberg, 1977, 31).
Kohlberg sees Loevinger's test not so much as a test of a
hidden iceberg, the ego, but as a test of the person as
psychologist trying to understand himself in his relations
to others.

Her model is thus in line with Robert Selman's
theory of social perspective-taking, which holds that central
to the stages of interpersonal perception is the level of
one's role-taking, differentiating, and coordinating the
perspective of self and other. Keeping the limitation of
Loevinger's test in mind, the test does provide a measure
of development in interpersonal perception or cognition.

William Perry's Theory

William Perry (1970) outlined a scheme of sequential
stages through which students move to organize and use know-

ledge, authority, values and responsibility. Perry's deve-

lopmental model pays tribute to the emotional processes upon

which cognitive growth is based. He speaks of "grief" of

development, acknowledging the pain and confusion through

which an individual must travel to continue growing. This

is very much in line with Piaget's theory of the equilibration

process, whereby an individual compensates for intrusions

into his schema by modification of schema forming new schema,

and thus accommodating to the new situation. It is consis-

tent also with Piaget's understanding that "there is a

constant parallel between the affective and intellectual

life through childhood and adolescence. Of course affectivity

is always the incentive for actions ... but affectivity is

nothing without intelligence" (Piaget, 1932).

Widick and Simpson (1976, 5) explain the Perry

scheme thus:

> The Perry Scheme provides a way of concep-
> tualizing student development that describes
> and explains the intervweaving of intellect
> and identity ... The nine positions define a
> relevant set of developmental goals for colle-
> giate instruction. The ultimate goals, the
> affirmation of identity through choice, bridges
> to Erickson's concept of development. However
> this scheme, like other cognitive developmental
> perspectives, outlines steps along the way that
> serve as intermediate goals and suggest the
> importance of cognitive conflict in moving
> students along that path.

Perry outlines his nine stages as follows:

Position 1: The student sees the world in polar terms, the

we-right-good versus other-wrong-bad. Right Answers for

everything exist in the Absolute, known to authority whose

role is to mediate (teach) them.

Position 2: The student perceives diversity of opinion and uncertainty and accounts for them as unwarranted confusion in poorly qualified Authorities or as mere exercises set by Authority "so we can learn to find the Answer for ourselves".

Position 3: The student accepts diversity and uncertainty as legitimate but still temporary in areas where Authority "hasn't found the Answer yet". He/she supposes Authority grades him/her in these areas on "good expression" but remains puzzled as to standards.

Position 4, A: The student perceives legitimate uncertainty (and therefore diversity of opinion) to be extensive and raises it to ... a realm of his/her own in which "anyone has the right to his own opinion", a realm which he/she sets over against Authority's realm where right-wrong still prevails, or

Position 4, B: The student discovers qualitative contextual relativistic reasoning as a special phase of "what they want" within Authority's realm.

Position 5: The student perceives all knowledge and values (including Authority's) as contextual and relativistic and subordinates dualistic right-wrong functions to the status of a special case, in context.

Position 6: The student apprehends the necessity of orienting him/herself in a relativistic world through some form of personal Commitment.

Position 7: The student makes an initial Commitment in some area.

Position 8: The student experiences implications of Commit-
ment and explores the subjective and stylistic aspects of
responsibility.

Position 9: The student experiences the affirmation of
identity among multiple responsibilities and realizes Commit-
ment as an ongoing, unfolding activity through which he/she
expresses his/her lifestyle. (Widick and Simpson, 1976, 9-10).

Figure 4: Flow Chart of Perry's Scheme

Modifying of Right Wrong Dualism	Discovery of Relativism and Need to Commit	Developing of Commitments	(open)
1 2 3	4 5 6	7 8 9	

The nine positions have been grouped in 3 parts: referring
to the dualistic thinkers, the relativistic thinkers and the
committed thinkers.

Goldsmith, (1977, 190) defined dualistic thinkers
as those who require structure in their world, view knowledge
as more or less absolute, perceive the world and themselves
in fairly simplistic and stereotypic ways, demand "rightness"
from Authorities and tend to be unaware of internal processes.
For basically relativistic thinkers, knowledge is contextual,
explanations depend on circumstances, instructors are
individuals to be consulted, and internal processes are
conscious. Making choices is difficult as it means narrow-
ing, closing of options.

Limitations of Perry's Model

One of the limitations of Perry's Model is that
it was developed at Harvard and may be restricted by the
unique character of that institution. Widick (1977) pointed
out that data on College and non-College attendance clearly
indicates that different types of colleges attract students
with distinctive patterns of attitudes, personality traits,
and ability. The adequacy and utility of the Perry Model
for describing and understanding student development and
needs at community colleges, vocational technical schools,
and professional schools still requires investigation. The
central assumption in applying the Perry scheme is that one
starts "where the student is".

Rest, in discussing cognitive stage theory, argued
that one needs to make specific use of the concept of stage.
Knowledge of the individual's particular stage should be used
to identify "specific tasks ... the order in which they are
undertaken and the way in which particular kinds of activity
are matched with the student's developmental level" (Rest,
1974c,253). For example, a career-like planning workshop
for students at dualistic stages would need to differ in
goals and processes from that provided for advanced relativis-
tic thinkers. In order to effectively implement and assess
differential developmental approaches one needs an extensive
knowledge of position characteristics. Perry's scheme does
not satisfy this criterion. Perry's ratings are difficult
to obtain as one needs to extract from the student the fine

distinctions which differentiate one stage of thinking from
another. Estimates of class ratings have been based on
reactions in the class, journal entries and rating interviews.
At this point the Perry model hints at, but does not provide
a sufficiently comprehensive and detailed description of the
developmental sequence to guide a diagnosis/intervention
methodology. "...the steps between its (the scheme's)
generalities and practical educational applications will
remain many and arduous" (Perry, 1970, 209).

The range of the Perry scheme still requires
researching. Does it describe all personality functioning
as Loevinger's Ego Development model claims to do, or is it
restricted to certain "context" areas of one's identity?
Widick (1977) suggests that research needs to ascertain the
relationship between the Perry stages and other conceptually
similar models which focus on different aspects of personality,
such as Kohlberg's scheme, Loevinger's model, Marcia's ego-
identity states. Perry thus has not developed a valid,
reliable, and efficient assessment instrument. An attempt
to develop an instrument to measure development on the Perry
scale has been made by Knefelkamp and Widick (1974). The
Kne Wi consists of ten sentence stems and two paragraph
completion items which appear to be effective in obtaining
Perry rateable responses.

What are the Processes of Developmental Change?

Like most cognitive developmental models, Perry's

model suggests that development comes about as a result of disequilibrium, that is, when the individual is confronted with information which cannot be assimilated to his existing mode of thinking. It has been suggested that the variables fostering transition to a new stage may be stage specific. For example, Widick refers to Perry's finding that the advancement of dualist thinkers resulted from confrontation with diversity; whereas relativists needed a sense of community support in moving to commitment. Transition processes may be even more specific: "In general the specific conditions for progressive position change need to be clarified and experimentally tested." (Widick, 1977, 37).

Following the above discussion of the developmental models and related scales used in D.P.E. programs, relevant intervention programs will be critically discussed.

Developmental Intervention Programs

The purpose of the following description and evaluation of programs based on developmental theories is to find guidelines for the design and evaluation of a teacher training program to be used in this study. This is the reason why apart from the curriculum developed for the Deliberate Psychological Education Project by Normal Sprinthall for junior high school students, the programs that have been selected for discussion have as their target population college students and student teachers.

Norman Sprinthall's High School Curriculum in the Psychology
of Counselling

Norman Sprinthall developed a curriculum in personal
and human development consisting of educational experiences
designed to facilitate personal, ethical, aesthetic and
philosophical development of adolescents. The project was
part of the Deliberate Psychological Education (D.P.E.) Program
developed for the Minneapolis public schools. During the
school year 72-3 a series of courses were tried out largely
as electives in a Social Studies Department. Sprinthall's
(1976, 24) program was based on the assumption that adolescence
represents a stage of development qualitatively distinct from
childhood. The shift to "formal operations" (Piaget),
a higher level of moral judgment, and accompanying shifts to
egocentric schema have major implications for programs that
seek to nurture psychological growth and ego development.
Other important aspects of the rationale of the Sprinthall
approach concern the physical location for the research
(natural setting of the school); the pedagogy of the practi-
cum and seminar approach and the emphasis on simultaneously
training teachers and developing curriculum materials. The
program contained a series of high school classes in psycho-
logy designed deliberately for higher stage attainment.

Objectives were two fold: to increase level of
psychological maturity of pupils and to teach particular
psychological skills. The population came from a local
public high school.

Program. The psychology of counselling class was
provided with a practicum and seminar experience to promote
the learning of listening skills and the development of
empathic responses. The practicum consisted of sequential
training in role-play exercises, examination of counselling
tapes, and counselling of high school peers. The seminar
sessions included discussions of counselling films and tapes,
readings on communication, and an integration of these with
the practicum units. Introductory activities were aimed at
creation of a collegial atmosphere between pupils and staff
and building the class as a group. In the first phase,
teachers modelled the empathic response by listening to each
student as he introduced himself, and then responded in a
manner designed to indicate that they heard and understood
both the content and some of the feelings that the person
introducing himself experienced.

Teaching active listening skills was done by direct
teaching of Active Listening Scale (a modification of Truax
Accurate Empathy Scale). This was followed by practice in
listening skills. Sprinthall explained that through practice
such as writing down single responses to stated "role play"
or actual concerns, the pupils gradually developed skill
and comfort with the scales. The two stage nature of these
learnings was emphasized: a) to accurately hear and identify
content and feelings and, b) to frame a response. Pupils
learned to score their own and others' responses both on the
audio-tapes and on the single response in-class practice

sessions. The third aspect of counselling and communication training, the non-verbal component, was introduced after the first three or four weeks on the active listening scales. Part of the time was spent on learning the above skills and part on discussion in seminars and on writing assignments. As the class proceeded through the term the skill training of the process work declined. Instead the pupils began to bring in their own "real life" concerns. The role play counselling shifted to actual problems, and the pupils started using their newly learned active listening skills on these real issues.

Sprinthall felt that by employing real experience through a practicum and extensive examination of issues through a seminar, a powerful and necessary conflict situation was created. As the class neared the end of the term, transfer of training problem was stressed. Pupils were asked to make brief communication audio tapes with friends as a means of trying out their skills with non-classmates. This provided for significant discussion when the pupils realized both how much they had learned as well as how difficult it was to transfer such learning to different situations.

Evaluation. Evaluation instruments used were Porter's Scales consisting of ten situations with multiple choice responses testing empathic communication; Loevinger's Scale of Ego-development; and Kohlberg's Scales of Moral Maturity. As Table 8 indicates, pupil scores between pre-test and post-test on the Porter's Scales increased from

a mean of 1.17 (on a 5-point empathy scale) to a mean of

2.76. On the Loevinger scale there was movement from level

3 to level 4 (probability < .001); and on the Kohlberg scale

there was movement from stage 3 towards stage 4 (p < .08).

The above quasi-experimental design with multiple assess-

ments of the dependent variables, employing a formative model

of evaluation, has been widely used by development programs

in psychological education. This design was chosen because,

as Sprinthall explained (Sprinthall, in Miller, 1977) it meets

the specific purposes of probing new curriculum directions

within the natural setting over a series of intervention-

evaluation cycles: the specific inputs that promote psycho-

logical development in the subjects may be identified.

Since formative evaluation takes place during the formative

stage, alternatives and modifications can be made to improve

the process based on the on-going data.

Conclusion. Sprinthall (1977, 31) concluded that

the deliberate expansion of social role-participation and

reflection on the experience appear as major ingredients

in personal psychological growth. He saw the implication

of the program as indicating the possibility of moving away

from the special remedial, adjustive and referral role of

psychology towards the educational, developmental function.

Critique of D.P.E. The Deliberate Psychological

Educational program is an attempted integration of cognitive-

developmental psychology (primary Kohlberg's moral reasoning

concepts), and humanistic psychology aimed at the high school

student. Kohlberg (1977), in reviewing the work of Mosher and Sprinthall, made a number of observations. One is the difficulty in integrating cognitive-developmental and human-istic psychology. The cognitive developmental approaches stresses the cognitive reorganization of experience through successively higher levels as the basic developmental process, while the humanistic approach tends to emphasize the affec-tive. Secondly, the cognitive developmental approach relies more heavily upon objective empirical research than does DPE.

Susan Goldsmith's Application of the Perry Scheme in the College Course on Human Identity

Susan Goldsmith's (1977) intervention program applied the Perry model to a college course. The class in "Themes in Human Identity" was interdisciplinary, combining literature and psychology to focus on exploration of one's self in relation to significant others, to career, society, and meaning of life.

The classes were small (30 or fewer) and met twice a week for two hours. Originally intended for freshmen, in the second year of the program it was offered to sophomores, juniors and seniors. The themes of 'Self and Significant Others' and 'Self and Career' were judged most appropriate for freshmen. Teaming a student development specialist with a literary scholar was the major adaptation in the third year.

Goals. Goals were a mastery of content and move-
ment on the Perry Schema: specifically to move dualistic
thinkers (Positions 1, 2, 3) towards relativism (Positions
4 - 6); and to move relativistic thinkers towards commitment
in relativism (Positions 6 - 9).

Since most students in the freshman class had
dualistic views, the goals was to stimulate a recognition
and acceptance of multiple perspectives, the first step
towards relativism.

Rationale. Rationale behind the course was based
on Sanford's (1966) view quoted by Goldsmith (1977, 188) as
to how structural developmental changes take place. Sanford
identified the process as a combination of challenge and
support. Challenge is conflict, a disorganizing experience,
something unexpected which forces the individual to adapt
to some new way. Support is reassurance, a balancing factor
that serves as some means of keeping the challenge from
overwhelming the individual: "The idea is to 'bend' the
structure just enough to force an adjustment of its shape
allowing the individual to 'grasp' the new idea" (Goldsmith,
1977, 188).

Dualistic challenges were provided to help dualistic
thinkers move to an acceptance of multiplicity: the existence
of many values and ideas. The first challenge variable con-
sisted of the issues chosen for study. For the freshman,
"self and significant others" was an area of current concern
since many were striving for independence from their families.

Similarly, "self and career" was thought-provoking. Ambiguity was the second challenge variable. Two instructors with equal authority did not say which interpretation or theory was correct, but encouraged students to express their ideas and always asked for other ways to look at things. Support variables included a moderate degree of structure in relation to the setting out of course requirements, and in having instructors initially act as lecturers and discussion leaders. The second major support variable was the personal atmosphere in the class.

 Course strategy. The concept of matching teaching methods to student cognitive levels was fundamental. Situations were constructed which the students could not ignore but which required thatthey try out new more complex ideas. For example, a student who said that Freud was "wrong" was asked to identify what parts he disagreed with. Another student who did not "like" Freud was questioned on the basis of his opinion. This was both a challenge and a support, a balancing of pressures sufficient to produce conflict with recognition of the limits. The course plan continued to adapt to the students throughout the quarter as shown in the accompanying Table 7 (reproduced from Miller, 1977, 189).

Table 7: Goldsmith's Developmental Education Program

Group	Goal	Challenges	Support
Dualists	Awareness of Multiplicity	Pertinent Issues Ambiguity	Moderate Structure Personal Atmosphere.
Relativists	Awareness of Need to Commit	Pertinent Issues Responsibility Choice	Personal Atmosphere Diversity

	STRATEGIES:	Matching
	DUALISTS:	Debate Other ways to Explain?
	RELATIVISTS:	Vicarious Experiences Choice-Making Which do you Choose?

(Miller, 1977, 189)

No evaluation was reported for the course. The
value of Susan Goldsmith's program for this author is its
deliberate attempt to match course activities to student's
cognitive development level. Another example of her taking
what we know about developmental theory and creating an
appropriate curriculum is her application of the concept of
support and challenge. That approach utilizes what we know
about the significance of disequilibrium in activating the
restructuring process.

Anita B. Tucker: Psychological Growth in a Liberal

Arts Course: A Cross-Cultural Experience

Purpose of the Experiment. The study was planned
as one of the on-going series of studies intended to further
develop and evaluate the psychological education approach
originated by Mosher and Sprinthall. The primary objective
of this study was to facilitate the positive psychological
development of college students in a cross-cultural context.
The major dependent variable was the stage of development
of the students as assessed by the Defining Issues Test of
Moral Reasoning, the Loevinger Sentence Completion Form,
and a Cross-Cultural Awareness Measure. A second and related
variable was Skill Acquisition Assessment of the students.
Since role-taking was viewed by Tucker as an essential con-
dition for developmental growth, this second order dependent
variable was considered an important outcome measure.

Two questions were generated for investigation
using the formative, hypothesis-seeking model of this study
(Tucker, 1977, 229):

1. Is the psychological education curriculum, which
includes extensive empathy training and in-depth inter-
personal interaction followed by structured examination of
this experience, more effective than a similar curriculum
which includes neither extensive empathy training nor in-
depth inter-personal interaction?

2. Is the psychological educational curriculum,

which includes a broad array of cultural bombardments in the form of content materials and simulated experiences followed by structured examination of those experiences, more effective than a similar curriculum which includes content materials of a cultural nature but no simulated experienced followed by structured examination of those experiences?

Rationale of the Course. The course was based on the assumption derived from work in D.P.E. that the combination of role-taking and reflection provides a method of stimulating overall development. The content of cross-cultural differences, the framework of developmental psychology, and the instruction from D.P.E. formed the three pedogogical strands for this study.

Course strategy. Two components in the curriculum format were a lab/small group and a seminar. The treatment was counselling skill development/empathy training for college students with a racial and gender emphasis. The empathy training was encapsuled within the format of "life simulation of affect-laden cultural cognitions" (Danielian, 1967, 312). This model uses values and assumptions of individuals, particularly cultural, as the significant variables. In the simulation, confrontation was achieved by the use of a foreign accomplice trained as a stable auxiliary in the whys and wherefores of a synthetic and contrived but wholly believable "contrast American" culture. The "contrast American" culture was a convenient label applied to a set of

assumptions and values which maximally contrasted with American assumptions and values and was logically derived from them.

In the following example, the American is attempting to generate some enthusiasm among the indigenous people by getting them actively involved in the planning stages of American-sponsored projects.

American: We were thinking of having a public meeting to ask the people if they had any suggestions for improving the civic action plans.

Contrast American: Why, aren't you satisfied with me here? You find that I'm not cooperating with you?

American: We think the people would be more likely to cooperate if they saw how their plans were made and felt that they had a part in them, in the planning itself.

Contrast American: So the people make the decisions. What do the leaders and officers do? Don't they make decisions?

American: Well, the only time this is really used is when our public officials feel they need popular support to implement some plans.

Contrast Americans: Perhaps your people don't have confidence in your leadership. Maybe there is something lacking in your leadership.

In Tucker's program, basic cognitive assumptions were made by individuals relative to their cultural back-ground and were conceived and interpreted by each individual.

The goal of the research model was the training effect of
the simulation episodes on the participants. It engaged
participants in emotional conflict as they sought to resolve
the role-play situations presented, and provided a situation
which revealed to the participants their responsiveness or
lack thereof to cultural clues. "To the extent that an
observer separated culturally derived behaviour (systematic,
or that which is common to all personalities), from that
which was individually derived he/she demonstrated cultural
cognitive awareness" (Tucker, 1977, 231).

In addition to the above, stimulation games
(Johnson and Johnson, 1975) which reflected stereotyping,
trust, racism, sexism, competition versus cooperation, open/
closed mindedness and power were presented. Overall training
was based on a modified version of Carkhuff's Active
Listening Scale.

Subjects. Both experimental and comparison groups
were under-graduate students who selected to enrol in two
open registration classes in the University of Minnesota.
Approximately two-thirds of each class were American blacks.
The difference in format of instruction for the experimental
group was the structured inter-personal interaction: the
class was taught in a more traditional lecture-type manner
and any social interaction which took place between students
occurred through their own initiative. Both groups of stud-
ents were responsible for mastering the course content in
terms of attending lectures, completing assignments, and

passing the final written examinations.

Evaluation. The study was conducted under the quasi-experimental design with multiple assessment of the dependent variables, and employed a formative model of evaluation. The dependent variables investigated were:

1. Counselling skills: Active listening and empathic response as measured by a modified version of Carkhuff's Index of Response (1969);

2. Personal growth: measured by the Defining Issues (DIT) as a measure of social reasoning and the Loevinger Sentence Completion Form (SCF) as a measure of ego-development; and

3. Cross-cultural awareness measured by a variety of clinical indices such as student's journals, questionnaires, personal interviews. The evaluation conformed to pre-test/post-test non-equivalent comparison group design. Analysis of the variance of simple gains scores of means or correlated t tests were performed. Results are shown in Table 8.

The raw P-scores from the DIT were transformed into percentages reflecting the usage of principled thinking characteristic of stages 5 and 6. Results indicated that the E group increased from 38.2% to 44.2% as a result of the learning activities; a change which achieved statistical significance. Though there was no significant change in student stage on Loevinger's scale, there was a trend in the E group to move from the stage 3/4 to 4. The shift indicated that the students were beginning to integrate the character-istics of the conscientious level.

To assess student's proficiency in mastering the
communication techniques, the final examination consisted
of a video taped, 5-minute dyad/dialogue to an unrehearsed
black-white, male-female conflict situation. The group mean
score, of the video performance was 3.02 (using a 5-point
scale which indicated that the student showed an accurate
understanding of the content. The score of 2.00 (a near
miss in accurate empathy) was, according to Tucker, above
the average for such responses. Clinical analysis of
students' journals and audio tapes of the class sessions
supported the findings of greater psychological development
in the experimental group. Personal growth also was evident
in the interaction of the students and the general rapport
which developed in the class. Further support for the
greater effectiveness of the experimental group program came
from the fact that 72% of the experimental class re/enrolled
for the sequential class compared with only 19% of the com-
parison group's re-enrolling for the second-quarter sequence.
Tucker's major conclusion from this study was that a psycho-
logical education curriculum which included extensive cultural
bombardment in the form of content material and simulated
experiences followed by structured examination of those
experiences was more effective in promoting the psychological
development of college students than a similar curriculum
which utilized cultural content fields as its sole emphasis.

Bryan Lance Hunt: Psychological Education for College Students:

Cognitive Developmental Curriculum

Purpose of the Study. The purpose of the study
was to develop and evaluate formatively a Psychological

Education Curriculum intended to promote directly psychological

development of college students. A related objective of the

course was to improve student interpersonal communication

and counselling skills. A second purpose of the study was to

provide evidence that educators trained to respond empathi-

cally to people and to conduct a reflective seminar can use

these skills to promote psychological development within the

mainstream of the college curriculum.

Rationale for the Program. The primary component
of the course was extensive empathy training adapted from

Gazda (1973) combined with significant outside practical ex-

perience followed by structured reflection on that experience.

The empathy training was based partly on Kohlberg's contention

that opportunities for social role-taking promote personal

and moral development and partly on Loevinger and Wessler's

(1970) contention that higher stages of development are

characterised by differentiation and integration of one's own

and other's feelings and experiences. Practical experience,

according to Rest (1974a) and Sprinthall (1976) appears to

promote development both by expanding the experience base and

by resolving the disequilibrium (which results when students

find their initial skills inadequate to cope with the multi-

tude of problems and situations arising in their practical

setting) through discussion and reflection. The outside experience of the practicum followed by reflection on that experience was based on Dewey's concept of an active learner who reflects on his present experience to guide his future experience. The promotion of moderate confusion and disequilibrium, while at the same time providing support and opportunity for reflection and discussion, was based on the contention that disequilibrium followed by reflection and discussion promotes development (for example, Ginsburg and Opper, 1969).

Program Design. A non-equivalent control group design was used to assess the changes in psychological development of the students. One of the two classes the experimenter taught, Group I (n = 28), was assigned at random to the experimental treatment, the other Group II (n = 20) to an active control treatment. A third class (n = 23) was selected at random and assigned to an inactive control condition. All three classes were sections of an Introductory Educational Psychology course for Education students at the University of Minnesota, Winter quarter, 1974. Subjects in Groups I and II met in class sessions 2 hours per day for 11 weeks. The experimental group received extensive empathy training, adapted from Gazda (1973) and Carkhuff (1969) and outside practical experience in counselling (3 hours per week). The training was based on Ivey's (1971) Microcounselling model. It consisted of video taped practice in the use of empathy followed by a critique from group and the teaching

assistant. The general format for the empathy training

sessions was the following (Hurt, 1974, 73-4):

    1. One student improvised or recalled a situation

about which he/she could share personal feelings.

    2. The teaching assistant video-taped a short

dialogue between the two students and the group.

    3. The first student shared his feelings about

a situation.

    4. The second student responded: "You feel

_____ at or about _____."

    5. The other students in the group and the teach-

ing assistant then wrote and shared their perceptions of

how and what the first student was feeling and rated the

second student's response on the empathy scale.

    The teaching assistant encouraged the students to

share their real concerns and feelings as soon as they felt

comfortable in doing so, and most did so by the second

session. The active control group received only outside

practical experience though both the experimental and active

control groups were presented with a brief lecture on the

importance of the use of empathy. The instructor required

students in both groups to keep journals in which they

recorded their feelings and reactions to their experience in

the practical settings, their readings, and the classroom

activities. The students in the experimental group were

asked to react specifically to their attempts at using empathy

as well as other aspects of their experimental program. The

inactive group received neither extensive empathy training
nor outside practical experience. Their program did include
some communications training, however, and they read the
same texts as the experimental and active control groups.
A series of measures was used to assess psychological deve-
lopment and the acquisition of communications skills. All
three groups completed (a) the Sentence Completion Form
(Loevinger and Wessler, 1970); (b) the Defining Issues Test,
and (c) the Conceptual Systems Test (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder,
1961), at the beginning and end of the course to assess
psychological development. The experimental and active
control groups completed the Index of Responding (Gazda et
al., 1973) at the beginning and end of the course to assess
acquisition of communications skills. The experimenter
clinically analyzed experimental group student journals and
final conferences with experimental and active-control group
students to assess psychological development.

Educational questions investigated in the study
related to the effectiveness of the experimental curriculum
in the promotion of psychological development and the acquisi-
tion of communications skills. Analyses of variance,
correlated and uncorrelated t-tests and chi-squared tests of
independence were used to assess differences on the dependent
variables from pre-testing to post-testing and differences
between groups at pre-testing and post-testing. Analysis
of Sentence Completion Form (SCF) data revealed no significant
increase between pre-testing and post-testing on the instrument,

indicating stability during the period of the course. In
the experimental group, 10 of 28 students indicated positive
changes in SCF total protocol ratings while only 3 of 20
students in the active control group and 2 of 23 students
in the inactive-control group indicated positive changes.
Thus there were some positive trend shifts for the experimental
group.

Analysis of the Defining Issues Test data revealed
a significant increase in mean t scores between pre-testing
and post-testing for the experimental group (p = .037) and
for the active control group (p = .045) but not for the in-
active control group.

Analysis of Conceptual Systems Test (CST) data
indicated no significant differences between the three groups
in gain scores from pre-test to post-testing although there
were some trends in favour of the experimental and active-
control groups.

Analysis of Index of Respondings (IR), (an empathy
rating) data indicated that the mean ratings at pre-testing
for the experimental group and the active-control group were
not significantly different. At post-testing the experimental
group rating was significantly higher (p = .018) than the
active-control group rating. Clinical analysis of student
journals and final conferences supported the findings of
relatively greater psychological development in the experi-
mental group. Hurt's major conclusion (1974, 4) is "that
the psychological education curriculum which includes

Table 8: Summary of the D.P.E. Programs Discussed

Study and Population	No.	Length of Intervention.	Goals.	Evaluation Measures.	Findings.
Norman Sprinthall (1972-73) High School Students	30	12 weeks	1. To teach particular psychological skills, specifically peer counselling; - active listening skills; - responding to content and feelings of peers.	1. Porter Scales, consisting of 10 situations with multiple choice responses.	Pre-test scores: $\bar{x} = 1.17$ (n=30), range: 1 to 3 on a 5-point empathy scale. Post-test scores: $\bar{x} = 2.76$ (n=23), range: 2.3 to 3.5.
			2. To increase level of psychological maturity of pupils.	2. Loevinger Scale of Ego Development.	Results on Loevinger Scale: Movement from level 3 to level 4 ($\bar{x}_1 = 5.21$, $\bar{x}_2 = 6.42$, p less than .001).
				3. Kohlberg Scale of Moral Judgment.	Kohlberg Scale results: Movement from stage III towards stage IV. $x_1 = 3.22$, $x_2 = 3.56$, (p less than .08).

Susan Goldsmith (1973)	Not re- ported	Twice a week for 2 hours, 12 weeks. Equals 48 hours.	1. Mastery of content. 2. Movement on the Perry Schema- to move dualistic thinkers towards relativism and relativitic thin- kers towards commitment in relativism.	Not reported.	Not reported.
Anita B. Tucker (1976) College under- graduates.	E group = 47 C group = 19	Twice a week for 2 hours, 12 weeks. Equals 48 hours.	Two major depen- dent variables were stage of development of students in 1. counselling skills. 2. Personal growth	Modified version of Carkhuff's Index of Respon- ding (1969). Defining Issues Test (DIT), as a measure of social reasoning.	Group mean score on final examination of students on com- munication skills was 3.02, using 5-point scale, which indicated that students showed an accurate understan- ding of the content. Significance increase in mean "P" scores for experimental group between pre-test and post-test, (p less than .02), but not for comparison group, (p less than .298, 1- tailed).

Anita B. Tucker (contd)				Loevinger Sen- tence Completion form (SCF).	No significant in- crease between pre- testing and post- testing, but mean score of E group did maintain stability. C group showed a slight decrease.
B.L.Hurt (1974)	E group n=28. Two con- trols, n=20, n=23.	12 weeks. Hours per week not stated.	1. To promote College stud- ent's psycho- logical development.	Loevinger SCF.	Loevinger SCF results: No significant in- crease between pre- testing and post- testing.
				Conceptual Systems Test (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961).	CST data indicated no significant dif- ference between the three groups in score gains from pre- to post-test.
				DIT.	DIT results: signifi- cant increase in mean "P" scores between pre- and post-test for the E group (p = .037), for the active control (p = .045) but not for inactive group.

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B.L.Hurt (contd)	2. To improve student inter-personal communication and counselling skills.	Index of Responding (IR), Gazda (1973).	Analysis of IR data indicated that mean ratings at pre-testing for the experimental and active control group were not significantly different. At post-testing, the E group rating was significantly higher (p=.018) than the active C group rating.

extensive empathy training and outside practical experience
followed by structured reflection on that experience can be
effective in promoting the psychological development of
college students." Hurt also emphasized the use of empathy
as the major aspect of the curriculum, promoting development
in two ways: the role of the helper or listener seems to
promote growth by forcing the helper to organize his thoughts
and feelings and in the process gain insight to guide his
future behaviour. Second, the use of empathy forces young
people out of their egocentrism into taking the role or
perspective of another which appears to promote a differen-
tiation of self from others, and in integrating the self into
a social world.

Discussion of the Developmental Education Programs

The above intervention programs have attempted to
promote growth along a number of dimensions by applying
cognitive developmental theory and research. According to
structural developmental theory, two basic mechanisms are
believed necessary for development: first, developmental
theory argues that a state of disequilibrium, followed by
cognitive reorganization underlies the process of development;
secondly, exposure of an individual to a level of reasoning
slightly above his own may facilitate development to the
next stage (Turiel, 1969).

All the programs provided their subjects with the
opportunity to experience a situation as a dilemma or conflict,

one not easily resolved according to their personal present
assumptions and ways of reasoning. Thus Sprinthall's students
faced conflict between real experiences in the advising
practicum and extensive examination of issues. Goldsmith's
course was based on challenge to dualistic students by making
them aware of the existence of many values and ideas. Tucker's
students faced conflict between their cultural values and
assumptions and the values and assumptions of members of
other cultures. Hurt's empathy training created conflict by
stimulating egocentric subjects to acknowledge other per-
spectives.

Experiences such as empathy training, simulated
experiences such as role plays, structured interpersonal
interactions such as peer counselling followed by structured
examination and reflection upon these experiences seemed to
stimulated psychological growth, as measured by DIT and
promote interpersonal skills as measured by Porter's scales
or Carkhuff's Index of Responding. Loevinger's Sentence
Completion Test was not significantly responsive to treatment
effects.

The studies discussed above do not claim to fulfill
the requirements of rigorous experimental design and will not
be criticized on this criterion. They have formed part of
a series of studies exploring the feasibility of psychological
education curricula and the modifications that may result
from multiple observations and formative evaluations of a
number of dependent variables. These programs, then, have tried

to set up a formal procedure for self correction. The
evaluations have included variables and measures which have
some known construct-validity. The results of the evaluations
have been encouraging in that the experimental groups usually
seemed to be better off after the interventions. However,
"the experimental designs, the small sample sizes, the power
of results, and the inconsistency of results limit the force
of these changes in the experimental groups" (Rest, 1977, 34).

Rest (1977) offered some suggestions for the next
step in psychological education. He stated that develop-
mental psychology still lacks an encompassing, well-documented
theory of social and personality development. Most develop-
mental psychologists would have to be fairly tentative about
the certainty and detail of findings in developmental
psychology. For example, role-taking looks like a very com-
plicated, multifaceted construct. Research literature is not
clear about what kind of role-taking experiences lead to
what kind of development. Referring to Loevinger's writing
and research, Rest pointed out that her work assumes a unity
and consistency in personality organization which is a
contested issue. Kohlberg's construct of moral judgment has
been well researched. Rest suggested, however, that moral
judgment is not all that there is to moral development and it
may well be that studies aiming at the development of moral
judgment do so because of the availability of Kohlberg's
model and test.

Rest also considered that the deliberate psychological

education programs are only loosely tied to developmental

psychology:

> I see neither program attempts to gain maximum
> leverage with developmental theories by trying
> to sequence educational experiences according
> to the postulated sequences. Programs are set
> up to be generally stimulating but not specifi-
> cally stimulating according to the postulated
> sequences of developmental theories.
> (Rest, 1977, 33).

Rest presented a number of issues for future eval-

uation research: What is the relationship between acquiring

a skill (such as listening) and personal development? Do the

people who improve most in the skills also show the greatest

personal development? How crucial is the practicum part of

the practicum-seminar program? How crucial are group dis-

cussion and group work skills?

Damon (1977) made a case for the importance of the

practicum: the training of students in real live social

situations with real consequences. Damon (1977, 14) reminded

us that measures such as those developed by Kohlberg, Selman,

Loevinger, Perry, are measures of the child's theoretical-

verbal reflections upon social and moral issues. "In this

sense the measures - and any curricula based upon them - are

significantly removed from the child's social moral knowledge

as displayed during the immediate practical transactions of

the child's everyday social encounters". He also noted that

evidence and theory linking a person's theoretical verbal

reflections to his or her practical social conduct are at best

ambiguous. Selman (1977), also cautioned that even if social

cognitive training is important it still does not guarantee concomitant change in behaviour. If then we are interested in a student's actual everyday social development rather than his theoretical reflections upon hypothetical social problems, the question then becomes: Can training which advances development with respect to the latter aid a person's development with respect to the former? On this basis Damon advocated a more direct method of training, such as the experiential activities in the psychological education programs above.

Though a great deal of research needs still to be done, the psychological education intervention programs of the type discussed in this chapter are offering a substantive direction for the promotion of structural changes towards more mature stages of a number of personal and interpersonal dimensions of development.

Moral Judgment Intervention Studies

The development of moral judgment has often been included in general psychological development programs. Some intervention studies, however, have focussed specifically on moral education. They will now be briefly discussed. They are important to this study since the development of mature moral judgment has been found to be related to the attentional phase of the empathic process.

The rationale for most moral education programs is based on Lawrence Kohlberg's hypothesis that discussion groups in which individuals argue for solutions to dilemmas on specific moral grounds cause the discussion participants to re-examine their present moral stance and to restructure it towards the level next higher to their own. This approach has usually been combined with Turiel's (1966) method of "plus one modelling" where subjects are exposed to moral reasons at one stage above their own so as to induce the optimal amount of disequilibrium to stimulate change. Blatt's study (1973) indicated that children who participated in classroom discussions of moral dilemma situations moved up a stage on Kohlberg's measure while a control group which discussed no moral dilemmas experienced no change in moral development. However, Jeanette Lawrence (1980), in a review and evaluation of moral intervention studies using the DIT as an index of moral judgement development, pointed out that the abovementioned assumptions are

> ... without rigorous empirical testing either
> by control of stimulus or micro-analysis of
> the treatment's characteristics, and further-
> more some studies suggest that other conditions
> are sometimes more effective.
> (Lawrence, 1980, 21)

One such study is Siegal's (1974) large-scale attempt (n = 358) to increase students' competence in evaluating moral issues and judgments. Three groups were exposed to three models of moral education and one kept as a control group. Group 1 was exposed to discussions of dilemmas generated

by the experimenter following Kohlberg's pattern. Group 2
was given the Meux packaged program, designed to train students
to test their moral principles by increasing logical reasoning
capacities. Group 3 was given the Association for Values
Education and Research (AVER) program to foster social role-
taking and logical reasoning in the realm of normative dis-
course. Group 4, the inquiry/control group, was trained in
hypothesis testing. An analysis of covariance performed on
the DIT post-test with pre-test used as a covariante showed no
significant difference (p = .126) although the Kohlberg group
had the highest means. Difference scores between pre-test
and post-test showed that the Meux treatment was relatively
more effective in raising DIT P score levels. Percentage
increases (pre- to post-test) were Meux 12.3, Kohlberg 2.9,
Aver 1.3, control 1.1. The finding does raise doubt about
assumed superiority of discussion methods, although it must
be viewed with caution. Siegal's was a first attempt study
using his particular model and the treatments were being
adapted while teachers were being trained in each of the
techniques. The study thus involved untested assumptions
about curriculum, design and evaluation manipulation.

A study by Piwko (in Lawrence, 1980) evaluated the effect of a
Moral Development Workshop on an experimental group of 36
college undergraduates. The experimental course consisted
of theoretical descriptions of various approaches to moral
development, exploration of moral implications of social
issues, and the opportunity for subjects to explore their own

personal values and value systems. Piwko used two control

groups, one composed of 15 volunteers from a Human Develop-

ment course and the second a random sample of 15 Psychology

students. Only the experimental group showed significant

upward movement (p < .05). Since treatment contained an

explanation of Kohlberg's theory as well as reflection on

personal values, it is difficult to identify the developmen-

tally influential variables in the workshop. But the differ-

ences between it and the two control groups may be attributable

to some aspect of the course content, such as moral judgment

experience or acquaintance with the theory.

Richard Coder (1975) used volunteer adult members

from each of two liberal church congregations: Catholic

Church (Group A) and a Congregational Church (Group B). A

control (Group C) consisted of subjects enrolled in church

seminars. The subjects were 87 adults, aged 25 to 55 years.

Group A was given a course of six two-hour periods over six

weeks focussing on moral dilemma discussions. Group B was

presented with six one-hour lectures on moral development.

In addition to the DIT, the study used two of Rest's other

moral judgement measures for pre- and post-tests; the Moral

Comprehension and the Law and Order Orientation tests (Rest,

Cooper, Coder and Masanz, 1974). The inter-correlations of

Moral Comprehension and Law and Order scores with the DIT

gave strong support to the validity of the DIT was a measure

of moral judgment development. DIT results showed no signi-

ficant differences between any of the three groups on the

pre-test and no differences between the two experimental

groups on the post-test. On the post-test the experimental

groups combined differed from the control group ($F = 5.688$,

$p < .005$). Matched t test comparison confirmed this differ-

ence at the .05 level. Coder concluded that the investigation

furnished evidence that differences in levels of moral

development exist in adults and that change can take place

during adulthood.

Results indicated an average upward shift of 9

percentage points. Lawrence questioned the attribution of

developmental change on the ground that return by mail of

the post-test stretched beyond the two-week target period.—

to nine months in some cases - but she admitted that the

significant difference between the experimental and treatment

groups cannot be dismissed. Such variability does present

some difficulty in interpreting the extent of the effect of

the intervention treatment. Coder's study, like Segal's,

does not confirm the widely held assumption that moral

dilemma discussions are more effective as change facilitators.

A study of Panowitsch (1975) provides opportunity

to examine the content of a moral judgment intervention that

used a treatment built on the concept that moral judgment-

making involves solving moral problems in relation both to

the content and to the problem solver's judgment processes.

The DIT and Cornell Critical Thinking test (CCTT) as tests

of moral judgment and logical judgment respectively were

used to compare students in four different college courses.

The subjects were enrolled in Ethics and Logic (experimental groups) and World Religion and Art (control groups) classes over several school quarters. It was expected that if the DIT were a sensitive test of moral judgment, then the Ethics groups would show significantly higher gains than the other two groups. The Ethics courses had two components addressing the idea of moral judgment involving both moral orientation and judgmental activity. The Ethics course consisted of (a) reading and understanding the thought of moral philosophers, for example Kant, Nietzsche; (b) the application of moral problem-solving to contemporary issues, for example, suicide, abortion, civil disobedience. Students were given experience in understanding moral concepts and in making their own moral judgments. In contrast, the Logic students were given training in formal logic and logical problem-solving. World Religion and Art students had experience with broad values issues.

Panowitsch's results confirmed hypotheses of the interrelationship between moral judgment theory, the Ethics course, and the DIT P index. The combined Ethics group showed significant gains on the DIT from pre-test to post-test (< .002) while the Logic and World Religion and Art classes showed no significant gains. The Logic and Ethics courses did not differ on the DIT pre-test but were significantly different on the post-test (p < .034). Comparisons by the Scheffe test showed that the Religion and Art classes differed from the Ethics and Logic classes but did not differ signi-

ficantly from each other. Panowitsch also gave a five-months

follow-up test on the DIT to the students taking the Ethics

and Logic courses. The changes for these Ethics subjects

were significant for both pretest to post-test, (p < .003)

and pre-test to follow-up (p < .015). From post-test to

follow-up, it did not change significantly but showed a

retention and plateau effect consistent with theory. The

Logic subjects showed no significant gains from pre- to post-

test or from either pre-test or post-test to follow-up.

Lawrence takes this study to illustrate the value of

(a) designing a moral education program in accord with the

theoretical concept of moral and judgmental components of

moral thought; (b) the DIT as a useful index of moral judg-

ment for educational interventions; (c) the use of a large

sample, that is, 150 students; and (d) the addition of

follow-up testing in a developmentally oriented study.

A large-scale attempt to integrate Kohlberg's

theory of moral development into social studies curricula has

been made by the Carnegie-Mellon and Harvard Universities'

Value Education Project (V.E.P.). The combined staff created

moral dilemma stories for 9th and 11th grade Social Studies

courses which had been prepared by personnel at a Social

Studies Curriculum Centre of Carnegie-Mellon University. The

project staff also developed a specific approach for training

Social Studies teachers to implement these materials within

the designated courses. The V.E.P. staff hypothesized that:

(1) there would be no difference in student growth

in moral development between classes whose teachers attended
a one-week training institute and those whose teachers re-
ceived training through a teacher handbook.

(2) there would be a significant difference in the
growth of students' moral development between classes which
discussed no moral dilemmas and those which had several moral
dilemma discussions over the course of the school year. In
addition the classes with the highest number of discussions would
show greatest gains on moral development.

The curriculum material for this project consisted
of a series of moral dilemma situations integrated into the
9th and 11th Grade Social Studies curricula. These dilemma
stories either related to the historical context of the
specified courses, related to the life experience of the
student audience, or centred on contemporary social and moral
issues. Each of the dilemma stories focussed on what the
central character should do when faced with a particular
moral choice. A teaching plan accompanied each of the moral
dilemmas. The teaching plans contained general instructions
that related to the teaching process, alternative dilemmas
which increased the moral conflict in the initial dilemma,
and a series of probe questions. Teachers could use those
probe questions to promote student-to-student interaction,
to focus more precisely on a particular moral issue, to switch
perspectives and discuss reasoning from another character's
point of view, and to help students consider the consequences
of their reasoning in a more universal setting.

Based on their own experiences in testing materials and developing a teacher process, the V.E.P. project staff decided not to require the teacher participants to become experts in the theory of moral development. Instead the objective was to train the teachers in a training program which maximized student-to-student interaction and developed teachers' skills in conducting a discussion. Four major steps were involved in the teaching process: (1) Students confront a moral dilemma, clarify the circumstances of the story, define any difficult terms and state exactly what they see as the dilemma of the main characters; (2) Students state their individual position and the action that they think the central character should take. During this step in the process, students may also write out reasons to support their action position. If there is no division on action, teachers may introduce an alternative dilemma to help promote greater division on the action that the central character should take; (3) The most crucial step involves the testing of the students' reasoning by discussing reasons in small groups and in full-class discussions. The discussion portion of the class requires students to examine, analyse and compare their reasons with those of other students operating at similar and adjacent stages of development; (4) The final step in the teaching process asks students to reflect on their position and the class discussion of the dilemma by summarising the various reasons discussed and by stating which reasons they think best explain what the central character

should do.

In preparation for implementing the field study, teachers in the project were trained either by attending a one-week institute or by receiving a teacher training hand-book. The various education project staff conducted periodic on-site evaluations of all teachers in the program. For evaluation purposes, the staff used a series of check lists which determined how explicitely the teachers followed the teaching process.

Two groups of teachers and students participated in the V.E.P. field test. One group in 6 suburban Boston schools consisted of 8 teachers and 500 students and used moral dilemma situations integrated into the 9th grade course. An-other group of teachers and students from urban suburban rural schools in the Pennsylvania area used an experimental edition of a new Senior High course in American History written and designed for students identified as slow learners. 750 students participated along with 30 teachers. The research design compared the method of training (institute or hand book) with a number of moral dilemmas discussed (0, 12, or 24) using a 2-way analysis of variance model.

The level of moral judgment of the student was determined by administering Kohlberg's Standard Interview form to a 25 per cent sample of the student population.

At the time of writing the research report, only preliminary results were available. There did not seem to be any significant difference in the development of the

students' moral maturity between those classes whose teachers
attended a one-week training institute and those who received
training through a teacher handbook. Second, there seemed to
be some significant difference between the growth of students'
moral development and the number of moral discussions conducted.
In general, the more moral discussions, the greater the
degree of change in moral maturity. Thirdly, in support of
Kohlberg's theory, the greatest individual growth took place
in those classes where the widest range of reasoning existed.
Fourthly, the overall growth in moral maturity varied from
approximately a quarter of a stage to a half of a stage.

Galbraith (1977) suggested some general implications
as a result of his work with the V.E.P. One is the need for
and importance of a systematic plan to integrate Kohlberg's
theories about development into the school curriculum.
Galbraith pointed out that one of the dangers that exists as
educators attempt to implement Kohlberg's theory centres on
the misuse of the theory. Kohlberg's teaching strategy for
integrating his theory should emphasise small and large group
discussions with students at adjacent stages of development
confronting one another and seriously discussing genuine
social and moral problems. In the process, the teachers'
skills in setting the atmosphere, promoting interaction, and
maintaining focus are more important to productive discussion
than their skill in stage interpretation. He warned that
educators must be careful not to misuse their understanding
of the theory to analyse and and categorise students at

particular stages. Another implication that developed from this project relates to the place of moral dilemma discussions in the curriculum. Galbraith claimed that moral development discussion should be appropriately integrated into the curriculums of English, Science, Mathematics, Language, Arts, and Guidance because moral dilemma situations grow naturally out of each of these areas. It was the experience of the V.E.P. staff that students who participated regularly in the discussion of moral dilemmas did begin to perceive the critical social and moral questions which surrounded them, and did not wait for classroom discussion of a moral issue to confront the moral aspect of a particular program. This seems more desirable than creating a separate course in Moral Education or Moral Development.

The Carnegie Mellon-Harvard Values Education Project is an example of researchers' attempting a closer link between moral judgment theory and the intervention treatment.

Enright (1979) has criticized the moral dilemma discussion type of intervention on the grounds that it claims to fit in with developmental theory yet in fact has several problems from a Piagetan standpoint. For one, the child is not thinking about his own experiences, but about a story character's experiences. If Piaget is correct in assuming that cognitive growth occurs from reflecting on one's own experiences then, Enright argued, the use of hypothetical dilemmas by themselves would not seem to lead anywhere.

Second, the relatively passive activity of listening to a

story is not providing for new social experiences for the

child which would be a basis for cognitive reflection. Third,

even if the child learnt something from the group discussion

there is no provision for helping the child act upon his

other newly formed ideas. Enright developed an intervention

program which related more closely to the child's own social

experiences. The intervention involved two first grade

classrooms. The focus was on growth for the students in both

interpersonal conceptions and social problem solving as a

result of both thinking through their actual interpersonal

conflicts occurring in the school environment and partici-

pating in a once-a-week session in which dilemmas were read

and discussed. Social problem solving was defined as the

number of different alternatives a child can cognitively

generate in thinking about a social situation in which a

behavioural decision must be made. For example, suppose

child A was on a swing for half an hour and child B wanted

a chance to swing, B would then have to think of alternatives

in solving the problem.

Procedure. Both classroom 1 and 2 were tested in

the fall, followed by an experiment in classroom 1 and a

control in classroom 2. Both classes were re-tested in the

winter at which time classroom 2 began an experiment similar

to the one implemented in classroom 1 after first test.

Classroom 1, after Test 2, continued with the experiment.

Each experimental and control period was 11 weeks.

The teacher in the Experimental condition was instructed to handle all interpersonal discipline problems between children that occurred throughout the day according to the following methods: (Enright, 1979, 6).

1.   Whenever an interpersonal problem arose between children, the teacher would first ask about the interpersonal qualities of the interaction (Selman's domain, 1976, 161). For instance, if Billy had just argued with Tom, the teacher would ask Billy what the act meant to Billy and Tom's friendship.   This was done in order to have the child reflect on his own experience.   Once the child responded, the teacher would ask another question to challenge the thought.   For instance suppose Billy's previous interpersonal conception was "We're not friends because he bothered me", the teacher would have him reconsider the thought by asking, "Does he have to do something nice for you, then for you to become friends?"   Billy's previous response was at Selman's stage level 0, while the teacher's question required a level 1 ability.

2.   After the interpersonal qualities were explored. the teacher asked for an alternative to the child's behaviour. In Billy's case, the teacher would ask, "What did you do and what could you have done differently?"

3.   Whenever the teacher saw a discrepancy between the child's thought and behaviour this was pointed out to the child.

The experimental group teacher also led a 30 minute

story dilemma session once a week for the 11 weeks so that

children could think about interpersonal and social problem

solving issues while in a more calm state than when being

disciplined. The following four measures were administered

to the first graders: Selman's (1976) Interpersonal

Conceptions measure; Damon's (1975) Moral Judgment measure;

Shure and Spivack's (1974) Preschool Interpersonal Problem

Solving measure (P.I.P.S.); and the vocabulary section of the

Stanford-Binet IQ test. Selman's measure has already been

discussed. Damon's moral judgment measure is similar to

Kohlberg's with the difference that Damon's is appropriate

for much younger children. PIPS is a measure of social

problem solving. Results showed that after initial 11

week program, class 1 was higher than class 2 in interpersonal

conceptions (p < .001), in moral judgment (p < .01), and in

social problem solving (p < .04). When re-tested for the

third time, results indicated that class 1 continued to

maintain the newly acquired interpersonal, moral and social

problem solving developments. Class 2, after an 11 weeks

experimental program showed equivalent scores to class 1

children. Admitting that it is not possible to specify the

necessary conditions for growth with an educational study

such as the above, Enright (1979, 12) stated that the

sufficient conditions seem to be:

1) interaction with others; 2) reflection on the

interaction; 3) reflection on the thought; 4) considering

discrepancies between thought and action; and 5) thinking

on one's level and slightly higher.

Enright's study supports Piaget's long-held claim that individuals grow cognitively when they reflect on their own experience. Enright's proposes that future social cognitive programs may do well to incorporate the children's actual social experiences into the program. Enright's study is significant in that it demonstrates how one can derive from the developmental model specific guidelines as to the structure of a social cognitive educational program.

Discussion of research problems related to moral judgment intervention studies

On the basis of a review of fourteen studies, Lawrence stated several indicators of what will contribute to confidence in the experimenter's claim to have facilitated change: the duration, design and characteristics of the experimental program. All effective studies were at least a quarter's duration. This is as expected since the studies discussed aim at structural change and structural change involes the reorganization of the person's way of thinking about moral issues - and that involves time.

Design defects such as biased sampling and omission of control groups have especially severe effects in developmentally oriented studies, where conclusions must be based on difference scores. The developmentalist must distinguish between artificially stimulated and "natural" developmental changes and must be reasonably confident that obtained

experimental changes do not reflect selection, maturation or historical effects or some combination of these. Failure to control for history and maturation effects are particularly damaging to inferences about sources of developmental change. The developmentalist needs adequate controls for effects between pre- and post-testings and for effects of time and stimulus variables on the internal processes of development within the subject.

Sampling problems impose further constraints on interpretation. Within formal educational institutions, random sampling can rarely be obtained for intervention. Sample selection and assignment to groups are influenced by such factors as course enrolments, organization, time tabling, etc. None of the researchers in the studies reviewed, drew random samples.

Moral judgment treatments are not concerned with the overt skill acquisition but with changes in the subject's mode of thinking about moral issues. Lawrence suggested that, in order to infer that the treatment stimulated such change, the experimenter must provide the following:

> Adequate control groups; control of extra-
> neous variables within the treatment group;
> description and observation of variables
> assumed to be developmentally critical; some
> monitoring of assumed mechanisms of structural
> change; and developmentally appropriate
> testing.
> (Lawrence, 1980, 18)

Lawrence's review has shown the relative uncertainty which which moral educators can base their programs on research.

Both the Siegal and Coder results raise serious questions about the dilemma-cum-discussion method for moral education programs. Coder's lecture treatment was as effective as the standard Kohlbergian approach. Siegal's adaptation of the discussion method was no more successful than the attempt to influence upward movement by developing subject's moral reasoning skills. On the other hand the Carnegie-Mellon Values Education Project pointed to the efficacy of moral dilemma discussions when their content and presentation are integrated with developmental theory. Enright's study pointed to the need to make the educational model relevant to the child's own social experiences.

In summarising the moral judgment intervention discussion, Lawrence stated three specific suggestions. One, as exemplified above is that intervention studies should be tailored to fit moral judgment theoretical concepts; that measurement instruments should be a good fit for the treatment and that future research should be focussed on moral and judgmental aspects of moral judgment programs. In answer to the question, "Is it possible to stimulate moral judgment development in an educational environment as measured by tests such as the DIT or the Kohlberg measures?" the answer is yes. However, research still needs an answer to "What are the critical input variables in the developmental process?"

Discussion of Effects of Developmental Educational

Programs on Structural Change

Both the psychological growth   programs and the moral judgment intervention studies which have been reviewed had set themselves an ambitious task, namely, to bring about stage change in the person's social structures within six to twelve weeks of being exposed to a particular treatment. This seems to be based on the assumption that basic structural change is long lasting and is generalized outside the classroom. On the whole, results are disappointing. Experimenters had more success with teaching subjects communication skills than achieving long term structural development.

Are intervention studies of the type discussed worthwhile? Selman's work and theory suggest they may well be. Selman drew two sets of implications for intervention from his theoretical model supported by research (Selman, 1977). A comparative study was carried out on logical, physical, perspective taking, interpersonal and moral reasoning in matched samples of socially well-adjusted and poorly-adjusted pre-adolescents (Selman, 1976). A sample of 24 boys (seven to twelve years) the clinical group, was compared to a relatively well-functioning sample of peers (matched for age, sex, race, IQ, and socio-economic status) on a battery of social and logico-physical reasoning measures.

Wheras the well-adjusted group performed at relatively parallel stages across the domains, the clinical group

performed at progressively lower levels as one moved
from deeper structural concepts (logico-physical and perspec-
tive taking) to the more surface structure or content bound
domains (interpersonal and moral). That is, though the c
clinical group in general had about the same level of cogni-
tive performance and was slightly behind in their perspective-
taking capabilities in comparison with the matched group,
they were not applying these more basic capabilities in the
domains of interpersonal and moral reasoning. Selman con-
sidered it unfortunate that proponents of the structural
developmental approach have interpreted the necessary but
not sufficient model as indicating that, if a child does not
give evidence of a prerequisite level on the deeper structures,
intervention at the more surface structure of interpersonal
and moral reasoning will be a waste of time.

Selman argued that perspective-taking does not
develop in a vacuum devoid of social experience. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, Selman has suggested that although a
certain level of social perspective taking structure is a
necessary condition for the related concepts, this does not
necessarily imply that this structure must develop before
the conceptions or that it sets a limit on possible conceptual
development. One implication, then, is that it is probably
easier for education to stimulate change in the more content
bound domains such as interpersonal or moral reasoning than
in the relatively deeper structural domains of logical
development and perspective taking.

The second implication Selman derived from an examination of patterns of social reasoning within the clinical sample of the study. He found that although, as a group, the clinical population was functioning at lower levels of interpersonal and moral reasoning than their peers, this was not true of every child in this group. The data showed that wheras the matched sample of normal children did normally better on the social cognitive measures, disturbed children did anywhere from very poorly to very well. Some very interpersonally disturbed children did very well on all of Selman's interpersonal and moral concept measures.

However, if a child was at an extremely low level of interpersonal reasoning, chances were extremely high that he/she could be a child in the clinical group. Selman concluded then that children with average or adequate level of social cognition for their age may act maturely or immaturely; however, children who do lag far behind their peers at the social cognitive stage also appear to have difficulty in relating to peers. The implication then is that, for normal children who function adequately, social cognitive education may have the effect of strengthening the deeper structures through stimulation of a wide range of skills which are based on this process, and, in so doing, prepare the groundwork of general structural movement at the next stage. However, for subjects who lag behind in domains such as interpersonal and moral reasoning, but who have adequate perspective taking abilities, intervention may be construed as application of

perspective taking to these more specific skills. The
significant implication, then, of Selman's work is that inter-
vention research should aim to stimulate the development of
the more basic abilities through the relatively more content-
related areas such as interpersonal and moral reasoning.

CHAPTER 7

EVALUATING RELATIONAL EMPATHY

The purpose of this report is to develop and evaluate a teacher training program for the development of relational empathy, or empathy-in-action specifically in the teacher-pupil communication process. This chapter deals with the considerable problems encountered in selecting appropriate measures to evaluate the different phases of relational empathy: the attentional phase (related to maturity of moral judgment); the experiential phase (related to empathy as an internal condition); the communication phase (related to communication of empathic understanding to the empathee).

Evaluating the Development of Maturity of Moral Judgment

The instrument selected for evaluating students' level of maturity of moral judgment is the Defining Issues Test (DIT) already referred to in Chapter 6. As described above, the test consists of six stories, each of which has twelve issues which the subject is asked to rate according to their importance in making a decision in a moral dilemma situation. Each of the issues is intended to represent a prominent concern of one of Kohlberg's 6 stages, beginning with Stage 2 and including two substages of Stage 5, morality based on social contract. The score for a stage is the average percentage of rank order of importance given to issues representing that Stage. The score assigned to the principled

stages (5 and 6) is the "Principled" morality score (P).
The P score may be expressed as a percentage as has been
done in this report. It is interpreted as the relative
importance attributed to principled moral considerations in
making moral decisions. The fundamental assumption of the
DIT is that persons will assign greatest importance to issues
stated at their own level.

Though the DIT is based on Kohlberg's stage theory,
there are some differences between it and Kohlberg's test.
Kohlberg's assessment asks a subject spontaneously to
generate a solution to a problem, whereas the DIT asks a
subject to evaluate various considerations provided. This
procedure minimizes error variance due to verbal expressivity.
Also, whereas Kohlberg's measure requires a judge to allocate
a subject's responses to data categories, the DIT has the
subject himself classifying his own responses. This makes
objective scoring possible.

Validity of the DIT

It is expected that a set of scores generated by
the DIT has certain properties arising from the theoretical
implications of the construct of moral judgment. Since these
"theoretical implications of the construct are multi-faceted,
there is no single piece of evidence that can validate the
DIT, but a case for its validity must be built up from many
studies" (Rest, 1974 Manual).

One property of the test is its relatedness to age.

Since moral judgment has been shown to follow a developmental sequence, the responsiveness of the scores to the variable of age provides one type of evidence for its construct validity. A study by Rest, Cooper et al. (1974), using groups of 40 pupils, each group from a junior high school (age 14), a senior high school (age 17, 18), college juniors and seniors and graduates, found correlations of P with age to be .62. When replicated with another sample using the same categories, the correlation of P with age was .67. Rest (1976) cited another sixteen studies, involving 1500 subjects, whose findings are consistent with his first study. Age has not been found to be related to the DIT for adult groups. For adults, there is evidence that the DIT P score is more strongly related to level of education than age (Coder, 1975).   Another type of evidence for the validity of the test comes from the pattern of the intercorrelation of its scores with theoretically related variables.

        Convergent validity is indicated by the high correlation of the DIT (in the .60's) with a cognitive capacity measure of comprehension,. The measure, designed to test subjects' comprehension of social moral concepts such as an internal standard, social contract, legitimized authority, due process of law, correlated with DIT scores .63, .67, and .52 respectively, using two samples of students with one of adults. With age controlled and IQ, and socio-economic status statistically partialled out, Rest (1974b) reported that the correlation remained significant. Rest (1974b, 5-5)

interpreted the highly significant correlation between compre-
hension and the DIT as suggesting that subjects pick higher
stage "issues" because of their greater adequacy as conceptual
frameworks.

The DIT P scores have also shown a correlation of
.68 with rankings of subjects according to the stages in
Kohlberg's scale (Rest et al., 1974).Rest sought correlations of
the DIT with certain attitudes. He wanted to show that
"moral judgment is not just a value-neutral intellectualizing
skill or style, but that it relates to value commitments as
well as to purely cognitive capacities" (Rest, 1974b, 5-7).
That is, moral judgment should theoretically correlate with
those attitude tests that key on stage characteristics. The
second reason for seeking evidence of association between the
DIT and attitude measure was in the interest of relating
responses to hypothetical situations with responses to real
life issues.

Rest and his associate in their 1974 studies
administered two attitude tests to their subjects, one was
the Law and Order test, which scores those responses as
'law and order' which advocate excessive powers to authorities
or support the existing social system, at the disproportionate
expense of civil rights or individual welfare. The second
attitude test, Libertarian Democracy, (devised by Patrick,
1971) measures support of civil liberties under unfavourable
circumstances. The DIT's correlation with the Law and Order
scale was .60 and with Libertarian Democracy scores it was .62.

These positive correlations again provide support for the
construct validity of the DIT.

Lawrence (1980) reviewed 14 moral judgment inter-
vention studies which used Rest's DIT as an index of moral
judgment development. The studies provided independent
support for the ability of the instrument to index upward
movement after intervention programs designed to influence
developmental change.

Reliability of the DIT

Rest administered the DIT to 28 ninth graders on
two occasions, two weeks apart. The P score correlation
was .81 (Rest et al, 1974). McGeorge (1974) reported a
correlation of .65 for 47 first year undergraduate students
tested 18 days apart, and commented that this correlation
was probably attenuated by a restricted range of scores.

The validity and reliability of results related to
research on the DIT is reasonably satisfactory and this led
to its selection for evaluating the development of moral
judgment, related to the attentional phase of the empathic
process.

Evaluating the Experiential Phase of the Empathic Process

In order to select the appropriate instrument for
evuating the development of the structures, processes and
skills involved in the experiential phase of relational empathy,

(which may be termed "empathic capacity") it has been necessary to examine the empathy measures available. The various types of empathy measures already in use, their reliability and validity, as well as the methodological problems involved in establishing construct validity will now be discussed.

Researchers have created or selected means of measuring empathy on the basis of their definition of the process. Researchers who conceptualize empathy as an internal condition have attempted to measure it either in predictive terms or situational terms. Predictive measures are based on the assumption that empathy exists if one person can predict with accuracy the response to certain conditions or stimuli of another individual (Dymond et al., 1950, see p. 13 of this report), or a group (Kerr and Speroff, 1954). Predictive measures reflect the convergence of two streams of thought - that of social psychologists such as Mead and Cottrell concerned with socialisation (specifically the function that seeing other's perspective of oneself plays in the development of the self); and that of psychologists concerned with one person's ability to understand the thoughts, feelings and motives of another.

Situational measures, on the other hand, have assessed 'cognitive empathy' by having the person identify another's affect without situational cues (e.g. Borke, 1971), and with a situation (e.g. Deutsch, 1974, 1975), or both. They have measured 'affective empathy' by asking the subject

what feelings he shares with another (e.g. Feshbach and Roe, 1968). Empathy, thus measured involves being sensitive to feelings as expressed through nonverbal communication.

Researchers who conceptualize empathy as an inter-personal skill, mainly in the counselling profession, attempt to assess the helper's or empathiser's performance in an actual or simulated helper-helpee interaction. In these measures, the communication by the helper of his empathic understanding of the helpee is considered an essential facilitative condition. Gladstein (1977) has distinguished subjective instruments that use the helper's or helpee's perception of their own counselling session(s) as the criterion. For example, Barrett-Lennard's Relationship Inventory focusses on the helpee's perception of received empathy. The other type of measure identified by Gladstein, which is used to assess the interpersonal skill of empathy, is objective. It is based on external, independent judg-ments of a helper's sessions with his helpee (e.g. the Truax Carkhuff Accurate Empathy Scale); or the helper's responses to a standardized set of stimulus statements (e.g. Kagan's Affective Sensitivity Stimulus Material). Gladstein's subjective/objective distinction does not seem warranted. The use of observer-judges as the primary data source does not necessarily make a measurement objective; and deriving data from subject responses, as does the R.I. does not always make it subjective. After all, in the latter, the subject rates various given aspects of interpersonal response on an anchored scale, and these data are combined to yield an index of empathy from the investigator's frame of reference.

The two types of measures, predictive and situational are now more fully examined.

Predictive Measures

Methodological Problems

Predictive measures have been used in studies of social perception. The extent to which a judge's (i.e. subject's)

prediction agrees with other's actual response is taken as a measure of the judge's accuracy of social or person perception, also referred to as empathy, social sensitivity and insight.

According to the prototype paradigm used for measuring predictive empathy (Dymond, 1949), two persons interact with each other, and then are asked to complete a series of rating scales. The necessary ratings to derive the measure of empathy for one member of the dyad are:

    a) A rates self;

    b) A rates self as he thinks B rates him;

    c) B rates A and,

    d) rates A as he thinks A rated A.

Initially two scores, A's rating of self (a), and B's perspective (b) are obtained and then combined as are B's ratings of A (c), and from A's perspective (d). Then the two combined scores are compared. If the difference between each set of total scores representing A's and B's ratings of A is small, then greater convergence of self-other predictive empathy is reflected and a higher accuracy score obtained.

Problem of assumed and real similarity between 'judge' and 'other'. One confusing element in interpersonal accuracy scores is the tendency for judges, under certain circumstances, to assume similarity, i.e. to attribute to others responses one would give oneself. This is a form of projection. This tendency generates high accuracy scores for judges who happen to be similar to the person or group being judged and whose self-ratings serve as the criterion (Feshbach and Roe, 1968;

Klein, 1979; Rothenberg, 1970).

Hastorf and Bender (1952) attempted to
control this factor. They developed a refined empathy score.
A score was initially derived from the degree of similarity
between A's and B's ratings of themselves. The assumption
of whether or not two people were empathic was then repre-
sented by the degree to which perceived dissimilarities were
represented accurately. Consequently the score, representing
the degree of similarity between the two members of the dyad,
was subtracted from the original set of four comparisons.
The uncorrected measure is considered 'raw empathy' while
the corrected version is 'refined empathy'. Hastorf and
Bender obtained correlations between raw empathy and similarity
(.53), raw empathy and projection (.37), refined empathy and
similarity (-.12), raw and refined empathy (.23). These
results clearly indicate that their refined empathy score
did not control for similarity.

The problem of assumed similarity is complicated by
Bronfenbrenner's (1958) finding that we tend to assume simi-
larity to people we like. He employed an Index of Favor-
ability toward others based on the algebraic sum of each
person's ratings of college students in general on 25 favourable
and 25 unfavourable adjectives (measure showed a spilt-half
reliability of .90). The correlation coefficient between
favorability toward others and assumed similarity (based on
179 cases) was .49, giving support to the above observation.

Hobart and Fahlberg (1965) have criticized the

refined empathy score on the grounds that highly similar judge-order members are penalized in this determination of empathy. Two types of responses contribute to a higher projection score: (1) all predictions on items where judges fail to perceive that they differed from others and, (b) all predictions for items on which judges and others respond with identical own responses and judges predict or possibly project correctly. Hobart and Fahlberg (1965) pointed out that Hastorf and Bender, by interpreting all similarity as projection, commit the same error, but in the opposite direction. "An adequate measure of empathy would achieve a better solution to the problem of differentiating empathy from accurate projection." (Hobart and Fahlberg, 1965).

Apart from similarity, another artifact in the measurement of accuracy arises from what Bronfenbrenner (1958) has referred to as judges' tendency to rate themselves high on admirable traits and low on non-admirable traits, so those who are actually high on admirable and low on reprehensible traits will tend to be scored higher than others on self-insight.

Components of the 'global predictive empathy' Score. Cronbach's (1955) paper provided a methodological critique of research in the area of judging accuracy of interpersonal perception. Cronbach stated that experimenters run the risk of giving psychological interpretation to mathematical artifacts. An operational definition is "wasted when it does not correspond to potentially meaningful constructs" (Cronbach,

1955, 177). Using the D^2 statistic (i.e. the arithmetical difference between judgment and criterion ratings squared), he found this apparently simple measure full of components, artifacts and methodological problems. Cronbach demonstrated that the "difference score" on trait ratings could be analysed mathematically into four components, some of which would be further reduced into variance and correlation parts, as follows:

1) Elevation component reflects Judge's way of using the response scale.

2) Differential elevation measures the variance of the individual Judge's ratings. It reports Judge's ability to judge deviations of the individual's elevation from the average (the grand mean of an individual Judge's predictions for all others on all items).

3) Stereotyped accuracy: accuracy in predicting the "generalized other" - depends on Judge's knowledge of the popularity of possible responses.

4) Differential accuracy: which others have highest score on an item may not reflect the same trait.

Cronbach argued that, when considering a judge's response in social perception tasks, it is necesary to con- centrate on the constant tendencies in the perceiver in respect of those traits. The interaction between Judge and Other should only be taken up after the constant processes characteristics of the judge are dependably measured. Thus the importance of the four components depends on whether they

relate to constant criteria. Cronbach explained that the

Elevation components reflect whether Judge interprets the

words describing the scale in the same manner as others do.

"It appears relatively unfruitful therefore, as a source of

information on his perception of others" (Cronbach, 1955,

191). Stereotyped accuracy expresses how closely Judge's

implicit picture of the 'generalized other' agrees with

reality. Cronbach considered the Stereotyped Accuracy score

important in assessing interpersonal perception. The Differ-

ential Accuracy component measurers judge's sensitivity to

individual differences, reflects his ability to interpret the

expressive behaviour of the particular Other, and as such is

significant in measuring social perception.

Cronbach's analysis showed how any predictive

measure of the Dymond type may combine and thereby conceal

important variables, or may depend to a large degree on unwanted

components. He suggested that only by careful subdivision of

global measures can an investigator hope to know what he is

dealing with. Cline (1964) reported a series of studies

by Cline and Richards (1957) in which the component approach

was utilized. Cline concluded from his studies that "a general

global ability to judge others accurately could be meaningfully

measured" (Cline, 1964, 229). This global ability involved

a factorially complex process that helped classify what was

general in the global measure. Stereotyped Accuracy appeared

to account for a large proportion of this generality. However,

after this component was eliminated, considerable generality

remained which appeared to be related to the Differential

Accuracy component. It appeared that one might be an accurate

judge because one has an accurate stereotype or because one

is able to predict specific differences between individuals

or both.

Bronfenbrenner (1958) came to a nearly identical

conclusion using quite different research procedures. Bron-

fenbrenner distinguished between to major types of ability

in social perception: a) sensitivity to the generalized other

which involves awareness of the social norm (equivalent to

Cronbach's and Cline's stereotyped accuracy) and, b) sensitivity

to individual differences or interpersonal sensitivity

(equivalent to Cronbach's differential accuracy).

In answer to the question of whether Dymond's

test measures the tendency of individuals to respond to an

interpersonal situation in terms of cultural norms rather than

empathic promptings, Bronfenbrenner suggested that both

factors operate. However, in his exploratory work he observed

that interpersonal sensitivity, and sensitivity to the gener-

alized other might represent quite different skills, only

slightly related in the general population.

A study by Gage (quoted by Bronfenbrenner, 1958, 39)

suggests that the accuracy score reflects both cultural

norms and interpersonal sensitivity. Gage first asked judges

to predict the questionnaire responses of subjects whom they

had never seen (but who were identified as college students)

and then subsequently secured a new set of predictions following

a period of direct observation. Surprisingly his judges did
somewhat more poorly after exposure than before. Gage
referred to judge's success in estimating the average response
of a group as "stereotype accuracy". Bronfenbrenner concluded
that in this situation at least the interpersonal sensitivity
of the judges or perhaps lack of it, interfered with their
comparatively accurate sensitivity to the generalized other.
He considered that similarly in Dymond's study, where judge's
score was based on success in estimating six or seven different
subjects, it seems probable that overall accuracy was deter-
mined primarily by an awareness of the typical response.
Bronfenbrenner was unsuccessful in his attempt to develop a
satisfactory "pure" measure of sensitivity to the generalized
other. His experiments in trying to devise it led him to the
conclusion that "although factors associated with the judge's
characteristic pattern of response and with his similarity
to the group affected the accuracy score, these influences
were always overshadowed by components attributable to
recognition of objective properties of the external social
world." (Bronhenbrenner, 1958, 92). Moreover, Bronfenbrenner
considered that the consistencies which do appear in this
area (accurate prediction of other's response), may be a
function of the preponderance inthe accurace score of a
component reflecting sensitivity to the generalized other.
It seems unlikely then "that a person's accuracy can be
described in terms of a single dimension or even a single
component score" (Tagiuri, 1969, 413).

Hobart and Fahlberg (1965) reviewed the criticism of predictive measures of empathy and suggested some ways of coping with the major criticisms. They advocated the use of test items with two response alternatives as a way of overcoming a number of measurement problems such as the tendency of respondents to make mid-scale or end-scale responses. To control for the possible influences of cultural norms and group sub-cultures that would give rise to steretype accuracy one would use culturally undefined tests. They stated that the refined form of the predictive test may still be well suited to the kind of study of empathy and role taking ability that is of interest to social psychologists. The difficulty with Hobart and Fahlberg's view is that they eliminate sensitivity to and knowledge of stereotypes or of the 'generalized other' that on evidence seems an important source of information in making inferences about others.

Reliability and Validity of Predictive Measures

Deutsch and Madle (1975) reviewed studies which provide information about the reliability and construct validity of some representative empathy measures. Dymond's (1949) study using predictive measures of individuals, obtained a test - retest reliability of .60. Values of such magnitude, Deutsch observed are useful, only when comparing two relatively large groups of subjects. Other studies (Daane and Schmidt, 1957; Dymond et al., 1952; Newbigging, 1953 cited in Deutsch) obtained somewhat better estimates of split-half

reliability ranging from .55 to .82. Reliability on gener-

alized predictive empathy measures, predictions of a group,

was presented by Van Zelst (1952) in a study of male union

leaders. The obtained split-half reliability (r = .87) was

quite acceptable for this type of test. Deutsch, however,

found no information on either test-retest and on interrater

reliability.

Reliability assessment has not been indicated in

studies such as that of Hastorf and Bender (1952), Bender and

Hastorf (1953), and Hobart and Fahlberg (1965). Such lack of

information makes the interpretation of non-significant

effects impossible since error attributable to measurement

may mask the impact of the experimental variable. Predictive

measures thus show moderate reliability, but it seems that

more information is still required.

While evidence of reliability of predictive empathy

measures is emerging, evidence for construct validity is not.

One type of information in establishing construct validity

is whether the measure is responsive to variables postulated

by theory. Dymond (1950) reported that high empathisers

appear to be well-ajusted, manifesting such characteristics

as optimism, flexibility and emotional maturity. On the

other hand, low empathisers are withdrawn, emotionally immature

and self-centered. Deutsch and Madle found no information

on whether treatment variables designed to facilitate empathy

produce higher empathy socres on predictive measures.

Dymond (1949, 1950) attempted to establish convergent

validity by correlating raw empathy scores with empathy
ratings made by independent raters. Though she indicated
that there was significant agreement between the two methods,
no specific correlations were reported. Other investigators
have correlated several types of empathy scores, such as
raw and refined (Hastorf and Bender, 1952; Bender and Hastorf,
1953; Hobart and Fahlberg, 1965) and such as refined empathy
with a situational measure of empathy (Astin, 1967). Deutsch
and Madle's review indicates that these correlations range
from .19 to .74, with most in the .30 to .50 range. Correla-
tion of the Affective Sensitivity Scale (Kagan et al., 1967)
with ratings of accurate empathy was only .36. Deutsch and
Madle concluded that the evidence for construct validity of
the predictive empathy measure is at this stage elusive.

Without such evidence the extent to which predic-
tive empathy measures actually assess one or more phases of
relational empathy, as opposed to other constructs, is a
question that remains unanswered. On this basis, the inves-
tigator has decided against the use of a predictive measure
in the selection of evaluation instruments.

Situational Measures

Situational measures require that the empathic
response, whether affective and/or cognitive, be a response
to a person's affect, situation or both.

The contexts portrayed have been real situations
and people (Stotland, 1969), photographs or line drawings of

facial expressions, situations or stories (Feshbach and Roe, 1968; Borke, 1971; Deutsch, 1975); audio-recordings (Rothenberg, 1970), or video-taped interaction sequences (Danish and Kagan, 1971).

Typically, empathy is measured by having the subjects label the contextual stimuli (e.g. Deutsch, 1974) and/or the affective response portrayed (e.g. Borke, 1971, Deutsch, 1975), or by responding with a statement reflecting how the subject felt when observing affect in a setting (Feshbach and Roe, 1968). Changes in physiological responses (Stotland and Walsh, 1963; Vanderpool and Barratt, 1970 cited in Deutsch, 1975) or shared physiological conditions (Stotland, 1969) as a result of viewing affective situations also have been used. In all cases standardized, affect-laden situations are used to assess an individual's perception of affective or situational stimuli.

Methodological Problems

Tagiuri (1969) has discussed some of the methodological problems of defining the stimulus which is to be judged. There are great variations in the kinds of stimuli used - real persons, photographs, recorded voices, etc. There is equally great variation in the nature of discrimination demanded of the subject in the emotion-judging task. Davitz (1964) found that stronger emotions and ones which are different from each other are more easily discriminated. Variations also occur in the nature of the identifying labels

that judges are asked to use. Quoting Munn (1940), Tagiuri
has referred to the problem of subjects reaching higher
agreement in judging when they are allowed to use their own
terminology and categories than when they are supplied with
multiple choice answers. There is no reason to assume that
different individuals are equally inclined to utilize the
same categories for ordering emotional expression.

On the issue of the definitions of the stimulus,
Tagiuri also pointed out that one needs to relate systematically
the stimulus properties of the person, or of part of the
person, to the circumstances surrounding the person in space
or time. After all, in the process of categorizing and
judging his environment, the individual generally does not
deal with discrete events but rather with sequences and
contingencies of events. Thus cues intrinsic to the person
object, the sequence and contextual situational information
may all be used by the judge: "virtually all the evidence
available points to the fact that the more information there
is about the situation in which an emotion is being expressed
the more accurate and reliable are judgments of the emotion"
(Tagiuri, 1969, 402). The significance of the judge's
utilizing input from both the stimulus person and the situation
is supported by Jones and Nisbett's (cited in Tagiuri) thesis
that the actor and observer take fundamentally different
attributional orientations in social interaction. The observer
typically assumes a "trait" orientation in which the actor's
behaviour is typically attributed to his stable dispositional

qualities. The actor himself, on the other hand, is much more likely to attribute the causal source of his behaviour to the demands of the situation facing him. As Regan and Totten (1975, cited in Tagiuri) have shown this involves the observer in part shifting to a situational attributional set.

Validity of the judgment is assessed by means of some criterion of the meaning of the stimulus property. One type of criterion frequently used is a consensus of judges or experts. One may also use predictive accuracy as a criterion. Another criterion is self-report by stimulus person. Apart from the last one, a major criticism of such methodology voice by Macarov (1978) is that it cannot measure empathy in the sense of taking the role of the other, for the "other" in these cases does not judge the accuracy of the response. The subjects are therefore trying to determine what the judges have established as the norm. "If they are empathizing, it is with the judges, not the other" (Macarov, 1978, 89).

Whether or not emotions are recognized depends, then, on the type of stimulus and the emotion being experienced, on the number and kinds of categories in terms of which the judgment is made and on the amount of contextual information given to the subject. It must be remembered that the attributes of the other person to which attention is given and from which inferences are made depend on each judge's social perspective-taking structures, on his level of conception of persons, on his motivational state, and on the particulars of the inter-action.

The process of inference, implicit or explicit, that one person applies in his judgment of another person depends also on the specific problem to be dealt with. Kagan (1967) noted that persons who are low on affective sensitivity tend to distort the affective states of others. This, in most cases, does not mean that the person inaccurately perceives the available cues but that the individual's various defense mechanisms, peculiar in content and strength to the personality structure of the individual change the perception, and the result is a distorted identification. For example, a person who has found through past inter-personal interaction that anger is a hurtful and threatening experience may tend to distort his identification of this feeling. He may feel that anger in others is always directed towards him and so react by not recognizing anger in others or by projecting onto the other some distorted and entirely different affective state. This is consistent with results regarding the inhibiting effects on accurate perception in the nonverbal area of an authoritarian personality (Kagan and Shauble, 1969).

Also, though one speaks of person A, the judge, coming to know the state of person B on the basis of both internal and external information, this is usually in natural settings not a one way process. Tagiuri pointed to the dyadic interplay where "observer and observed are simultaneously observed and observer. Their reciprocal feedback processes modify their self-presentations and in turn their

reciprocal perceptions in a continuous recycling but varying process during which each person uses the variations in himself and the other person as a means of validating his hypotheses about the other." (Tagiuri, 1969, 426).

Reliability and Construct Validity of Situational Measures

Deutsch and Madle (1975) found that reliability estimates on situational measures have fared better than on predictive measures, both as far as magnitude of the correlation coefficients and the age range of subjects employed (preschoolers through adults) are concerned. Since most of these measures rely on a system of sorting responses into empathic and non-empathic categories, judges agreement on scoring responses is critical. For all practical purposes the situational empathy tests have demonstrated almost perfect interrater reliabilities (.82 to .99). In a complex measure using 41 video-taped scenes to which a cousellor was required to select the appropriate multiple-choice responses, Kagan et al. (1967), who define the empathic response as both sharing and understanding of another's feelings in relation to contexts, obtained test-retest reliabilities of .75. Deutsch (1974) in a highly complex measure using eight types of video-taped sequences of interaction which place an individual in specific setting obtained test-retest reliabilities from .67 to .99 with most on the .90s range. In a later situational measure using line drawing pictures and stories

Deutsch (1975) found test-retest reliabilities to be again

over .90. Internal inconsistency information was found only

on the Affective Sensitivity Test (Kagan et al., 1967).

Individuals (Kagan et al., 1967; Campbell et al., 1971)

reported that the Affective Sensitivity Scale obtained

Kuder-Richardson-20 coefficients ranging from .58 to .80.

Evidence for construct validity of situational

measures appears to be greater than that of predictive measures,

though great variability of situational measures exists.

Developmental indices such as chronological or mental age

are one set of variables which should theoretically be

related to empathy. Most investigators using situational

instruments have examined age or mental age differences and

have reported that empathy scores do increase with either or

both of these variables (Gates, 1923, 1927; Walton, 1936; both

cited by Deutsch and Madle, 1965; Rothenberg, 1970; Chandler

and Greenspan, 1972; Deutsch, 1974).

In their attempts to gain construct validity

information, researchers have investigated whether treatment

variables designed to facilitate empathy produce higher empathy

scores. Particularly relevant information has been obtained

from whether intervention to increase general 'clinical

skills' increases empathy scores. Evidence supporting this

type of construct validity has come from several researchers

(Astin, 1967; Kagan, et al., 1967; Gellen, 1970; Danish

and Kagan, 1971). Also, empathy scores are higher when

individuals perceive similar others (Feshbach and Roe, 1968) .

Attempts to establish convergent and discriminant validity have been limited. On the whole, in terms of both reliability and construct validity, situational measures seem superior to predictive measures.

Hogan Scale for Empathy

One test which does not easily fall into either the predictive or situational type of empathy measure, yet is significant to this study, is the Hogan Scale for Empathy (Hogan, 1975).

Hogan viewed empathy as a personality trait. As such his empathy scale uses sets of personality scale items that represent what people believe to be true of the "empathic" man. The subject is then asked to answer these items for himself. As Gladstein (1977) pointed out, Hogan, in effect, used a role or cognitive view of empathy to predict how high empathisers will behave in certain situations.

Hogan's initial attempts to obtain a Q-sort description of the "ideally empathic person" have already been described briefly (Ch. 1, p. 16). He developed an empirically keyed empathy scale by comparing the responses of 57 men with high ratings and 57 with low ratings for empathy across the combined - items pool of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Greif and Hogan have reported the psychometric properties of this 64 item scale were satisfactory; a test-retest reliability coefficient of .84 was found over

a three month interval while internal consistency estimates
as high as .71 have been reported. The scale has been
extensively validated since 1966. Hogan has stated that
"it routinely yields correlations about .4 with rated empathy,
rated social activity and skill at playing charades" (Hogan,
1975, 15). Research suggests a reasonable correspondence
between the empathy scale and the theoretical context within
which it was developed (see discussion Chapter 1).

Evidence for its convergent validity has come from
findings by Hogan and Dickstein (1972) that empathy as
measured by the scale correlates significantly (.48, p < .01)
with maturity of moral judgment; with likeability (Hogan
and Mankin, 1972; r = .60); with communicative competence
(Hogan and Henley, 1970; r = .60). Kurtines and Hogan (1972)
found that the Hogan Scale for Empathy significantly
discriminated between 130 college students with a group of
119 incarcerated delinquents matched in terms of socialization
scores, suggesting that empathy may in fact compensate for poor
socialization.

Greif and Hogan (1973) have found further evidence
that supports the conceptual validity of the Hogan Scale for
Empathy by analysing the relationship between the scale and
the well established factor structure of the CPI. Their
results indicate that the scale is primarily related to the
second CPI factor - "person orientation - specifically inter-
personal effectiveness and social adequacy".

The Hogan Scale for Empathy (HSE) is easily admin-
istered and scored, takes about 8-10 minutes to complete,
and is not oriented specifically to a counselling or psycho-
therapeutic context. A shorter version of Hogan's Scale for
Empathy, consisting of 39 items found on the CPI, has been
selected for evaluating the experiential phase of the
empathic process. This is the phase which relates to empathy
as an internal condition. The shorter scale correlates above
.90 with the 64 item version. Its use in the present investi-
gation has been recommended by Hogan (personal communication).

Evaluating the Communication Phase of the
Empathy Process

The Index of Responding

Evaluation of the communication phase is aimed at
two aspects: firstly, evaluating student-teachers' level of
communication of their empathic understanding to the empathee
using an objective measure; secondly, evaluating the level
of empathic understanding communicated as perceived by the
empathee or helpee. For the first aspect, Gazda's Index of
Responding (Gazda, 1977) based on Carkhuff's empathy scale,
has been selected. It is considered an appropriate measure
for this study, as it has been especially adapted for use by
educators. It consists of eight brief statements made by
either pupils or teachers in school situations. The subject
is asked to write a response which will show the helpee that

he has attempted to hear and understand what the latter has expressed, be it verbally and/or nonverbally. The helper's response is then rated on a four-level Empathy Scale, a modification by Gazda et al., of Carkhuff's Accurate Empathy Scale. Levels 1 and 2 are indicative of ineffective (hurtful or irrelevant) interpersonal responses. Level 3 is minimally helpful. Responses rated at Level 4 indicate deeper feelings than were set forth in the original statements and add meaning to them.

The validity and reliability of the AE Scale have already been discussed in Chapter 4.

Gadza et al., (1977) reported two studies which investigated the reliability of the Index of Responding. In one study, 63 students, enrolled in undergraduate education courses, were administered the test on two separate occasions, four weeks apart. A close examination of the raw scores indicated that the magnitude of r (.52) was drastically affected by a restricted range of scores (1.4 - 2.4). When an unrestricted standard deviation of .50 was substituted in a special formula (from Quinn and McNemann's Psychological Statistics) an r of .90 resulted.

Another study sought to establish the split-half reliability of the Index of Responding. The study was carried out in the Winter quarter 1973, with 137 untrained sophomore and junior teacher education students at the University of Georgia. A product-moment coefficient of correlation was computed between scores on odd items and even items. The

split-half reliability coefficient was .77; Gadza considered
that this coefficient would have been considerably higher if
a correction had been made for restricted range as in the
previous study. The two studies indicate a satisfactory
reliability of the Index of Responding.

The instrument which has been selected for evalua-
ting the second aspect of the communication phase, that of
perceived empathy, is Barrett-Lennard's Relationship Inventory.

Barrett-Lennard's Relationship Inventory

Barrett-Lennard has been concerned with evaluating
another phase of empathy-in-action, namely that of received
empathy. He developed the Relationship Inventory (1969, 1978)
to measure four dimensions of interpersonal relationship
adapted from Roger's conception of the necessary conditions
for therapeutic personality change. The various forms of
the Relationship Inventory measure empathy, congruence, level
of regard, and unconditionality of regard from the inter-
perceptions of either participant in formal helping or signi-
ficant life relationships. The form relevant to this phase
of the empathic process is the other-toward-self (OS) form
of the RI, which samples the perceptions of the helpee in
a dyadic relationship. The items for the intrument were
prepared by Barrett-Lennard in consultation with the staff of
the Chicago Counselling Center, including Carl Rogers. The
content of the test was checked by having five judges classify
each item as a positive, negative or neutral indicator of the
variable in question (Barrett-Lennard, 1962). Later item-analysis and

revision resulted in the final set of 64 items used in the
questionnaire, 16 items represented each of the above variables.

The multiple choice questionnaire permits three
levels of positive response (+1, +2, +3) and three levels
of negative response (-1, -2, -3) for each item. The
respondent indicates by his answer how strongly he considers
the statement to be correct or not correct. The scoring
range is -3n to +3n where n is the number of items, so the
possible range of scores for each variable is -48 to +48.

The split-half reliability coefficient determined
by Barrett-Lennard (1969) and Gurman (1977) for the empathy items is .96 for
the helper (n = 40). In the Technical Note on the 64-Item
Revision of the RI Barrett-Lennard (1969) quoted a number of
studies which have assessed split-half reliability, with
coefficients ranging from .75 to .95. The test-retest
correlation obtained when the test was administered to 36
college students with a time lapse of four weeks, was .89
for the empathic understanding items. Hollenbeck (cited in Barrett-
Lennard, 1978) obtained test-retest correlations over a six-month interval,
which ranged from .61 to .81 for the four scales. Thus
reliability of the R.I. seems well established.

The Relationship Inventory has been extensively
validated in a wide range of differing contexts and over 100
studies (Barrett-Lennard, 1972). Mason and Blumberg (1969)
found that the R.I. distinguished between students' perceptions
of classrooms in which they learned most and those in which
they learned least. As already mentioned (Ch. 4) results

regarding the R.I. are more significant in studies dealing
with normal patients functioning in interpersonal relation-
ships rather than more disturbed clients. Kurtz and Grummon
(1972) found that the only two measures, of the six measures
they investigated, which related to each other were tape-
judged empathy and client-perceived empathy, although this
finding was not supported by the correlational study of
Caracena and Vicory (1969). Kurtz and Grummon found that
only client-perceived empathy was strongly related to therapy
outcome.

Gladstein's (1977) review indicates that studies
which show positive correlations between empathy measures
and client outcome are those where the client judges both
the offered empathy and his/her own satisfaction or improve-
ment. The reliability and construct validity of the R.I.
seem to be sufficient to make it a useful instrument measur-
ing an important phase of the empathic process.

Fromthe point of view of this investigation an
important limitation of the R.I. is that, according to its
originator, it cannot be reliably used in research with sub-
jects whose reading skills and verbal conception ability are
less than the average for ninth graders. To make the R.I.
more suitable for use with children, Scheuer (1969, 1971),
in close consultation with Barrett-Lennard, produced an
adaptation named the Teacher-Pupil Relationship Inventory
(TPRI). It provides for separate 'pupil' and'teacher' forms.
According to Scheuer, in the pupil form, based on R.I. form

OS-M-64 (for male other), "each item follows as closely as possible the original language and theoretical concepts of Barrett-Lennard's instrument" (Scheuer, 1969, 57). Fifty percent of TPRI items are identical or nearly so with the corresponding items on the R.I. Scheuer used the instrument in a study carried out in a large residential school for emotionally disturbed children. TPRI forms were collected from 169 children and their 19 teachers. The mean age of child subjects was 13½ years. A pilot study found that the TPRI required a reading age of at least 5.5. The reported odd-even split-half reliability coefficients for the TPRI form were lower than those typically found with standard

OS forms, (Barrett-Lennard, 1969; Gurman, 1977) although Barrett-Lennard (1978, 17) found them acceptable except for unconditionality of regard scale. Corrected coefficients were .39 for the unconditionality scale and a mean of .66 for the other three scales.

The TPRI has been selected as the most appropriate measure available to assess the received empathy phase (derived from the point of view of the children taught by the subjects) of student teachers participating in the intervention program.

CHAPTER 8

THE INTERVENTION PROGRAM: ITS AIMS AND

DESCRIPTION

Aims of the Program

The intervention program which has been developed

for this study has three aims related to the three phases of

relational empathy or empathy-in-action.

1. The attentional phase - the program aims to

provide students with experiences that have been shown to

promote maturity of moral judgment. This attribute has been

related to the adoption of an empathic set, required in the

attentional phase.

2. The experiential phase - relates to empathy as

an internal condition. The program aims at increasing

students' cognitive capacity to take the role of the other.

This has been shown to be a key aspect of empathic capacity.

No attempt is made to improve directly the affective aspect

of empathy, involving affective sharing of the other's feeling.

3. The communication phase - the program provides

students with the opportunity to practise attending and

listening to nonverbal and verbal cues emitted by the empathee,

as well as responding to the empathee in such a way as to

indicate one's empathic understanding.

The investigation is also aiming to find an answer

to the question that James Rest (1977) has raised. How do

specific aspects of the program affect specific kinds of students? The relationships between two independent variables, sex of subject and his score on a scale of authoritarianism, and the dependent variables are examined. Reasons for focus on these independent variables follow.

Dependent Variables:

1. Maturity of moral judgment, measured by the Defining Issues Test.

2. Empathic understanding, measured by Hogan's Scale for Empathy.

3. Communication of empathic understanding, measured by the Index of Responding and the Teacher-Pupil Relationship Inventory.

Independent Variables:

1. Sex of subject.

2. Authoritarianism measured by an authoritarianism scale developed by Phillips (1979).

Rationale for Selection of the Independent Variables

One of the independent variables considered is authoritarian thinking. Research by Danish and Kagan (1971) on training in affective sensitivity found that some individuals are strongly resistent to change and the kind of experiences used to improve subjects' ability to detect and identify the immediate affective state of another. They found a positive

correlation between scores on their Affective Sensitivity

Scale and openness on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale. Research

by Kagan and Shauble (1969) and Hansford (1977) also supports

the contention that empathy and nonverbal perceptiveness

are negatively related to dogmatism and prejudice. One of

the important processes in social perspective-taking is

self-other differentiation, involving knowledge of self and

differentiation from the other. However,"the prejudiced

individual is more apt not to face these (unacceptable)

tendencies in himself openly and thus fail in integrating

them satisfactorily with the conscious image he has of himself"

(Adorno et al., 1950). These tendencies and impulses in

himself may block accurate self and other perception. Thus

a person who finds his own emotion of anger at others

unacceptable will tend to misperceive it in others.

On this basis it was hypothesized that individuals

scoring low in authoritarianism would be more responsive to

an intervention program promoting empathy than individuals

scoring high. The authoritarianism scale used was a modifi-

cation of a scale for middle childhood developed by Phillips

(1979) as part of Australian Primary Schools Project question-

naire (A.P.S.P.), a survey of the attitudes of Sydney,

Australia primary school children. Only minor modifications

were made to make it suitable for use with college students.

Thus references to 'teacher' were replaced by 'lecturer',

'children' by 'students'; 'boys and girls' by 'males and

females'. The modifications were carried out with the

assistance of the author of the scale. The use of local
idiom in the questionnaire recommended it particularly for
a Sydney sample of college students.

Reliability and Validity of the Authoritarianism Scale

Two hundred and seven children from grades five and
six were given the test a second time after a six month interval.
The test-retest correlation was .91. Split-half coefficient
correlating scores on the first 23 items with scores on
second 24 items was .89, which "represents a satisfactory
degree of internal consistency for a questionnaire that covers
a broad range of areas" (Phillips, 1979, 26).

Phillips established the validity of the measure
by giving 500 children a number of independent authoritarian
measures taken from Trinket Brunswick (1953), Gough (1950)
and Wilson (1973). A high correlation was found on similar
items related to authoritarianism in all four measures. The
factor analysis of the test found factors of logically
clustered items identified in other studies, thus providing
more evidence for its construct validity. Factor I had
highest loadings of sexual statements which denigrated women
to a subordinate position. Factor II was defined as rigidity,
a general factor involving cynicism and toughness. Factor
III had its highest loading on authoritarian submission
and Factor IV involved the rejection of ideas and insights.
Ninety percent of the 47 items are positively worded requiring
agreement. Phillips considered that in view of Messick's and

Jackson's (1967) suggestion that an acquiescent response set
is a stable characteristic which would be categorized as
authoritarian submission, avoiding reversal of positive and
negative items would have the effect of increasing the
reliability of the scale.

Sex as an Independent Variable

The second independent variable taken into account
was sex of the subject. Chodorow (1974, 78) reflected a wide
range of psychological research that consistently indicates
that "feminine personality comes to define itself in relation
and connection to other people more than masculine personality
does" (Chodorow, 1974, 44). Chodorow pointed out that the
existence of many sex differences has its roots in early
specific early childhood experiences. The "earliest mode of
individuation, the primary construction of the ego ... all
differ for boys and girls because of differences on the
character of the early mother-child relationship for each"
(Chodorow, 1978, 167). Because of these differences, Chodorow
concluded, girls emerge from the early childhood period with
a basis for empathy built into their primary definition of
self in a way that boys do not.

It was hypothesised that women would score higher
at the pretest on the empathy measure (Hogan's Scale for
Empathy) than males but that these
differences would be reduced after training. This prediction
was not made for the DIT which is a measure of moral judgment

with a high cognitive component. Moreover, research on
moral judgment by Gilligan (1978) has shown that when the
categories of women's thinking are examined in detail, an
outline of a moral conception, different from that described
by Freud, Piaget, or Kohlberg begins to emerge. Gilligan
(1979) highlighted the fact that Kohlberg's six stages which
describe the development of moral judgment from childhood to
adulthood were derived empirically from a longitudinal study
of 84 boys from the United States. Among those found to be
deficient in moral development when measured by Kohlberg's
scale are women whose judgment seems to exemplify Stage 3,
where morality is conceived in terms of relationships, and
goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others.

Gilligan's research on moral judgments made by
women indicates that their moral conception is fundamentally
concerned with the capacity for understanding and care. The
structural progression of this conception of morality involves
a shift from an egocentric through a societal to the universal
moral perspective as described by Kohlberg, but it does so
through the use of a distinct moral language, in which terms
such as "selfishness", "responsibility" define the moral
problem. This is in contrast to Kohlberg's theory which the
moral problem is seen to arise from competing rights and the
highest stages of moral development represent a reflective
understanding of human rights. This different construction
of the moral problem by women may be seen as the critical
reason for their failure to develop within the constructs of

Kohlberg's system. In view of the above research, still in its early stages, and the cognitive nature of moral judgment, no difference was predicted for men and women on the pretest of the DIT.

Description of the Intervention Program

The intervention program is both didactic and experiential, with emphasis on the latter. The didactic part consists of lectures by the tutor and readings, providing students with the theoretical basis of the program. The experiential part provides students with experiences that have been shown to be related to the development of the processes, structures, and skills involved in an empathic interpersonal relationship. Though earlier chapters have dealt more fully with theory and research related to the empathic concept, the theoretical underpinnings of specific program activities will now be briefly outlined. The program has three phases corresponding to the phases of the empathic process: the attentional, experiential and communication phases.

For the sake of clarity, the features of each phase are now restated (see Chapter 1)

Activities Related to the Attentional Phase of the Empathic Process

The Attentional Phase: Person A, the empathiser,

has an empathic set. He actively attends to B who expresses his experiences in words or signs.

Theory and research by Hogan (1975), Rest (1974), DeVries (1966), Feshbach (1975), Selman (1971) have established a relationship between the level of a person's moral judgment and his empathic set. On this basis, it would seem that conditions that have been found to promote maturity of moral judgment would also tend to stimulate a motivation to understand other people.

The objective of this phase of the intervention program is to provide students with experiences which promote development of maturity of moral judgment. As already discussed in Chapter 1, the structure of reciprocity, where the other is seen as a self equal to oneself, is characteristic of Piaget's highest stage of moral judgment. It also underlies Kohlberg's stage of principled thinking. Development of maturity of moral judgment requires a shift from egocentrism to reciprocity; from a focus on another's action to a focus on his motives and intentions. Another aspect is the shift from heteronomy, a morality of obedience of an external law or rule to autonomous morality, characterised by principled thinking.

The above theoretical considerations have guided the following strategies that have been developed for this phase of the program.

Moral Dilemma Discussions: A number of moral dilemmas have been devised for group discussion. Moral dilemma

discussion is one of the conditions that have been shown to
be related to the development of maturity of moral judgment.
Piaget and Kohlberg have stressed the value of exposure to
dissonant information in inter-individual exchanges in the
form of discussions, as a means of stimulating movement
towards mature levels of moral judgment. The research of
Kohlberg and Turiel advocates moral dilemma discussions,
requiring subjects to decenter from the actions and conse-
quences of the actions of the people involved, to a consider-
ation of their motives. According to Kohlberg, discussion
participants are led to re-examine their present moral
stance and to restructure it towards the level next higher
to their own, by arguing for solutions to dilemmas on specific
moral grounds.

Intervention strategies aiming to promote moral
judgment development have shown that the efficacy of moral
dilemma discussions can be enhanced in a number of ways.

The staff involved in the Carnegia-Mellon and Harvard
Universities' Values Education Project (see Chapter 6)
developed a systematic plan to integrate Kohlberg's theory
about moral judgment development in their intervention
treatment. Their method, used to train teachers to implement
a moral development program, has been adapted for this phase.
Four major steps are involved in the teaching process:

1) Students confront a moral dilemma, clarify the
circumstances of the dilemma, define any difficult terms
and state exactly what they see as the dilemma of the main

characters.

2) Students state their individual positions
regarding the action that they think the central character
should take; as well as reasons to support their action
position.

This step has been modified by requiring each
student, after he has stated his choice, to participate in
imaginative role-taking. He is asked to imagine how he
would feel if he were in the central character's shoes.
Stotland's (1969) research indicates that any interpersonal
process, symbolic or overt, which causes an individual to
imagine himself in another's position would lead a person to
empathise with the other by leading him to see the other as
equal to oneself. The very process requires decentering
from a person's actions towards imagining his feelings and
motives. Students may then be confronted with a conflict
between their original choice of action and their thinking
after extending reciprocity to the other. They may change
their judgment at this stage.

3) The discussion step requires students to examine,
analyse and compare their reasons with those of other students.
Reasons are discussed in both small groups (3-4 members) and
large groups, so that students at similar and adjacent stages
of development can confront one another and seriously discuss
genuine social and moral problems.

4) The final step in the teaching process asks
students to reflect on their position and the class discussion

of the dilemma by summarising the various reasons discussed

and by stating which reasons they think best explain what

the central character should do.

Another feature of this part of the program arises

from Enright's (1979) research. Enright argued that pre-

senting students with hypothetical moral dilemmas does not

fit in with developmental theory. If Piaget is correct in

assuming that cognition growth occurs when one reflects on

one's experiences, then a moral education program should be

more closely related to subjects' own social experience.

On this basis, students in the program are provided with the

choice of discussing the prepared moral dilemmas or thinking

through any actual interpersonal conflict occurring in their

immediate personal environment.

Focus on Similarities Between People: Another

condition related to development of more mature moral judgment

is focussing on the similarities between people. Seeing

another as an individual human being who, as oneself, is

subject to pleasure and pain and desires is part of the

reciprocal response characteristic of mature moral judgment.

This view is supported by research which has shown that one

empathises more with a person whom one perceives as similar

and equal to oneself (Feshbach and Roe, 1968; Klein, 1970;

Rothenberg, 1970).

Throughout all phases of the program, students'

attention is drawn to similarities between their needs and

perception of the world and those of others. The others

include their family, peers, the persons whose role they take
in psychodrama or moral dilemma situations.

Activities related to the Experiential Phase of the Empathic Process

The Experiential Phase: Person A knows how person
B feels and sees, and understands the reason for B's feeling
as he does. A resonates to the particular affective and
content components of B's experience.

The objective of this phase of the program is to
provide students with experiences which will increase their
empathic capacity, especially the cognitive capacity to take
the role of the other, or social perspective-taking. These
terms have been fully defined in Chapter 1.

The following activities have been selected as
appropriate for this phase of the program. An attempt has
been made to integrate them closely with relevant theory and
research.

Activities Designed to Develop in Students Greater
Self-Knowledge Leading to a More Accurate Self-Concept. As
discussion in Chapter 1 has indicated, there is a close
connection between 'self' and 'other' understanding. Mead
(1934) explained that our action and thought are structured
by the tendency to react to the other as one does to the self,
and by the tendency to react to the self's behaviour in
the role of the other. Knowledge of one's self is the basis
for knowing others, since "we extend to others the understanding

we have from our own case of the system which is our personality"
(Peters, 1974, 39). A clear self-concept emerges when the
individual views himself from the perspective of a variety
of others in his social group. These varied perspectives
are abstracted into the 'generalized other'. Owing to limited
opportunities for role experimentation, some individuals
never internalize a sufficiently wide repertory of roles.
They "fail to develop a sense of their own identity so they
have no basis for seeing themselves objectively" (Katz, 1963,
81).

Students in the program experience a variety of
exercises to enable each one to clarify his self-concept and
increase knowledge of his own self. This includes familiarity
with his own emotional state. Provision is made for open
communication in small face-to-face groups which establishes
conditions for the individual to become aware of tendencies
and impulses in himself that block accuracy of self and other
perception.

The initial activities related to the clarification
of students' self-concept follow "The Trumpet", a problem-
solving guidance system, developed by Weinstein, Hardin and
Weinstein (1976). The objective of the system is self-science,
investigation and knowledge of one's self. "The underlying
assumption of self-science is that increased knowledge about
one's patterns of behaviour allows more choice and accuracy
in selecting behaviour that gets the intended consequence"
(Weinstein et al., 1976, 12).

The Trumpet consists of eight steps: Participants experience confrontations, list their responses, recognize patterns, accept that they own their patterns, consider consequences, allow alternatives, make evaluations, choose.

A variety of experiences are provided which elicit a response from the individual. These exercises are contrived confrontations which force one to attend to behaviours that one might normally ignore or take for granted. They are then followed by a sequence of questions to be answered concerning the response. The concept closely follows Sprinthall's (1976) technique of guided reflection on structured experiences as a means of promoting developmental change. Since the major thrust of the present investigation is the development in students of the processes and skills involved in empathic interpersonal relationships, rather than directly development of the self, exercises concerned with only the first four phases of the Trumpet have been selected. Thus, after initially responding to a confrontation, participants are asked to examine their responses by observing thoughts, feelings and actions exhibited during the confrontation. Once the response is inventoried as completely as possible, students try to determined whether their response to this confrontation was in any way typical, or consistent with their responses in other similar situations. They are led to clarify and examine the functions of their patterns of behaviour. Pattern clarification as a means of increased self-knowledge emerges from a response to a particular exercise in the class, as a result

of reading over one's journal and from all of one's responses

to all of the exercises; or as a result of experiences out-

side of class.

The details of activities related to the development

of greater self-knowledge and a more accurate self-concept

are found in Appendix A.

Activities Providing Opportunities for Students to

Practise Multiple Perspective-Taking. Going beyond the

development of the self-concept, Selman (1975, 1976) has

studied the developmental process of reciprocal social per-

spective-taking. It refers to the way one comes to understand

how one's subjective view of the self and other relates to the

other's view. The key aspects in this development are self-

other differentiation and the ability to take multiple

perspectives. Goffman (1959) defined self-other differentiation

as the extent to which an individual experiences a clear

distinction between himself as an actor in a situation and

other actors with whom he is interacting in that situation.

Appreciating others' perspectives necessitates an awareness

and knowledge of one's own perspective. Research has also

shown that the ability to decenter, that is, to detach oneself

from one's own position is related to the development of more

mature levels of perspective-taking.

To promote greater self-other differentiation the

program gives students opportunities not only to know them-

selves better, but also to experience a variety of roles and

to practise perceiving others' perspectives.

As research by Clore and Jeffery (1972) indicated, one's role-taking ability can be enhanced by participating in social interaction in both naturalistic settings, and laboratory training in imaginative role-taking.

Activities in the program aimed at promoting multiple perspective-taking include dyadic interaction in the form of peer counselling. Students attend to their partner's verbal and nonverbal cues and attempt to repond in a way which reflects accurately what the other is communicating. Though peer counselling forms an integral part of the communication phase of the empathic process and is included there, it does at the same time provide for verbal exchanges which force one to differentiate between one's own and others' perspectives.

Psychodrama is a particularly powerful means of understanding others' views, as well as one's own, and the relationship between the two. As such it has been included in this intervention. Psychodrama provides opportunities for role playing or "action learning" by requiring participants to put themselves into situations, concepts, relationships through action (Hollander, 1978).

Through the enactment of life situations, usually involving significant others, the individual is able to experience his individual process intra-and inter-personally.

In the enactment part, the role-player can freely move in and out of different roles, including one representing his own self. He can also step outside the scene, with a

double taking his role. This allows the person to gain an outside perspective of himself and the situation being enacted. By taking an identity other than one's own and experiencing another's world, one can better recognize self-other differences.

The structure of psychodrama that is implemented in the program is the one developed by Carl and Sharon Hollander (1978). The Hollander Psychodrama Curve consists of three phases - the warm-up, enactment and integration. The warm-up is the most critical phase. It is the process of "getting ready" for an event. The purpose of the warm-up is to generate spontaneity. The teacher or director plays a vital part. For him the process begins with the discovery of one's own feelings about oneself and one's biases and attitude about role playing. The involvement of students is essential. Through the spontaneous interaction of students, the teacher can help them identify the topic to be investigated. Since this investigation has as its specific focus teacher-pupil interaction, the director may suggest that the initial situation to be enacted is a classroom scene in which students have felt confused or anxious.

The second phase of the psychodrama is the enactment. The first part involves "setting the scene" or determining in detail the time the role playing is occurring, the physical setting, the people involved, and the circumstances. It is helpful if the director and the students speak in the present tense and in the first person, as if the situation is happening now.

The situation becomes very real if the role players physically set up the room or space of the scene, using chairs, pillows, desks to represent objects in the scene.

Establishing time and space prepares the protagonist and audience for the significant roles to be played by the auxiliary egos. The persons to play auxiliary egos are selected from the group by the protagonist and are inducted into the roles by his modelling the verbal and nonverbal actions of the "real" people. Because the auxilliary egos represent people in the protagonist's phenomenological field, their performances support the warming-up experience of the protagonist. The initial psychodrama scene begins at the level of the protagonist's "reality". The values of the initial scene help the director to diagnose the role-players' "micro socio-emotional situation" (Hollander, 1978, 7). The final stages of psychodrama enactment require a purposeful positive ending. The protagonist is aided by introducing rehearsal-for-life situations. Once an experience is provided, be it in life or in psychodrama, such that the protagonist becomes totally involved, experience becomes incorporated as a part of that person's role repertoire.

The third phase of the psychodrama involves integration or sharing. Once the enactment is concluded, the auxilliary egos return to their seats in the audience, the director and protagonist sit in front of the audience, who is invited to share their personal experiences as they relate to the situations enacted. The director can encourage students

to draw upon their experiences and from these will unfold new awarenesses and insights. It is important for the director also to share experiences, values and beliefs. To add to the learning, time may be spent focussing on the experiences of the role players - how they felt in the roles, whether their roles helped them actually perceive the situation from another's viewpoint.

Clore and Jeffery consider that, like the behaviours in modelling, the emotional responses induced by role playing are coded and stored, to be retrieved when similar situations are presented. Thus the ability to change perspectives is enhanced by building up a backlog of varied role experiences. Whereas in this phase of the program students are required to take multiple perspectives, in the attentional phase related to promoting an empathic set, they are required to attend to similarities between people.

Students are thus given opportunities to develop a personal orientation where the other is perceived as equal or similar to oneself (in his human beingness), yet different in his perspective. Research indicates that this is a condition under which empathy is more likely to occur. It needs to be noted that experiences aimed at stimulating development of reciprocity and decentering included in the intervention program related to the attentional phase, are likely to lead to the development of one's capacity to take the role of the other.

The didactic part of the program relevant to the

experiential phase consists of a lecture on the interference process and forms of role-taking, so that students can become aware of their own inference process.

Activities Related to the Communication Phase of the Empathic Process

The Communication Phase: This involves two steps: (a) person A expresses his empathic understanding to B by means of words and/or nonverbal signals; (b) person B receives A's empathic communication.

The activities related to communication phase are aimed at the first step, that is, the communication by the empathiser of an accurate understanding of the feelings, experiences and behaviour of the empathee from the latter's frame of reference. As discussed fully in Chapter 4, the communicative aspect of accurate empathy has been viewed by Truax and Carkhuff as a teachable skill which could be "learned and sharpened with practice" (Truax and Mitchell, 1970, 313). This is the approach adopted in this report.

The format for empathy training in the program is based on one proposed by Gazda et al., in their manual for educators, Human Relations Development (1977). Gazda's model is a modification of Carkhuff's Human Resource Development model for specific use by educators. The format selected is the more general of the two provided, emphasizing phases of training and the abstract concepts associated with the helping model. (Note: In the model, the empathiser is referred to

as helper; the empathee as helpee). As the program is being

offered to students in their first year of college, a more

general course aimed at making them aware of the aims and

methods of training seems appropriate. The format is both

didactic and experiential. Some exercises from Egan's (1976)

modification of Carkhuff's H.R.D. model have been added.

The program consists in training in interpersonal

perception and in responding empathically, using as a criterion

Gazda's Empathy Scale. Interpersonal perception refers to

the process whereby one person discerns both the overt and

the covert behaviour of another person. It involves shifting

focus from oneself and attending and listening to the other.

Processes and skills developed in the experiential phase of

the empathic process are relevant here.

The trainees are provided with a framework for

understanding the importance of accurate perception and with

activities which develop competency in perceiving other's

feelings. Exercises acquaint them with a sampling of forms

of nonverbal behaviour, important as cues for verbal communi-

cation. After being introduced to the Empathy Scale,

students are given exercises to develop their discrimination

skill. This refers to their ability to recognize an appro-

priate empathic response - discriminate it from responses

which are not helpful.

Exercises in discriminating empathic responses made

by others prepare students for the key aspect of the communi-

cation phase, that is, the act of responding empathically to

verbal and nonverbal messages emitted by the empathee.
Students are initially trained in primary-level empathy,
which involves communicating to others an understanding of
their frame of reference, as explicitly expressed by them.

They are given exercises in responding in natural
style at levels 3.0 or above on the Empathy Scale to prepared
helpee situations. In advanced stages of training the group
members will be responding verbally, building a base through
level 3 empathy, and finally attempting to move to higher
levels of empathy. Advanced or additive accurate empathy is
concerned not only with what the other person states and
expresses but also what he implies or leaves unstated or
doesn't clearly express.

Facilitative Conditions Related to the Whole
Intervention Program

The program has certain features which aim to
establish conditions shown to facilitate developmental changes
in group members.

Acceptance and Support. At all phases of the
program the group leader models the skills associated with
the empathic process. They include attending, listening,
responding empathically. In addition, the leader shows
support for and acceptance of each individual member, modell-
ing a high level of regard and unconditionality of regard.
Rubin's (1967) research has pointed out the significance
of a psychologically safe environment in which an individual

can alter his self-concept.

Susan Goldsmith's (1977) developmental education intervention program exemplifies this approach. It was based on Sanford's concept of the process of structural change as a combination of challenge and support. On the one hand, structural changes require a conflict, a disorganizing experience that invokes within the individual the equilibration process. On the other hand, support is also needed as a balancing factor that serves as some means of keeping the challenge from overwhelming the individual. Support in the program is also provided by a moderate structuring of the course. In the initial meeting students are presented with an overview of the program. They are also invited to feel free not to participate in any activity which they perceive as threatening or uncomfortable.

Processing, in the form of reflection or the structured examination of relevant experiences, is a feature of the program.

Anderson's (1978), (see Chapter 5) research suggests that the efficacy of small group experiences in producing interpersonal attitude changes can be increased by focussing on member to member interaction, and by gathering feedback about important process variables from the group as a whole.

Processing of experiences may produce the conflict necessary for developmental change by stimulating members to decenter from their view and focus as well as acknowledge other perspectives.

Sprinthall's (1976) Deliberate Psychological Education project led him to the conclusion that deliberate expansion of social role-participation and reflection on or structured examination of the experience appear as a major ingredient resulting in personal psychological growth.

Journal Keeping. Students are required to record their reflections upon the personal and interpersonal experiences both within classroom time and outside. The aim is to encourage students to reflect more deeply and in private upon their development in the interpersonal relationship area.

CHAPTER 9

THE PRESENT STUDY

The previous chapter set out the aims and described
the features of the intervention program developed for this study.

The experimental section is presented under the
following headings: 1. Hypothesis
                      2. Subjects
                      3. Design and Procedures for Collecting Data
                      4. Evaluation Measures
                      5. Procedures for Treating Data
                      6. Results.

Experimental Hypotheses

The hypotheses set out below are based on the
assumption that the intervention program which has been designed
on the basis of research indicating that certain experiences
promote the development of the processes, structures and skills
of the empathic response, will produce change in students along
identified dimensions. The hypotheses are stated in null form.

1. There will be no significant difference between
the control and the experimental group's scores on the
Defining Issues Test (DIT), measuring maturity of moral
judgment, during pretest and post test.

2. There will be no significant difference between
the control and experimental group's scores on Hogan's Scale
for Empathy (HSE), measuring empathy as an internal condition,
during pretest and post test.

3. There will be no significant difference between
the control and experimental group's scores on the Index of
Responding (IR), and the Relationship Inventory (R.I.) during
pretest and post test.

4. Within the experimental group there will be no significant difference between male and female subjects' scores on the DIT during pretest and post test.

5. Within the experimental group there will be no significant difference between male and female subjects' scores on the HSE during pretest and post test.

6. Within the experimental group there will be no significant difference between male and female subjects' scores on the IR and R.I. during pretest and post test.

7. Within the experimental group, subjects scoring high on the authoritarianism scale will not differ significantly from subjects scoring low in their scores on the DIT during pretest and post test.

8. Within the experimental group, subjects scoring high on the authoritarianism scale will not differ significantly from subjects scoring low in their scores on the HSE during pretest and post test.

9. Within the experimental group, subjects scoring high on the authoritarianism scale will not differ significantly from subjects scoring low in their scores on the IR and R.I. during pretest and post test.

Since each of the dependent variables had a number of t tests carried out on it (for DIT - 12 t tests, HSE and IR - 10 t tests), making it possible that a significant result would be obtained by chance, it was decided to set a convervative alpha level. A conservative alpha level suggests .004 level of significance for t tests involving the DIT (.05 divided by number of tests) and .005 level of significance for t tests involving the HSE and IR. However, based on the

consideration that it is unclear how reliable the measures
are, and that there is a danger of commiting Type 2 error,
the significance level of .01 was selected. Levels of $p < .05$
are shown on the tables to indicate significant trends.

Subjects

The 105 subjects in the experiment were drawn from
a population of 229 students in their first semester, 1980
at a Catholic teachers college, Sydney, Australia. The body
of first year students was divided into eight sections of
approximately 30 students. Three sections represented students
choosing the curriculum area relevant to Infants teaching
(children aged 5-8 years); three the primary area (8-12 years)
and two sections included students choosing Junior Secondary
teaching. Placement within individual sections comprising a
curriculum area was in alphabetical order. Apart from the
curriculum subjects, all students were exposed to the same
core courses in theory of education, literature and communica-
tion and a course entitled Dimensions of Man, within the frame-
work of which this research was carried out. On the whole, then,
in the first semester of their college life, students were
exposed to similar experiences. Time-table constraints and
need for cooperation from other staff made random selection
of sections for the experiment impossible.

The two sections which were used as a control group
were students who had chosen Infants teaching. The two sections
who became the experimental group were a Primary group and a
Junior Secondary group. The allocation to either the experi-
mental or control condition relied completely on time-
tabling arrangements. Thus every section in the subject pool
may be said to have had equal probability of being assigned

to either. The most obvious difference between the control
and experimental groups was that the control group (n = 51)
had only one male, whereas the experimental group (n = 54)
was composed of 41 females and 13 males. This composition
reflected the bias of males to choose teaching at higher
levels of schools. The above differences between the control
and experimental groups are considered when discussing pretest
scores.

Initially, 116 student teachers participated in
the experiment. Eleven were dropped from the program,
either because they chose to discontinue their college
studies (2); because they missed one or both testing
sessions (7), or because their answers on the DIT were in-
consistent and needed to be discarded (2).

Design and Procedures for Collecting Data

Although it would have been preferable to obtain
randomization and carry out a true experiment, administrative
constraints made it impossible to assign subjects to the
experimental (E) and control (C) groups at random. The
design suitable in evaluation research where subjects are
not randomly assigned to groups is the quasi-experimental
non-equivalent control group design. The following design
was employed:

$$\text{E group:} \quad T_1 \quad E \quad T_2$$

$$\text{C group:} \quad T_1 \quad C \quad T_2$$

T represents a testing period; E represents the experimental
condition and C the control condition.

It meets the following three requirements of quasi-
experimental design as set down by Kenny (1975):

1. There must be a treated and an untreated group.

2. There must be pre-treatment and post treatment
measures.

3. There must be an explicit model that projects
over time the difference between the treated and untreated
groups.

In the report, both the experimental and control
groups were tested in week 1 of semester one. This was
followed by an intervention in the E group and a control
condition in the control group. Both groups were retested
in week 12 at end of semester.

The period of experimental and control condition
was 11 weeks. Both groups met with a tutor twice a week for
one hour, making a total of 22 hours. The first hour the
tutor met with the whole section of 25-30 students, the
second hour the tutor met with only half a section (12-15
students) at a time. In the experimental condition, any
necessary didactic material was presented to the whole group,
whereas activities involving more intensive group interaction
were kept for the half group sessions. Control subjects
participated in an course entitled Dimensions of Man concerned
with personal growth of students using a more didactic
approach. In that course no deliberate attempt had been made

to integrate it closely with developmental theory, a feature
of the intervention condition.

Evaluation Measures

The three measures administered during pre and post
testing were the Defining Issues Test, Hogan's Scale for
Empathy, and Gazda's Index of Responding. An authoritarianism
scale was also administered.

At the end of the semester, before going into the
schools for a three week school experience program, students
in the E group were presented with Barrett-Lennard's Relation-
ship Inventory Teacher Pupil form (TPRI) the primary group
being presented with a simplified and shortened version of
the test. They were requested to have their pupils fill them
in at the end of the three week teaching practice period. It
was stressed that any results would remain confidential. This
task was made voluntary, as it was felt that any compulsion
may be counter-productive. The results were disappointing.
Only a few students responded to the request. Most failed to
have the TPRI answered. Reasons given included lack of
permission by the regular class teacher, too young a class
and general reluctance to receive feedback at so early a
stage of their teaching. Arrangements for the investigator or
a qualified delegate to collect the R.I. data were not implemented
due to constraints imposed by the college administration. The
plan to use Barrett-Lennard's Relationship Inventory as one of the evaluation
measures for the Intervention Program thus had to be abandoned with regret.

Procedures for Treating Data

Data analysis compared group means using the t test. The pooled variance estimate t statistic was applied when the F test for homogeneity of variance showed no significant differences; the separate estimate t statistic was applied when non-homogeneity of variance was indicated by a significant F value.

t tests were computed to compare the group means of the experimental and control groups on the DIT, HSE, and IR during pretest and post test. Differences between means of the experimental group during pre- and post-testing were analyzed by use of a t test for correlated samples. The same was done for the control group. Due to the uneven distribution of males in the control and experimental groups it was decided to control for sex by making a comparison between the means of the females in the control group and those in the experimental group on the three measures during pretest and post test.

Within the E group, t tests were computed to compare males and females on the three measures during pre- and post test.

The pre- and post test scores on the three measures of experimental subjects in the top quartile (scoring 10+) and bottom quartile (scoring 0-4) on the authoritarianism scale were also compared by means of the t test. This ensured (unlike a medium split would have done) that the subsamples were clearly and distinctly different on the authoritarian dimension.

As well as obtaining t tests of significance, an

analysis of the interaction of scores on the DIT with type
of treatment (experimental or control) was computed by
counting the number of subjects in each group who gained on
the measure.

The only test which required subjective ratings of
subjects' responses was the Index of Responding. Two inde-
pendent raters were used. The ratings of Rater 1 were chosen
randomly from the two sets of ratings for the data analysis.

Analysis of the data was carried out on the Uni-
versity of New South Wales Cyber computer using the
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

Results

Reliability of responses was checked by computing
correlation coefficients between pre- and post test scores.
As Tables 13 and 14 indicate, all r's except for the IR
scores of the experimental group were significant ($p < .001$).
Interrater correlation coefficient was .92 indicating a
high level of agreement.

Table 9: A Comparison of Control and Experimental Groups on
the DIT, HSE and IR during Pretest

Group	Measure	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t
Control (n = 51)		30.39	10.53	1.47	2.99*
	DIT				
Experimental (n = 54)		37.22	12.68	1.73	
Control		22.71	3.86	.53	.24
	HSE				
Experimental		22.89	3.85	.52	
Control		1.20	.13	.02	.08
	IR				
Experimental		1.20	.10	.01	

*p < .01 (two tailed test).

As Table 9 indicates there was no significant
difference between the means of the E and C group on the Hogan
Scale for Empathy and the Index of Responding. Surprisingly,
however, the t test indicated a significant difference
(p < .01) between the two groups on the Defining Issues Test,
in favour of the experimental group. This may have been due
to the occurrence of chance events or may well reflect some
differences in persons choosing Primary and Secondary teaching
rather than Infants teaching. This unexpected result meant

that the intervention effect on the DIT could not be gauged by comparison of the treated and untreated groups as the treatment was confounded with the causes of the pretest.

Table 10: A Comparison of Control and Experimental Groups
on the DIT, HSE and IR during Post Test

Group	Measure	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t
Control	DIT	34.53	13.09	1.83	3.25*
Experimental		42.52	12.13	1.65	
Control	HSE	22.27	3.54	.49	1.36
Experimental		23.41	4.93	.67	
Control	IR	1.21	.11	.01	15.22**
Experimental		2.29	.51	.07	

* p < .01 (two-tailed test)

** p < .001

Table 10 indicates that during the post test the E group retained its significant (p < .01) higher scoring on the DIT. Null hypothesis 1 that there would be no significant differences between the DIT scores of control and experimental subjects during pretest and post test is rejected.

There was no significant difference between the two groups on post test HSE scores, though there was a trend in the E group toward a higher score. The F value indicated

a significantly greater variance within the experimental group as compared to the control group ($F = 1.94$, $p < .05$) during post test. This may reflect some treatment effect. Null hypothesis 2 that there would be no significant differences between HSE scores on control and experimental group during pretest and post test needs to be accepted.

Results in Table 10 show that the E group obtained significantly higher scores on the IR during post test. Null hypothesis 3 that there would be no significant differences between the C and E subjects during post test is rejected ($p < .001$).

Since research has shown that males perform better on moral judgment measures which follow Kohlberg's scheme, it was speculated that the difference in the mean score on the DIT between control and experimental groups may be due to the high proportion of males in the experimental group in comparison to the control group (13 males out of 54 as compared to 1 out of 51). A comparison was thus made between the experimental and the control females scores on the DIT during pretest and post test.

Table 11: A Comparison of Control and Experimental Females

on the DIT

Group	Measure	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t
Control Females (n = 50)		30.70	10.40	1.47	2.57*
	DIT pretest				
Experimental Females (n = 41)		36.83	12.34	1.93	
Control Females		34.84	13.03	1.84	3.03**
	DIT post test				
Experimental Females		42.90	12.12	1.89	

* $p < .05$ (two tailed test)

** $p < .01$ (two tailed test)

Table 11 indicates that the experimental females did not score significantly higher than the control females on the DIT during pretest, but did obtain a significantly higher score during post test. Evidently different sex composition (more males in E group) was a factor in the significantly higher score on the DIT of the experimental group during pretest.

A t test was obtained to compare control and experimental group scores on the authoritarianism scale. As Table 12 indicates, no significant difference was found.

Table 12: A Comparison of Control and Experimental Groups
on the Authoritarianism Scale

Group	Measure	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t
Control	Authoritarianism Scale	6.98	4.28	.59	.31
Experimental		7.24	4.20	.57	

Comparison of Control and Experimental Groups Gains from Pretest to Post-Testing on Dependent Measures

Another way of evaluating the effectiveness of the treatment in promoting upward change on the three measures is by computing t tests of significance between means of pretest and post test scores of both control and experimental groups. As Table 13 shows the control group gained significantly ($p < .01$) on the DIT. No such gains were made on HSE and IR measures.

Table 13: Correlated t Tests on Pretest and Post Test Scores of Control Group

Measure		Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t	Correlation Coefficient
DIT	Pretest	30.39	10.52	1.47	2.71**	.59***
	Post test	34.53	13.09	1.83		
HSE	Pretest	22.71	3.86	.54	.93	.55***
	Post test	22.27	3.54	.49		
IR	Pretest	1.20	.13	.02	.34	.32*
	Post test	1.21	.11	.02		

*	p < .05 (two tailed test)
**	p < .01 (two tailed test)
***	p < .001 (two tailed test)

Table 14 indicates that the gains on the DIT by E group were of greater significance (p < .001) and higher absolute value (+5.30) than gains by the C group. These results need to be treated with caution. Campbell (1969) has argued for the fan spread hypothesis, whereby those with the higher mean mature at a greater rate than those with the lower mean. Campbell used this interaction of selection and maturation as an argument against raw change score analysis.

Table 14: Correlated t Tests on Pretest and Post Test Scores
of Experimental Group

Measure		Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t	r
DIT	Pretest	37.22	12.68	1.73	3.79*	.66*
	Post test	42.52	12.13	1.65		
HSE	Pretest	22.89	3.85	.52	1.32	.81*
	Post test	23.41	4.93	.67		
IR	Pretest	1.20	.10	.01	15.93*	.16
	Post test	2.29	.51	.07		

* $p < .001$ (two tailed test)

Moreover a pretest and post test gain score is
considered inappropriate for the DIT (personal communication,
October, 1980, James Rest, author of the test). Another
method was used to analyse the interaction of the test with
type of intervention. The number of subjects in the E and C
groups who gained on the DIT during the post test was counted
and a percentage obtained (Table 15).

Table 15: Percentage of Gainers on the DIT

Group	No. of Gainers	Percentage of Gainers
Control (n = 51)	31	60.7%
Experimental (n =54)	37	68.5%

Though null hypothesis 1 that there would be no significant difference between DIT scores of control and experimental subjects during pre- and post test has been rejected (p < .01, two tailed test), Table 15 does indicate a trend for the experimental condition to be somewhat more effective than the control condition in promoting moral judgment development as measured by the DIT.

Referring back to Table 14, the results do not show any significant gain on the Hogan Scale for Empathy by the experimental group. There was a significant difference between experimental subjects' mean score on the IR during pretest and post test (p < .001).

Comparisons of Experimental Males and Females on the Dependent Variables

Table 16 shows the differences between means of experimental males and females on the three dependent variables during pre- and post tests. There was no significant difference between males and females' scores on the DIT during pretest

Table 16: A Comparison of Experimental Males and Females Scores on the DIT, HSE and IR during Pretest and Post Test

Measure	Sex	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t
Pretest DIT	Female (n = 41)	36.83	12.34	1.93	.40
	Male (n = 13)	38.46	14.17	3.93	
Pretest HSE	Female	23.71	3.24	.50	2.97*
	Male	20.31	4.57	1.27	
Pretest IR	Female	1.22	.10	.02	2.86*
	Male	1.13	.06	.02	
Post Test DIT	Female	42.90	12.12	1.89	.41
	Male	41.31	12.57	3.49	
Post Test HSE	Female	24.00	4.69	.73	1.59
	Male	21.54	5.40	1.50	
Post Test IR	Female	2.36	.48	.07	1.88
	Male	2.07	.57	.15	

* p < .01 (two tailed test)

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and post test, though the difference obtained was due to higher scores for males during pretest and for females during post test. Null hypothesis 4 is upheld.

Females scored significantly (p < .01) higher than males during pretest on the HSE. As already discussed, empathy is a trait more often characteristic of the female personality than that of the male. So this was not a surprising result. Post test scores showed no significant differences between the means of females and males on the HSE. It seems then that the males in the E group did respond to the intervention program with its focus on empathy training as they no longer scored significantly less than females. Thus null hypothesis 5 is rejected.

The difference between the experimental males' and females' pretest IR scores needs to be treated with caution because of the difference in variance between male and female scores on this variable (F = 2.89, p = .051), a factor which affects the validity of the t test, especially when two groups have an unequal number of subjects. It is also noted that the pretest IR standard deviations are very low, with them 5-10 times as great on post test. A reason may be that the skill of empathic communication, as measured by the IR, was unfamiliar to both groups during pretest.

There was no significant difference between male and female post test scores on the IR. Null hypothesis 6 is rejected with above reservation.

Table 17: Comparisons of Pre- and Post Test Scores of Males

and Females in Experimental Group

Sex	Measure		Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t
Male	DIT	Pretest	38.46	14.17	3.93	.85
		Post test	41.31	12.57	3.49	
Female	DIT	Pretest	36.83	12.34	1.93	4.02*
		Post test	42.90	12.12	1.89	
Male	HSE	Pretest	20.31	4.57	1.27	1.34
		Post test	21.54	5.40	1.50	
Female	HSE	Pretest	23.71	3.24	.51	.69
		Post test	24.00	4.69		
Male	IR	Pretest	1.13	.06	.02	5.90*
		Post rest	2.07	.57	.15	
Female	IR	Pretest	1.22	.10	.02	15.33*
		Post test	2.36	.48	.07	

* $p < .001$ (two tailed test)

Table 17 shows the results of correlated t tests of significance between means of pre- and post testscores on the DIT, HSE, and IR for females and males in the experimental group. Though the experimental females had lower DIT mean score than males during pretesting, they significantly increased their mean score (6.07 points, $p < .001$) during the

post test. Males, in contrast, did not show a significantly

higher mean during post-testing though the trend was there.

Table 18 indicates that 70.73% females as compared

to 53.84% males gained on the DIT.

Table 18: Percentage of Gainers on DIT among Experimental

Males and Females

Sex	No. of Gainers	% of Gainers
Female (n = 41)	29	70.73
Male (n = 13)	7	53.84

On the HSE females, who scored significantly higher

than males during pretest did not gain significantly between

pre- and post treatment. Males also did not gain significantly

but showed a trend in that direction (a gain of 1.23 against

females' gain of .29 scores).

Both males and females gained significantly

(p < .001) on the IR between pre- and post testing. Differ-

ences in variance between pre- and post test scores may have

brought into question the use of a parametric test such as

the t test, but the obvious increase in the means scores

seems to make it acceptable.

Comparison of High and Low Authoritarianism Scorers on the
Dependent Variables

Turning now to independent variable of authoritar-

ianism as a determinant of responsiveness to the intervention

program, Table 19 suggests that authoritarianism did not seem

to be related to maturity of moral judgment scores. There
was no significant difference between low and high authori-
tarianism scorers on the pretest and post test DIT scores.
Hypothesis 7 is retained.

Low authoritarianism subjects did not score signi-
ficantly higher during the pretest than the high authoritarians
on Hogan's Scale for Empathy and Index of Responding. The
level of significance of p. < .05, however, suggests a strong
trend for low authoritarians to score higher on these empathy
measures.

During the post test the low authoritarians scored
significantly higher than high authoritarians on the HSE
(p < .01). While low authoritarians slightly increased
their scores on HSE the high authoritarians decreased theirs.
This is in keeping with literature that indicates that a type
of program which promotes self-knowledge and exposure to
possibly threatening ideas may lead to greater defensiveness
by a highly authoritarian personality. Hypothesis 8, that
high authoritarians will not differ significantly from low
authoritarians on their scores on the HSE during pretest and
post test is rejected.

On the Index of Responding the near significant
(.05) difference between the two groups of subjects during
pretest disappeared during the post test. The high as well
as the low authoritarians increased their scores on this
measure of skill. Hypothesis 9 is retained. These results
will be discussed in Chapter 10.

Table 19: A Comparison of High and Low Authoritarianism Subjects on the Three Dependent Variables

Group		Pretest Measure					Post test Measures			
		Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t		Mean	S.D.	S.E	t
Low Authoritarians		34.97	13.57	2.44	.94		39.42	12.15	2.18	1.10
	DIT					DIT				
High Authoritarians		31.79	10.91	2.23			35.71	12.82	2.62	
Low Authoritarians		23.35	3.79	.68	2.07*		23.94	3.99	.72	2.79**
	HSE					HSE				
High Authoritarians		21.04	4.51	.92			20.58	4.93	1.01	
Low Authoritarians		1.22	.11	.02	2.19*		1.78	.61	.11	.23
	IR					IR				
High Authoritarians		1.15	.10	.02			1.82	.73	.14	

* p < .05 (two tailed test)

** p < .01 (two tailed test)

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Table 20 shows no significant difference between experimental males' and females' scores on the authoritarianism scale.

Table 20: A Comparison of the Authoritarianism Scores of Experimental Females and Males

	Authoritarian Score			
	Mean	S.D.	S.E.	t
Females (n = 41)	7.15	4.48	.70	.29
Males (n - 13)	7.54	3.31	.92	

Intercorrelations Between the Variables

Pearson correlation coefficients were obtained between the three dependent variables, and between them and the independent variable of authoritarianism during the pretest and post test (Tables 21 and 22).

Table 21: Correlations on Pretest Scores of Experimental Group on the DIT, HSE and IR and on Authoritarianism

Variables	DIT	HSE	IR	Authoritarianism
DIT		.17	.02	-.25
HSE			-.02	-.26
IR				-.14

There were no significant correlations between the pretest scores on the DIT, HSE, and IT and between them and authoritarianism.

Table 22: Correlations on Post Test Scores of Experimental Group on the DIT, HSE and IR and on Authoritarianism

Variables	DIT	HSE	IR	Authoritarianism
DIT		.39**	.42***	-.23
HSE			.04	-.30*
IR				-.12

* p = .013

** p < .01

*** p < .001

During the post test DIT scores correlated significantly with HSE (P < .01) and with IR scores (p < .001). There was no significant correlation between HSE scores and IR scores. Authoritarianism showed a significant negative correlation with HSE (P = .013). It was not significantly correlated with the other two dependent variables.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

The intervention program was effective in raising student teachers' scores on the Index of Responding and was associated with significant increases on the Defining Issues Test. It had no significant effect on Hogan's Scale for Empathy scores. The control condition, however, also resulted in a raising of scores on the DIT. Formal education in adult subjects has been found to relate positively to increasing scores on the DIT (Rest, 1974b). One can conclude, therefore, that the experimental condition, which included giving subjects an opportunity to analyse moral dilemmas and focus on the different motives, needs and interests of the persons involved is one possible way of promoting developmental change. It needs to be noted that, at this stage, there is no methodology to measure which particular parts of the program provided the stimulant conditions for particular students.

The lack of a significant response by experimental subjects to the empathy measure underscores the question, whether a personality trait like empathic capacity can be changed within a relatively short period. Moreover, there is some evidence that major personality changes in adults usually follow a period of disequilibrium where restructuring is sought. In this study subjects were not volunteers actively seeking to change themselves, but students fulfiling course requirements.

Results regarding the Index of Responding were
more encouraging. The program was effective in training
subjects in the skill of communicating empathy to a helpee
following the Carkhuff-Truax model.

Unfortunately, the need to abandon Barrett-Lennard's
measure of received empathy does not allow one to draw any
conclusions about the transfer of this skill to the real-life
classroom situation.

As to the relative performance of experimental
males and females on the DIT null hypothesis 4 is retained.
That is, there were no significant differences between males
and females on the DIT during pretest and post test. However, the
experimental females showed a significant gain on the DIT
from pretest to post test, while the experimental males did
not. Table 18 also indicates that 70.7% of experimental
females gained on the DIT as compared to 53.8% of experimental
males.

Gilligan (1978) has suggested that Kohlberg's
scheme based on a longitudinal study of 84 males and measures
based on it, such as the DIT, have not given adequate expres-
sion to the concerns and experiences of women. On the
basis of research on the way women reason in moral conflict
situations, Gilligan claimed that the reason why females
tend to score low on Kohlberg's scheme (Kohlberg, 1971) is
their different moral orientation. In contrast to males,

with their concern for universal ethical principles, females
make decisions based on empathy and compassion, and on a
consideration of what is the best solution in a particular
context.   It seems that this would be the mode of a
sample of Catholic young women, many from homes and schools
fostering traditional female sex roles.   The significantly
higher pretest means score of experimental females in
comparison to males on Hogan's Scale for Empathy (p < .01)
shown in Table 16, supports this view.

The young women in the sample, however, were
able to show an upward shift towards more "principled"
moral judgment when exposed to the 'male' type of thinking
involved in the moral judgment intervention program.   This
'male' orientation was well expressed by an 11 year old
boy interviewed by Gilligan (1980).   "Justice", he said,
"is a mathematics problem with people".   The experimental
females' significant increase on the moral judgment
measure (Table 17) is in line with Kohlberg's view that
women will advance on Kohlbergian measures when they are
challenged to solve moral dilemmas that require them to
look beyond the relationships that have in the past generally
influenced their moral experience.

An analogous trend may be observed when comparing
male and female scoring on Hogan's Scale for Empathy.
During pretesting females scored higher than males (p < .01).

The difference was no longer significant during post-testing, indicating a trend for males to improve their empathy scores when exposed to what may be considered a more 'female' orientation, concerned with how the 'other' is feeling when in an interpersonal relationship to the 'self'. The above mentioned trends suggest that there was a differential response to the program by males and females. Both groups gained significantly on the Index of Responding.

Authoritarianism was not found to be related to the subjects' response to the program as measure by the DIT. This was surprising as the factors identified in the Authoritarianism test included rigidity (Factor II) and authoritarian submission (Factor III), both divergent from the construct of reciprocity and thinking based on universal ethical principles, seemingly embodied in Kohlberg's developmental scheme of moral judgment. One wonders to what extent Kohlbergian stages reflect primarily a cognitive development rather than thought structures related to moral action based on reciprocity. It may be that a high Kohlbergian score is more a reflection of the cognitive ability to balance and coordinate the different rights of individuals in a social system when this is the norm, rather than an indication of a way of thinking about other people arising out of a respect for their equal rights.

Authoritarianism correlated negatively with
empathy. As shown in Table 19, low authoritarians obtained
significantly higher mean scores on the HSE than did high
authoritarians during post test (p < .01) but not during
pretest, though there was a trend in that direction. As
already noted, the experimental condition did not signi-
ficantly increase subjects' scores on the HSE. The above
results suggest, however, that low authoritarian thinkers
were able to respond to the empathy training program and
improve their empathy scores more than did subjects with
high authoritarianism scores. This conclusion is supported
by the near significant negative correlation (p = .013)
between HSE and Authoritarianism during the post test.
If indeed, as research indicates (see Introduction), a high
level of empathy is desirable in teachers' relationships
with their pupils, then this finding may have implications
for selection of teacher trainees. Teacher education
institutions may consider a score on an authoritarianism
measure as one of the relevant factors in selection pro-
cedures for entry into the teaching profession.

There was no significant difference between high
and low authoritarians on the Index of Responding. Both
high and low authoritarians were able to be trained in the
skill of empathic communication. This skill as presented
in Carkhuff's Human Resource Development model is highly
structured and unambiguous. High authoritarians can respond

to structure, and as such will benefit from an empathy-as-a skill training program as much as low authoritarians.

A positive correlation was obtained between the Hogan Scale for Empathy and the Defining Issues Test during the post test ($p < .01$). One possible explanation is that although students did not significantly change their perception of themselves as empathic persons (as measured by the HSE), the ones who scored higher on empathy were applying this capacity when considering issues of justice as measured by the DIT. This is in line with Selman's (1976) theory of a time-lag between the acquisition of a skill and its integration into one's cognitive structure.

The significant positive correlations between post test scores on the DIT and HSE, as well as the DIT and the IR lend support to Barrett-Lennard's (1976) analysis of the empathic process as one consisting of a number of overlapping phases, involving a cluster of structures, abilities and skills. It seems that maturity of moral judgment is one of these structures.

One may conclude that the intervention program was effective in raising the experimental subjects' level of maturity of moral judgment as measured by the DIT and their skill of communicating empathy as measured by the IR. Males and females benefitted from different aspects of the program. The two independent variables, sex and authoritarianism were unrelated to the acquisition of the skill of empathic communication.

Summing Up

What are the contributions of the present investi-
gation to the area of promoting empathic interpersonal
relationship skills in student teachers, with particular
emphasis on their application to the classroom?

1.   It seems that the theoretical part of the thesis
has gone some way towards clarifying the construct of empathy.
It was shown how different theoretical positions have led to
a variety of meanings to be attached to it. Empathy has
variously been defined as cognitive capacity to see another's
perspective; an affective sharing of another's emotion; an
interpersonal skill of communicating empathy. Based on
Barrett-Lennard's conceptualization of empathy-in-action, a
model of empathy as an interpersonal process involving a
number of phases, processes and skills was put forward.

2.   The methodological problems of measuring empathy
were discussed at length. They were related to the difficulty
of formulating a precise operational definition of the
construct.

3.   The intervention achieved the objective related
to the communication phase. The significant improvement by
the experimental group in their scores on the Index of
Responding indicated that student teachers had acquired the
skill of attending to verbal cues emitted by a helpee. They
also acquired the skill of responding to the helpee in such
a way as to indicate one's empathic understanding. As results

indicate, changes on Hogan's Scale for Empathy were insigni-
ficant, and those on the Defining Issues Test were modest.

These results need not however be viewed as
too discouraging. The study indicates that students do
not need to undergo structural change in order to develop
the skill of empathic communication, which they then may
apply in the classroom. Moreover, the practising of the
skill may stimulate structural changes. Selman (1976) has
suggested that, though in some cases a certain structural
change is a necessary condition for the development of
certain skills in the interpersonal area, in other cases
structural changes may occur synchronously as a function of
the same conditions that stimulate the acquisition of a
skill. One may speculate that the skill of empathic res-
ponding which students have acquired, when applied to the
classroom, may produce a reciprocal interaction between
pupils and teachers. Such an interaction, involving a
teacher's attending, listening and responding to pupils'
frames of reference may lead to greater focus on others'
perspectives, to an appreciation of self-other differences
and eventually to a restructuring of the way one organises
one's social world.

4. The gains on 'principled' thinking scores on
the DIT may represent a genuine extension of reciprocity
to a wider circle of people, going beyond the do's and don'ts
of a particular group to considering what do's and don'ts
would be required to develop a just, cooperative system
in terms of a whole society. This would mean that a

teacher may consider whether a rule that is fair within a middle class suburb, should be changed when considering what is fair for the wider Australian society.

5. The study has also thrown up an important question for teacher educators. Should one merely teach students about children's development and behaviour, or should one also apply a developmental education approach to promote the growth, both cognitive and social, of the future teachers themselves? Just as we have come in recent decades to focus on the development of the whole child, teacher educators may consider the development of the whole student teacher, including his/her moral, ego and interpersonal skills development.

6. The findings of this report indicate that authoritarianism is a variable negatively related to the development of empathy. Further research is required to support this finding and to investigate what other teacher behaviours and attitudes are negatively affected by authoritarianism. As already discussed, such research may point to the need to take account of this variable, among others, in selection of students for the teaching profession.

7. A question that arises in regards to the implementation of an intervention program is the timing of its initiation and its duration. Is such a program most effective when presented at the beginning of preservice teacher training, at the end, or perhaps after a year or two of teaching, when high anxiety relating to mere survival in the classroom situation has been allayed? This question requires further research.

Limitations

      1. One limitation of this research is related to the very construct of empathy and its effective measurement. Selection of evaluation measures was made from those that were available, but as discussed in Chapter 7, measures of the construct are, at this stage, inadequate.

      2. Another limitation arises from the fact that owing to administrative constraints, the investigator was unable to select random samples for the control and experimental conditions. Because of this limitation, the results of the study need to be interpreted cautiously.

      3. The other limitation arises from the fact that the use of the Relationship Inventory, chosen to assess subjects' empathic communication as actually received by their pupils, had to be abandoned due to hazards of naturalistic research (See Ch. 9, p. 300). There is thus no evidence that the skill of empathic responding, which student teachers were successfully practising among their peers under supervision, and in response to hypothetical helpee problem situations on a pencil-and-paper test (IR), did in fact transfer to real life classroom situations.

      Future researchers may consider developing observational checklists of teacher-pupil interactions, so that an assessment could be made of the efficacy of such a program in producing significant changes in teacher-pupil relationships. Such observations would need to be made at regular intervals over a period of time, so that one could note whether teachers were applying empathic skills not only in situations where a sympathetic helpee was asking for assistance, but also in situations which they found threaten-

ing in some way.

It is hoped that the above difficulties and cautions will not discourage future research from investigating the various aspects of the empathic response which seems at the core of human relations.

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APPENDIX A

Intervention Program Outline: (Week by Week)

Week 1: Pretesting - on Defining Issues Test, Hogan Scale of Empathy, Index of Responding and Questionnaire, indicating authoritarian thinking. Followed by:-

1. Group building exercises designed to help members of a small group feel more at ease and get acquainted with one another.

- subgrouping by type of activity, number of
  siblings.

- interviewing each other.

2. Lecture - Conditions which facilitate self-other understanding. (Reference to George Mead's theory of the development of the self-concept through seeing oneself from the perspective of others with whom one is involved in social interaction.)

3. Activites which allow students to known themselves better in terms of needs, feelings, expectations, desires, so they are freed for increased sensitivity to the same in others, thereby improving their interpersonal communication skills.

   i) Journal keeping (some suggestions on areas
      to focus on).

   ii) Vegetable - Fruit name game (Weinstein
       et al., 1976, 20-21).

iii) Forced Choice (Weinstein, et al, 1976, 22).
Exercises followed by processing of the experience.

Week 2:

    1. Warm up - Body language.

    2. IALAC - (I am loveable and capable), an
illustration of how self-concept gets built up or torn down.
(IALAC is an allegory developed by Sidney Simon of the Center
of Humanistic Education at the University of Massachusetts).

    3. Lecture - The Trumpet, a problem solving guidance system that may help one to gain greater self-knowledge
(Weinstein et al., 1976, 28-33).

    Game - Picker-Pickee. Processing of experience.
(Weinstein et al., 1976, 34).

    4. Brief introduction to the importance of how
seeing other people's motives   improves one's motivation
to relate to them in an empathic way - moral judgment
development.

    5. Activities:

        i) Moral dilemma discussions in small groups,
           then whole group (Appendix B).

        ii) Fantasy - Aggression Exercise. Processing
           of experience (Weinstein et al., 1976, 40-41).

        iii) Who am I - an individual brainstorming
           exercise to enable students to describe
           their own dominant self-concept style,
           (Egan, 1976, 56).

Week 3:

     1. <u>Warm up</u> - Continuun of awareness (taken from module, 'Self Awareness', <u>Professional Teacher Preparation Program</u>, University of Houston, College of Education, 1977).

     2. Activities:

        i)   Mapping some Dimensions of Your Interpersonl Style (Egan, 1976, 58).

        ii)   Me as a facilitative Person - some strategies in facilitating positive self concept in children (taken from module 'Self Concept' development, <u>Professional Teacher Preparation</u>, University of Houston, College of Education, 1977).

        iii) Moral dilemma discussions.

Week 4:

     1. <u>Lecture</u> - Introduction to the Human Resource Development Model (HRD), based on Carl Rogers' formulation of empathy as a facilitative condition. Lecture on <u>Conditions that Facilitate Interpersonal Relations</u>. Why important for teachers.

        FORMAT FOR TRAINING: PERCEIVING, DISCRIMINATING,

                          RESPONDING.

     2. Discussion of Processes that Distort Perception. Rumour Clinic exercise (Gazda, 1977, Instructor's Guide, 36-39).

     3. <u>Activity</u> - Exercises on How Do You Express Your Feelings? (Egan, 1976, 80-87).

Week 5:

1. Lecture - Significance of Nonverbal Behaviour.

2. Activities:

    i)   Role plays - representing feelings, situations.

    ii) Body Language - an exercise to acquaint
         students with a sampling of forms of non-
         verbal behaviours that carry messages
         (Egan, 1976, 100-101).

    iii) Attending and Recall - an exercise which is
         meant to help students sharpen their
         attending skills with respect to the non-
         verbal dimensions of the communication
         process (Egan, 1976, 101-102).

    iv) Training in perceiving feeling. Exercise
         on the Discrimination of Feelings and/or
         Content (Gazda, 1977).

Week 6:

1. Activities:

    i)   Exercise on the Passive Discrimination of
         Feelings (Egan, 1976, 31-34).

    ii) Exercise illustrating Barriers to Effective
         Communication.

    iii) Exercise on Think-Feel, to give students
         opportunity to distinguish between observa-
         tions, thoughts and feelings. Processing of
         above experiences.

Week 7:

      1. <u>Lecture</u> - Introduction to the Act of Responding and Empathy Training.

      2. <u>Activities</u>:

          i)   Exercises in perceiving and responding.

          ii)   Illustration of Empathy Scale.

          iii) Rating of own responses (Weinstein, 1979).

Week 8:

      1. <u>Discussion</u> of some common problems in communicating primary empathy.

      2. Illustration of Ineffective Communication Styles (Gazda, 1977, 47-50), and the Twelve Roadblocks to Communication (Gordon, 1974, 80-81).

      3. Exercise on Perceiving Empathy requiring rating of written helper responses on Empathy Scale (Gazda, 1977, 66-67).

Week 9:

      Activities:

      1. Responding with Empathy. Written responses to prepared situations (Gazda, 1977, 68-70).

      2. Verbal responding - students are asked to volunteer to role play helpee situations or classroom situations, using personally relevant material, or that of people they know. Working in triads, roles of helper, helpee and observer are alternated. Each helper is asked to respond at minimum

level 3. Interaction and processing of the experience.

  3. Moral dilemma discussions.

Week 10:

  1. Psychodrama conducted by a trained counsellor.
Students are asked to enact situations involving a pupil
whom they most fear to find in their classroom in their
ensuing teacher practice period. The drama involving the
student teacher and the threatening child is enacted.

  2. Students approach other students in their group
with whom they have least interacted throughout the semester
and explain what it is about themselves that has hindered
the relationship.

Week 11:

  1. Lecture on how different forms or role-taking
are related to how we view another person and how accurately
we can see the world from his/her perspective.

  2. Activities:

    i)   Fantasy journey (taken from module 'Self

         awareness' Professional Teacher Preparation

         Program, University of Houston, College of

         Education, 1977).

    ii) Moral dilemma discussions.

    iii) Role plays of threatening classroom

         situations (continuation of work in Week 10).

Week 12:

        Post testing of students on:

1. Defining Issues Test.

2. Hogan Scale for Empathy.

3. Index of Responding.

APPENDIX B

MORAL DILEMMAS

Moral Dilemma Discussion Format

Four major steps involved in moral dilemma discussions. Students are asked:

1. Individually write down what is the moral dilemma? Be clear on the circumstances of the story, define any difficult terms and state exactly what you see as the dilemma of the main character or characters.

2. What action should the main character take? State your reasons to support the action advocated. Now imagine how you would feel if you were in the shoes of the person being judged. How similar are you to that person? You may now want to change the course of action chosen initally as the "right" course of action.

3. Discussion in small groups. Examine, analyse and compare your choices and reasons with those of other students.

4. Reflect individually on your position and the classroom discussion of the dilemma by summarizing the various reasons which you think best explain what the main character should do.

II. MORAL DILEMMAS

In Europe, a woman was near death from cancer. One drug might save her, a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The druggist was charging $2,000.00, ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said "no". The husband got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should the husband have done that?

Why?

(Moral dilemma devised by Kohlberg)

* * *

(Moral dilemmas below devised by author:)

A gang of terrorists has kidnapped and, after delayed torture, killed a prominent public figure. They have also published a list of other well known people whom they intend to kill. Several members of the gang are captured. The law of the land does not allow capital punishment. However, there is a public outcry that the just punishment for the terrorists is death.

Should the law be changed and capital punishment reinstated to punish these people?

* * *

(This case happened in Malaysia)

A young girl is ill with cancer. She is in great pain. Her doctor refuses to give her heroin to relieve pain lest she becomes addicted to it. Two of her friends, seeing her pain, smuggle some heroin into the hospital and administer it to her secretly. The girl subsequently dies

and the two friends are charged with acting   illegally.

Should they be punished?

* * *

The Australian Medical Association has proposed to the government that heroin be imported for use with patients in severe pain, where it is the only drug which will be effective. There is, however, a risk that some of the heroin will fall into the hands of drug addicts.

The government is in a dilemma.

What is your view?

* * *

Aid of food, clothing and medicine was given by the World Council of Churches to a group of African guerilla fighters to distribute among the poor black communities to whom they have access. Some of the aid was, no doubt, retained by the guerrillas for their own use. They have been waging guerrilla warfare against the South African government which has been depriving their own people of basic human rights. On some of their raids white South African civilians and overseas church missionaries were killed.

Was the World Council of Churches justified
in giving aid to these people?

* * *

In the Malacca Straits, the freighter Hai Hong was lying at anchor with her suffering cargo of 2,500 Vietnamese refugees. For a fortnight now, the Malayasian authorities refused to allow them ashore. Last week, they were on the point of towing them back outside Malayasian territorial waters into the monsoon-torn sea. Pressure from United Nations' High Commission for Refugees won a temporary reprieve. The Malayasians agreed to let the refugees stay - in their ageing freighter if the West would give them homes quickly. Western countries were very slow to respond.

Australia had already accepted 9,000 refugees, which was the limit set by the Australian government.

There was world wide pressure on the Australian government which was closely involved in the Vietnam war, to take the extra homeless from the Hai Hong.

What should the Australian government have done?

* * *

The I.R.A. is thought to be planning a series of large scale bombings in London. Sean O'Dohorty, who is known to have links with the I.R.A., has been detained by the authorities for questioning.

If necessary, should torture be used, to extract the required information?

* * *

In 1889 the Mignonette was an English yacht which sank in a storm 1,600 miles from the nearest land. Four members of the crew, Dudley, Stepens, Brooks and Parker, of whom the first three were grown men and Parker a lad of 17 years, survived the sinking by taking an open boat. The boat was virtually without supplies. After drifting for 20 days, and all becoming very weak from their privations, Dudley, with the assent of Stephens, but not Brooks, killed Parker who was weakest of all. For four more days the three mean lived by eating Parker's body. On the 4th day they were picked up by another vessel and taken to England.

Dudley and Stephens were prosecuted for the murder of Parker. The judge stated the following facts: that if the killing and cannibalism had not taken place the three men would probably have died from starvation before rescue, and that when it did take place there was no reasonable prospect of rescue.

Should they be found guilty of murder?

* * *

EXTRACT FROM J. FOWLES, 'THE MAGUS', (PANTHER, 1976).

     Conchis was a wealthy doctor living on a small Greek island in 1940, when it was occupied by Germans. The German commandent was a most sympathetic man who loved singing and French culture.

     He asked Conchis to become the new mayor of the village. Conchis refused on theground that he wanted no involvement in the war or work along with the Nazis. The German sent out for two leading villagers and Conchis discovered that they had proposed his name. After being promised their tacit support Conchis accepted.

     What should he have done?

          * * *

     Conchis and the German officer, Lt. Kluber, came into frequent contact and came to like each other (p. 417).

     The Germans decided to "stiffen morale" in the area through S.S. Colonel Wimmel. He had a simple technique to counter the growing resistance movements in Greece. For every German wounded, ten hostages were executed. For every German killed, twenty. He had a handpicked company of "Teutonic monsters", who were known as 'die Raben ', the ravens.

     In autumn 1943, Lt. Kluber came to Conchis to report a terrible incident (p. 420), where four German soldiers were killed by Greek guerrillas who had come over from the mainland to raise morale and stiffen resistance on the Greek side. Wimmel's price list was well known and villages hoped to assuage it by finding the guerrillas.

     But Wimmel and his Ravens arrived. All men on the island between ages 14 to 75 were to be rounded up. Conchis was put under arrest. Wimmel made his terms clear: 80 hostages were to be chosen at once. The rest of the men would comb the island, find the guerrillas, and bring them back - with the stolen weapons. If villagers did that within 24 hours, the hostages would be deported to labour camps. If they did not, they would be shot.

     The healthiest males between ages twenty and forty were picked. Seventy-nine were chosen, and Wimmel pointed

to Conchis as the 80th hostage. They were herded into the
local school, without sanitation, given nothing to eat
and drink.

While the villagers stayed out all night looking
for the guerrillas among the hills and forests, the Germans
themselves had already captured the guerrillas.

The were tortured most brutally. Conchis was
told that the leader would be executed in a correct military
manner if Conchis were to persuade him to disclose the names
of his friends and to explain that he needn't feel guilty
about talking, now that he was caught (p. 420, 426, 427).

What should be have done?

* * *

When the man refused, Conchis was taken to a separate
room and given food and drink. He was assured by Wimmel that
he was not to be a hostage.

In the morning, Wimmel announced to the assembled
villagers that the hostages would be executed.

The hostages, as well as Conchis were marched to a
square, where one of the guerrillas was hanging from
branches of a tree. (p. 430).

Wimmel made Conchis a new proposition. The 80 male
villagers' lives would be spared and they would go to a
labour camp on one condition. That is, that Conchis, as
mayor of the village, would carry out in front of the
villagers the execution of the two remaining guerrillas.
The hostages began to shout frantically at Conchis to do
as told.

What should he have done?

* * *

Conchis felt that he had no choice. He knew he would be publicized widely as a Greek who co-operated with the Nazis but on the other hand how could he condemn 80 men. He raised the gun he was given and pressed the trigger. Nothing happened. A click. He pressed again, another empty click.

Wimmel explained that the gun did not fire because it was not loaded. Slowly Conchis understood that he was to club them to death.

What should he have done?

* * *

What Conchis did is described on pages 433-34.

* * *

THE STORY OF NED KELLY

Authority: "Ned Kelly, Man and Myth", Wanganatta Adult
             Education Centre, Cassell, Australia, 1968.

Ned Kelly was the eldest son of an Irish ex-convict John 'Red' Kelly and an Irish migrant Ellen Quinn. The family settled in Greta, a small town in North Eastern Victoria. They had come from the U.K. hoping to better their life but found that the same sort of people who owned land and money in England also owned in Australia. They were disappointed with the hard life that poor people had in Australia and considered many of its laws unjust. Ned's father died while he was still young. As the eldest son, Ned, at an early age had to look after his family. Particularly his younger brother Dan and his mother, whom he loved deeply.

By the time he was in his early twenties he had been twice charged with robbery with violence, had spent six months in prison for assault and indecent behaviour, three years for receiving a stolen horse. In that year he was arrested for drunkeness and charged with resisting arrest after a wild and desperate fight with four policemen. The magistrate on this occasion only fined him.

One of the four policemen, Constable Fitzpatrick, determined to 'fix' Kelly, went to his homestead and came back with the story that he had been struck over the head by Ned's mother, Mrs. Kelly. Ned later claimed that Fitzpatrick had behaved in a brutal and unmanly way to his mother. In any case, Mrs. Kelly was jailed for three years. Ned felt that the law was unjust towards poor people like his family and favoured only rich people.

Ned, mad with rage at what he considered the severe treatment of his mother, took to the hills along with his brother Dan and two other friends. Six months later four policemen were sent into the ranges to bring Ned Kelly in. They came across him at Stringybark Creek. That same day Ned shot dead three of the four policemen, Lemgan, Kennedy and Scanlon, all Irishmen. Ned later explained the shooting of the policement by saying that they had come into the bush to shoot him down like a man dog, even though they knew that he and his mother had been wronged. In the next few months that Kelly Gang, as they were now known, twice flew into a little township, help up the townspeople and robbed the local bank. Ned wanted to give some of the money to the widows and orphans and poor of Greta who needed it.

The final showdown with the police came at Glenrowan. The Kelly Gang took over the town, locked the people up in the local pub, meanwhile organising the tearing up of a railway track so that the police train which was expected would plunge into a ravine. While waiting for the train load of police to die, Kelly and his gang provided the townspeople with a festive time. The police were forewarned, however, and arrived unharmed. There ensued a battle between the police and Kelly. At one stage he appeared before the whole battery of the police, clad in his homemade armour and challenged the lot of them. He was shot down through his unprotected knees and captured.

At the trial, which was held in Central Criminal Court, Melbourne, Ned Kelly reminded the judge that a day would come at a bigger court when they would see which was right and which was wrong. He was sentenced to death for 'wilfully murdering' a Constable two years earlier at Stringybark Creek. Execution by hanging was carried out on the twenty-five year old Kelly on the eleventh of November, 1880.

QUESTIONS:

Ned thought that he was doing the right thing because of the injustice and pain that the

police had inflicted on him and his mother.

1. Do you think that his behaviour was justified?

2. Do you think that he was justly punished?

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